The social and psychological underpinnings of achieving change in intergroup relations

Társadalmi és pszichológiai tényezők szerepe a csoportközi viszonyok megváltoztatásában

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List of publications used in the doctoral dissertation

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Introduction

Social psychology has a prominent place in tackling intergroup conflicts. The main reason for this is that it offers an understanding of the connection between individual level processes and structural aspects of discriminatory practices (both in person-to-person interactions and institutionally). Where structural change is needed, individual agency becomes the drive for larger societal changes. Social psychology explains how individuals experience everyday contacts between members of different groups, as well as how they use group membership to engage in efforts for social change. There are important historical examples that highlight the intricate relationship between individual and societal level social psychological interventions. For example, Allport's contact hypothesis (1954) was not only a powerful justification for school desegregation policies following the Brown v. Board of Education decision in the US, it also clearly outlined the conditions of creating psychologically inclusive environments for Black children in the early years of desegregation (see Pettigrew, 1961). Ultimately, understanding individual level psychological processes can offer substantial contribution to changing intergroup relations effectively in society.

Psychological antecedents of intergroup hostility and prejudice

The basic tenet of social identity theory, developed in the late 1970's by Henri Tajfel (see e.g., Tajfel, 1978), is that people derive their positive self-esteem from group membership. The classic study of "minimal groups" showed that an essential aspect of this positive sense of belonging is the distinction from other groups and the tendency to both favor the ingroup and discriminate against members of other groups (i.e., out-groups). Social identity theory, therefore, suggests that the psychological need for positive self-evaluations creates an inherent obstacle to maintaining harmonious and egalitarian societies.

However, people belong to different social groups and categories ranging from small, personal groups, such as the family to larger and more abstract categories, such as the nation or even all of humanity (see Turner, 1985). Therefore, the inevitable unfavorable distinction between members of the ingroup and the out-group is shaped by the salience of certain group memberships over the others. Consequently, the salience of some group memberships has a tendency to increase hostility toward other groups (e.g., we Hungarians vs. they Romanians), whereas the salience of others can reduce it (e.g., we Europeans). The distinction between social identities that increase intergroup conflict vs. those that decrease them have been identified in

prejudice reduction methods building on common ingroup identity (see Gaertner et al., 1993) or superordinate identities (see Wenzel, Mummenday, & Waldzus, 2008).

Social categories are largely socially constructed and the product of history (i.e., history of society and science), though they can entail biological roots as well. Based on objective and socially constructed elements, we consider some groups as natural in kind (for a theory of essentialism see Prentice & Miller, 2007). People are inclined to perceive social groups as natural with underlying essences (see Rothbart & Taylor, 1992) which is in line with the concept of psychological essentialism. Psychological essentialism explains the belief of a causal relationship between unobservable essences and observable similarities (Medin & Ortony, 1989). These essentialist beliefs have an impact on intergroup attitudes (Bastian & N. Haslam, 2006). For example, essentialist beliefs can lead to higher prejudice and social exclusion of immigrants (Kadianaki & Andreouli, 2015; Zagefka, Nigbur, Gonzalez, & Tip, 2013), higher levels of sexism and acceptance of gender inequality (Morton, Postmes, S. Haslam, & Hornsey, 2009), and explain negative racial attitudes (e.g. Jayaratne et al., 2006). Psychological essentialism may indeed be one of the key mechanisms of intergroup hostility and attributional errors in connection with social categories such as race, ethnicity, and gender (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011). Beliefs in biological or genetic determinism can function as a source of prejudice, especially if traits or characteristics of group members are seen as biologically determined (Andreychik & Gill, 2015; Kahn & Fingerhut, 2011; Keller, 2005).

Based on the different perception of the origins of social categories, groups can have more or less flexible boundaries that allow a different degree of mobility from one group to another and the recognition of cross-group similarities. Groups allowing high intergroup mobility (e.g., schools, clubs, circle of friends) may still prescribe a set of formal or informal conditions for entry, such as entrance exams, place of residence, age, musical taste, etc. However, there are other groups that maintain strict boundaries and are suspicious of intergroup mobility, such as in case of gender or national categories. There are also a wide range of social categories where conditions of entry and the definition of group boundaries show high individual differences, while also reflecting culturally accepted norms, such as in the case of ethnic or racial groups. In these cases, some group members may be more open to intergroup mobility, but others feel threatened by changes in intergroup relations (see the distinction between ethnic and civic definitions of the nation that reflect both individual differences and aggregate level differences cross-culturally, Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010; described in more detail in Studies 6 and 7).

Evolutionary explanations of prejudice suggest that "the perception of possible physical or psychological harm, motivates individuals to protect themselves by flight (e.g., removal) or

fight (e.g., retaliation and escalation)" (Blascovich et al., 2000, p. 22). Threat can be experienced both on an individual and on a group level and can come from various sources that result in increased anxiety and a decreased sense of security (Nash, McGregor, & Prentice, 2011). Stephan and Stephan (2000) identify four types of threats: realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotypes. Realistic threats are constituted by direct threats to the ingroup's existence in a physical or material sense. Symbolic threats are based on differences in morals, values, beliefs and ideologies. Intergroup anxiety reflects the negative affective component of potentially troubling and uncertain intergroup interactions. Finally, negative stereotypes encompass the negative expectations about the behavior of out-group members. The integrated threat theory outlines the different causes of prejudice in connection with different target groups, and suggests that specific intergroup contexts evoke different types of threats. A meta-analysis of 95 studies found that all four types of threat specified by integrated threat theory (and additionally group esteem threat following Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) were moderately to highly correlated (r = .35–.59) with negative out-group attitudes (Riek et al., 2006).

According to Neuberg and Schaller (2016), different prejudicial reactions are connected with different kinds of threats from an evolutionary perspective, and stereotyped cues are the sources of the particular threats that a group represents which then lead to different affective (fear, anger, and disgust) and behavioral reactions (escape, confrontation, condemnation). It is for this reason that visibly different out-groups are more readily subject to mistaken threat perceptions (literally a false alarm, Neuberg & Schaller, 2016). Stangor and Crandall's (2000) stigma-as-threat theory arrives at the conclusion that, while some characteristics are considered to be universally dangerous and threatening, and may therefore provide a direct link between threat avoidance and stigma, the characteristics that tend to be stigmatized are subject to great variability within and between cultures and across time. Consequently, the universal motivation to avoid danger leads to culturally constructed and socially shared perceptions of threat.

Symbolic threat is about protecting what is normal and accepting, establishing and maintaining the concept of "us" and "them", me and the other, as they are based on perceived intergroup differences in values, norms, and beliefs (Velasco González, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008). The separation of groups defined in cultural, ethnic, political, religious terms or on the basis of illness, disability or disfigurement can be seen to underpin the social order and define normality for the mainstream. Although such separation provides one level of certainty, the existence of these excluded groups also evoke intergroup anxiety and concern about personal threat to mainstream group members. Kristeva and Roudiez' (1982) concept of

abjection (see also Douglas's, 1966, work on the cultural interpretations of cleanness) grasps the bodily basis of aversion and its metaphorical meaning at the same time. While the abject (defined as something causing revulsion by violating the boundaries of the self, such as the sight of a corpse) and dirt disturb the individual on a personal and bodily level, there is a social consensus about the disturbing/disgusting character of the object that maintains social order and the boundaries of normality. Therefore, in the absence of realistic or tangible threats, symbolic threat can provoke feelings of disgust, as well as fear and anger. In sum, perceiving groups as threatening is connected to both evolutionary explanations of danger avoidance and socially shared perceptions (i.e., social norms). Regardless of its source, higher levels of threat perception lead to more and more overtly expressed prejudice. Moreover, expressed prejudice in response to high threat may not even be recognized as prejudice (McDonald & Crandall, 2015). Instead, the holders of these views "present their beliefs, actions and feelings about out-groups as the unbiased observation of reasonable people" (Durrheim et al., 2016, p. 26).

Importantly, individual differences in the perception of group boundaries and the threat presented by out-groups account for individual differences in intergroup attitudes as well. This suggests that social psychological interventions can be effective in changing intergroup relations across different settings by changing individual perception, but interventions need to take contextual factors into account, and acknowledge normative, cultural and biological factors that influence the shared perception of groups and intergroup relations.

Social identity, as the drive to change the intergroup status quo

Social and collective identities are among the most important drivers of activism (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010). According to social identity theory (SIT), when members of minority groups cannot achieve positive self-esteem through individual strategies; see no possibility for social mobility; and consider the social system illegitimate, yet transformable, they are more likely to engage in social competition in the form of collective action in order to change the situation of their ingroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

In most cases, social identities become politicized in the process leading to collective action. In the course of politicization, group members become aware of the shared grievances of the group, identify an external enemy and blame that for their grievances. The political consciousness which is formulated in the process has four components: „(1) a sense that one's fate is linked to that of other members of a group or category (gays, farmers, women, blacks); (2) discontent with the power and influence of the group; (3) a belief that power differentials are a result of structural rather than individuals factors; and (4) a collective orientation toward

redressing these inequities" (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010, p. 177). Collective identity refers to the same phenomenon as the classical concept of social identity, however its general use emphasizes the emotional and cognitive aspects of belonging to a specific social group or community, therefore it regards group membership not only as a source of reference for self-definition, but also as a direct source of political action especially in connection with movements based on identity politics.

Social or collective identity may be the most commonly identified predictor of collective action (see Simon, 2010 for a review, and van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008 for a meta-analysis). According to the re-analysis of 182 previous studies, social identity (r=.34) and especially politicized collective identity (r=.43) showed moderately strong correlations with attitudes toward collective identity, intention to participate and actual collective action. Two further factors were relevant – perceived efficacy and perceived injustice, which also impact collective action through identity (van Zomeren et al., 2008) and can be equated with Tajfel's original suggestion about perceiving the intergroups status quo illegitimate, but believing in transforming it.

Importantly, identities can become politicized not only in relation to social identities based on sociologically defined categories, but also as a consequence of opinion-based group memberships (Thomas, McGarty & Mavor, 2009). Such opinion based groups are formed on the basis of a shared conceptualization about how to change the social order to become more fair and just from the perspective of the ingroup. Consequently, opinion based identities are both the precursors of collective or political actions and their outcome (see McGarty et al., 2014). In summary, the concept of opinion based identities highlight both the importance of social categories in engagement for social change action and its limits, as opinion based identities do not necessarily overlap with pre-existing social categories and identities.

Changing intergroup relations by prejudice reduction and by social change-oriented action

Most social psychological interventions are applied either to intergroup contexts in which the groups are or had been in open conflict, or to contexts in which the groups occupy different societal positions, one of them being a higher-status advantaged group, whereas the other, a lower-status disadvantaged group. The main reason that most interventions do not distinguish between these two vastly different contexts is that these intergroup situations tend to share important psychological consequences. Moreover, they tend to overlap in real life. The case of

hate-crimes against historically disadvantaged groups, police brutality against members of the Black community in the US and in Europe clearly attests to the connection between the two. With other words, in structurally unequal situations, open conflicts become part of the everyday practice that members of the disadvantage group experience. Another example is the situation of Roma people in Europe. Roma people are affected by structural inequalities in society, the prevalence of anti-Gypsyism suggests that effective interventions need to include elements both of conflict reduction and antidiscrimination. Roma people are treated as a "dissident" out-group and not as a "derogated" group in Hungary, which suggests that they are viewed as challenging the status quo, referring to the possibility of open conflict, not just structural inequalities (see Hadarics & Kende, 2018).

Interventions with an aim to change existing intergroup relations can be distinguished by their scope, as they aim to achieve change at different levels, by targeting individual, intergroup, or societal level change, and they can be distinguished by their overall goal of creating *social cohesion* (i.e., striving for an improvement for all members of society and creating harmony), or striving to change existing intergroup relations through *social competition* or collective action.

These goals (social cohesion vs. social competition) may both represent intentions to improve intergroup relations, however, striving for both simultaneously may not be possible. Social disapproval of prejudice and normative expectations to live in intergroup harmony – prevalent in prejudice reduction interventions and integration policies – may result in blurring intergroup differences and lead to reduced efforts for social change among members of disadvantaged groups (see Becker, Zawadzki, & Shields, 2014; Dixon et al., 2012; Durrheim, Jacobs, & Dixon, 2014; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Mobilization of minority groups is dependent on the recognition of similarities and the common sources of injustices, as politicized collective identities emerge if group members recognize their shared grievances and sources of injustices (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). This recognition is straightforward when intergroup hostility is overtly expressed, but more nuanced where prejudice is veiled. Thus, when interventions strive to reduce overt prejudice because it fuels direct discrimination and violence, they may create a social and political context in which veiled prejudice becomes the obstacle for social change through its sedative effect on the mobilization of minority groups. Interventions should therefore be mindful of these two, somewhat contradictory routes to achieving social change.

Individual level interventions aim to change people's attitudes, biased perceptions and emotions toward members of other groups. Individual interventions do not usually require direct contact with members of other groups. They work with the assumption that prejudice is a result of how we process information (motivated information processing) and it is a normal part of human cognition that serves our basic motivation to understand and control our environment, and to connect with others (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981). However, given our limited cognitive capacities and tendency to simplify and categorize social information, we often generalize our experiences and create shortcuts dividing the world into "us" and "them". We develop biased perceptions that put "us" (ourselves and others similar to us) in a more positive light and categorize "them" as more negative (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Other cognitive shortcuts lead to reinforce these generalizations (i.e., stereotypes). Furthermore, we have a tendency to select and process information that confirms our existing knowledge, making our biased perceptions highly resistant to change. Therefore, interventions that target negative stereotypes about out-groups will be more difficult to implement, compared to interventions that focus on our more varied and immediate emotional responses or potential behaviors.

Intergroup-level interventions concentrate directly on groups and group-level processes, and most often involve contact between members of different groups. These interventions build on the assumption that prejudice is not a mere consequence of individual-level bias, the cognitive ways of processing information and relating to the world. Instead, people's prejudices are assumed to be connected to the psychological consequences of group membership, specifically, to the comparison between members of ingroups and out-groups. In other words, we live in a world defined by multiple groups that we all belong to, and we navigate our society by making group-based comparisons. We aim to see ourselves in a more positive light (gain self-esteem from these intergroup comparisons), and thus are motivated to value our own group at the cost of derogating other groups (Tajfel, 1978).

However, people actively construct their social world and, and therefore, their biased, negative and often homogenizing perception of out-groups can change when people obtain new and positive experiences with members of other groups. Therefore, when engaging in positive cross-groups interactions (through intergroup contact, cross-group friendships or desegregation policies), people reevaluate their own groups, or become aware of the fact that we all belong to many distinct but overlapping social categories. This blurs the distinction between the previous "us versus them" and allows for recategorizations in the new "us".

Societal-level interventions take broader social processes, structural inequalities and social norms into consideration. They do not focus directly on prejudice reduction or creating harmony in society, but on status differences between groups, injustice in society, values like cultural diversity and potential for structural and social change. In everyday encounters people rarely take a broader perspective and reflect on structural inequalities, therefore societal-level interventions work by raising awareness of the connection between individual attitudes and societal processes or use a more indirect approach and create conditions for developing more favorable attitudes. The importance of these interventions grew out of recent understanding of the demobilization effect of intergroup contact on members of disadvantaged groups (see e.g., Wright & Lubensky, 2009) and identifying the importance of bringing the discussion of structural inequalities directly into interventions (Becker et al., 2013).

The effectiveness of interventions is highly influenced by the social-political normative context that can both facilitate and hinder the desired outcome (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Prejudice reduction interventions are most effective in social contexts in which the positive change is supported by norms. Such support can be offered by authorities that prescribe appropriate behaviors for example by legal measures and public discourse and by so called descriptive norms, which is a reflection of what most people think and do (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). However, when intergroup hostility is expressed in blatant forms, it also creates a non-supportive context for any kind of change. One study, for example, found that awareness raising can most easily be done through group discussions which is easy to implement in schools. The method works because participants can influence and encourage each other in endorsing positive attitude change and supportive norms for behaviors on behalf of groups in need (Thomas & McGarty, 2009). However, this method could be less effective in the absence of consensus about values of diversity and the norms of non-prejudice. Therefore, in countries with weaker egalitarian norms and the lack of endorsement of diversity and multiculturalism, such methods may even backfire, as members of a group can reinforce each other's prejudicial views about the out-group, which appear as the norm. Because of this, the theoretical insights from decades of prejudice reduction interventions may be extremely important, their application to the situation of specific intergroup settings, such as Roma people or Muslim immigrants in Europe need to be carefully considered and tested empirically.

The aims of the research

The aim of the dissertation is to highlight the intricate connection between social identities and intergroup relations in specific intergroup contexts. For this, we need to have an understanding of the nature of intergroup hostility, where it comes from, what kind of psychological needs it fulfills in a particular social and political context. This aim is fulfilled in connection with Roma people in Hungary. The reason for this is partly because this is the largest ethnic minority group in Europe, and in Hungary, in particular, and also because anti-Gypsyism has only recently been acknowledged as a unique form of prejudice by European stakeholders (See ECRI, 2011) and even less acknowledged by social psychological enquiry. My research also intends to highlight the importance of understanding the psychological characteristics of anti-Gypsyism from an applied viewpoint, in order to contribute to the effective of prejudice reduction interventions and interventions aiming to promote Roma inclusion and access.

The second part of the dissertation deals with issues concerning social identification processes, both in terms of content and mode of identification. The research aims to show that higher identification may be closely connected to intergroup hostility in line with social identity theory, however, not all forms of social identities predict hostile intergroup attitudes, in fact specific content and especially in combination with specific mode of identification can lead to and predict higher pro-social intentions, and intentions to change the intergroup status quo. These studies investigate national vs. European identification, attachment vs. glorification, and civic vs. ethnic definitions of the ingroup (i.e. the nation).

Finally, the last study brings into question whether classical forms of collective action represents the sole route to social change when analyzing the motivations of volunteers within the refugee crisis. The study investigates the role of moral motivations and opinion based identities as forms of politicized social identities to show that there are alternative social and psychological routes to bringing about social change, besides striving for harmony via prejudice reduction and striving for change via collective action.

Overview of the studies

Study 1

National and European policies aim to facilitate the integration of Roma people into mainstream society. Yet, Europe's largest ethnic group continues to be severely discriminated against. Although prejudice has been identified to be at the core of this failure, social

psychological research on anti-Gypsyism remains scarce. In this study, we present empirical findings showing that anti-Gypsyism is a unique form of prejudice because (a) it reflects socially approved dominant societal norms; (b) intergroup contact increases rather than decreases prejudice; and (c) not just negative stereotyping, but also cultural distancing of Roma people is a form of social exclusion. We present the development of an integrative Attitudes Toward Roma Scale (ATRS) based on existing measures and theoretical assumptions about prejudice toward Roma people. We relied on student and community samples in Hungary and Slovakia (N = 1082). Exploratory factor analysis revealed and confirmatory factor analysis supported the structural equivalence of a three-factor solution of the 16-item scale, consisting of *Blatant Stereotyping, Undeserved Benefits*, and *Cultural Difference*.

Our findings confirmed that intergroup contact with Roma people is associated with more negative attitudes, and prejudice is mostly expressed in blatantly negative ways, made possible by social contexts that approve of these beliefs. The analysis also revealed that essentialist, romanticized ideas of cultural differences between Roma and non-Roma populations contribute to the psychological distancing of Roma people from the national ingroup.

Study 2

Study 2 presents the results of research conducted across six European countries using student and community samples (N = 2,089; Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Norway, Italy, Spain) to understand how anti-Gypsyism among majority-group members predicts unfavorable acculturation preferences toward Roma people. Openly negative stereotypes predicted acculturation preferences strongly across the countries. However, stereotypes about the Roma receiving undeserved benefits were also relevant to some degree in East-Central Europe, implying that intergroup relations there are framed as realistic conflict. Stereotypes about traditional Roma culture did not play a central role in acculturation preferences. Our findings highlighted that anti-Gypsyism may be an impediment to integration efforts, but efforts should be context-specific rather than pan-national.

Study 3

Although intergroup friendships have been shown to reduce prejudice, little research considered whether interventions fostering intergroup friendship would be effective in highly prejudicial contexts. Based on the findings of Study 1, we made cautious predictions about the effectivity of contact-based interventions, and focused on contact that is essentially positive and has the most potential to overwrite existing barriers: intergroup friendship. We conducted a

quasi-experiment ($N = 61$) to test whether a contact-based intervention based on intergroup friendship could reduce bias against Roma people among non-Roma Hungarians. Participants in the contact condition engaged in a face-to-face interaction with a Roma person, and responded to questions involving mutual self-disclosure. Through pre- and post-test questionnaires, we observed significant positive change in attitudes and contact intentions among participants in the contact condition, while these effects were not observed among participants in the control condition. Positive change was moderated by perceived institutional norms, which corroborates the potential of contact-based interventions.

Study 4 and 5

Moving away from anti-Gypsyism, we looked at the psychological and social antecedents of anti-immigrant attitudes, using a social identity approach. Anti-immigrant attitudes are not only widespread among Eurosceptic nationalists, but also among people who feel that immigration threatens European values and identity. We therefore assumed that the connection between nationalism and xenophobia could only partially explain the rise of hostile attitudes in the post-2015 period. In two online surveys ($N = 1160$) we compared how (a) glorification vs. attachment and (b) national vs. European identity can predict anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes in Hungary.

In study 4, national and European glorification predicted higher anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim prejudice. However, attachment with Europe predicted positive, while attachment with Hungary predicted negative attitudes toward immigrants. We replicated this pattern in study 5, and found that the different predictions of national vs. European identities were mediated by attitudes toward the EU. Eurosceptic attitudes were associated with increased hostility toward both immigrants and Muslim people and reflected a perceived contradiction between the interest of the nation and that of the EU.

We conclude that for a better understanding of intergroup hostility toward Muslim immigrants in Europe, we need to simultaneously consider the psychological phenomenon of ingroup glorification and the values and norms of the social categories with which people identify.

Study 6 and 7

Further exploring how social identities shape intergroup relations, we investigated how the content of national identity influences intergroup action intentions. Europe has witnessed a polarization of intergroup attitudes and action tendencies in the context of the refugee crisis of

2015 and the rise of right-wing populism. Participation in both pro-minority collective action and right-wing nationalist movements has increased among members of ethnic majority groups. We analyzed these collective action intentions toward Roma people and Muslim immigrants in Hungary related to concepts of citizenship. In an online survey relying on a probabilistic sample that is demographically similar to the Hungarian population (N = 1069), we tested whether relying on the concept of ethnic citizenship predicted higher intentions to engage in pro-majority collective action and lower intentions to engage in pro-minority collective action, and whether the connection was mediated by fear and empathy. We expected that the connections would be the opposite for civic citizenship. Our results supported the hypotheses, but we found that the ethnic definition was a stronger predictor of intergroup action intentions toward the immigrant group, and the civic definition a stronger predictor in the case of the Roma minority group. Therefore, in study 7 (N = 320) we collected experimental evidence to show that civic and ethnic citizenship affected both types of collective action tendencies. We found that the manipulation had an effect on the concept of citizenship only in the ethnic dimension, nevertheless influenced pro-minority collective action intentions, especially in the presence of high empathy and low fear in the expected direction, that is, pro-minority collective action intentions were higher in the civic citizenship condition than in the ethnic citizenship condition. The effect was not found with regard to pro-majority collective action intentions. These findings highlight the potential consequences of nationalist rhetoric on intergroup action intentions and point out both the scope and the limits of influencing its effect.

Study 8

Finally, in exploring the psychological motivations of behavior to change existing intergroup relations, I present a study conducted among volunteers in the refugee crisis of 2015. The refugee crisis in the summer of 2015 mobilized thousands of volunteers in Hungary to help refugees on their journey through Europe despite the government's hostile stance. We collected data using an online questionnaire (*N* = 1459) among people who supported the refugees to test whether the motivations for volunteerism were similar to the motivations for political activism. Hierarchical regression analysis and mediation analysis revealed the similarities, and identified the presence of opinion based identity and moral convictions as predictors of both types of actions, but also highlighted that previous activism and previous volunteerism shaped engagement. We therefore argue that volunteers and political activists are not necessarily different by virtue of their motivations but that they choose different actions to alleviate the

problems embedded in the intergroup situation. Implications for other asymmetrical politicized

intergroup conflicts are discussed.

Dominant social norms enable the expression of prejudice: The case of anti-Gypsyism in East-Central Europe[1]

Anti-Gypsyism is prevalent and severe on a personal, institutional, and state level in many European countries, especially in Eastern Europe where Roma people constitute a large ethnic minority group. A racially motivated serial killing in Hungary, expulsion of Roma people from France and Italy, walls built to fence off the Roma population in cities in the Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia, the overrepresentation of Roma children in special education, and of Roma in prisons all demonstrate the depth of the problem (see e.g., Barberet & García-España, 1997; Brügemann & Škobla, 2014; Kende & Neményi, 2006). The Roma are an ethnically, linguistically, and culturally diverse group with a long history of severe discrimination, marginalization, and poverty (Feischmidt, Szombati, & Szuhay, 2013; Fraser, 1995; Ladányi, 2001; Pogány, 2006). Both before and following the Porrajmos (the Roma Holocaust in the Second World War which cost two to five hundred thousand lives, Hancock, 2004), the history of the Roma minority attested to different waves of forced and unsuccessful assimilation and ethnic tensions resulting in widespread discrimination in all areas of social life (see Barany, 2000; Filčák, Szilvasi, & Škobla, 2017).

Anti-Gypsyism is a key factor in the maintenance of the marginalized position of Roma people in Europe. Anti-Gypsyism refers to the biased, generalized perception of Roma people (e.g. stereotypes), negative emotions (such as indifference, threat, fear), and negative intentions (e.g. discrimination, verbal expression of hostility, unequal treatment and the absence of helping and benevolent intentions) towards them. The problem is that efforts for the economic and social integration of Roma remain futile, if the majority society opposes their integration and prefers either that Roma people live in segregation or completely assimilate into the majority society (Stewart, 2012). In this context, politicians tend to be reluctant to take on issues to improve the situation of Roma people, especially if it requires efforts and resources from members of the majority population, and in the presence of the electorate's prejudicial attitudes. In short, this social-political context enables that individual level anti-Gypsyism concurs with institutional levels of discrimination (FRA, 2018). Furthermore, public actors and politicians often use anti-Roma sentiments for political mobilization, creating a context in which anti-

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[1] This chapter is based on the following publication: Kende, A., Hadarics, M., & Lášticová, B. (2017). Anti-Roma attitudes as expressions of dominant social norms in Eastern Europe. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *60*, 12-27.

Gypsyism is accepted and acceptable. Within this normative context, the expressions of both solidarity and social change in favor of the Roma are hindered.

Although the situation of the Roma attracted a great deal of attention among ethnographers, cultural anthropologists, and sociologists, there have been few studies by social psychologists on anti-Roma attitudes as a form of prejudice (for some exceptions see Bigazzi, 2012; Dunbar & Simonova, 2003; Hnilica & Radová, 2013; Ljujic, Vedder, Dekker, & van Geel, 2013; Váradi, 2014; Villano, Fontanella, Fontanella, & Di Donato, 2017). Consequently, there is a lack of understanding of the psychological processes involved in anti-Gypsyism, and how these attitudes relate to other forms of racial and ethnic bias. Ljujic, Vedder, Dekker, and van Geel (2012) suggested that anti-Gypsyism has unique characteristics, as the phenomenon can only be partially explained by generalized group based enmity (Zick et al., 2008). We therefore set out to investigate the psychological mechanisms of prejudice against Roma people in the Eastern European social context from a social psychological perspective.

Anti-Gypsyism as a Special Form of Ethnic Bias

Anti-Gypsyism is most commonly expressed as blatant prejudice and in the form of prejudice denial. The coexistence of these two forms of prejudice expression may seem contradictory, but they can be explained by the motivation that people would like to appear non-prejudiced, and consider the endorsement of negative stereotypes as justified by personal experiences and not the result of prejudice (see Durrheim, Quayle, & Dixon, 2016). Therefore, people may agree with overgeneralized negative statements about Roma people, but would still not consider themselves prejudiced. In fact, the more prejudiced an individual is, the more likely they would deny even the existence of prejudice in society against a group.

Blatant prejudice means the endorsement of traditional negative stereotypes about the lifestyle of Roma people from a moral perspective (depicting them as lazy or as criminals; see Kende et al., 2017; Villano et al., 2017), and depicting Roma people as less than human (i.e. dehumanizing them, see Pérez, Moscovici, & Chulvi, 2007; Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015). The problem with blatant anti-Gypsyism is that on the one hand, it creates a direct obstacle to equal treatment and harmonious relations between individuals, and on the other hand, it promotes explicit social norms in which maltreatment and discrimination of Roma people appear acceptable and justified by the characteristics associated with the group.

In contrast, *prejudice denial* is a more invisible form of anti-Gypsyism that nonetheless contributes to the maintenance of an unequal status quo. Importantly, prejudice denial not only

denies discriminatory practices, it also fuels the idea that Roma people receive too many undeserved benefits whenever efforts are made to enhance Roma inclusion (Kende, Hadarics, & Lášticová, 2017). Prejudice denial might not lead to direct violence, but it can maintain individual and institutional practices and policy decisions that perpetuate inequality. This form of prejudice is invisible for those who are motivated to maintain the current status quo (typically the non-Roma population) which makes it difficult to address the problem by those who are affected by it. Prejudice denial is directly reflected in colorblind policy decisions that also deny the existence of historical disadvantages, structural discrimination and is manifested as attempting to solve problems merely as social issues (for example, addressing school dropout without tackling racism as a reason for this; see Weinerová, 2014).

While anti-Gypsyism is prevalent in all countries of Europe, the distribution of blatant prejudice and prejudice denial varies across the continent. Blatant anti-Gypsyism is present all over Europe, albeit to a different degree, but the combination of blatant anti-Gypsyism and prejudice denial, specifically the idea that Roma people receive too many benefits, is only common in East-Central Europe. Roma people represent a relatively large and growing percentage of the population in these countries, and therefore are often perceived as a threat to the welfare of the country (Kende et al, 2017; 2020). Therefore, prejudice reduction should mainly focus on altering negative stereotypes about the Roma in European countries with a small Roma population where the main obstacle is blatant prejudice, while also addressing both the issue of negative stereotypes and threat perceptions that derive from the belief in a competition over limited resources in East-Central Europe.

The overt expression of prejudice is counternormative in societies with egalitarian social values, putting pressure on individuals to act in prejudice-free ways (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Durrheim et al., 2016). In these societies, people are motivated to appear non-prejudiced to suppress its expression in order to conform to the general egalitarian norms (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Therefore, one important question related to anti-Gypsyism is whether people feel that their negative reactions to Roma are justifiable according to accepted social norms. This would mean that egalitarian social norms do not apply to Roma—non-Roma relations, and prejudice against them can be openly expressed.

The level of external or internal motivation to appear non-prejudiced determines whether existing negative feelings are expressed openly or remain suppressed. High external motivation to respond without prejudice would reflect that the individual is exhibiting public conformity to social norms, while internal motivation to respond without prejudice is a sign of internalized

non-prejudicial attitudes (Plant & Devine, 1998). Interestingly however, in intergroup contexts in which prejudice is perceived as appropriate, high external motivation and low internal motivation lead to open rather than suppressed expression of prejudice (Forscher, Cox, Gaertz, & Devine, 2015). The importance of social norms and the normative appropriateness of prejudice have been underlined by studies that established strong correlations between perceived prejudicial norms and either individually reported levels of prejudice or approval of discrimination (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002).

There is evidence that anti-Gypsyism is expressed in overt and explicit ways in public discourse, in the media, in policy decisions and institutional practices all over Europe (Kertesi & Kézdi, 2011; Podolinská & Hrustič, 2015; Kroon, Kluknavská, Vliegenthart, & Boomgaarden, 2016; Vidra & Fox, 2014). Numerous studies used measures of overt expressions of prejudice to tap into the issue. Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, and Cotterill (2015) found that a blatant dehumanization scale was a valid measure of anti-Gypsyism, and predicted discriminatory behavioral tendencies beyond subtler prejudice measures. Most research on anti-Roma attitudes has relied on items reflecting explicitly negative statements about criminality and laziness (e.g., the anti-Roma attitude scale created by Enyedi, Fábián, and Sik, 2004 is the most cited measure of anti-Gypsyism in Hungary).

Related to the normative context that encourages rather than discourages the expression of hostility toward Roma people, the conditions for intergroup contact between non-Roma and Roma people are suboptimal from the perspective of prejudice reduction (as described by Allport, 1954). According to Reicher (2012), positive intergroup contact is often the consequence of societal changes brought about by disadvantaged groups through social competition, rather than the dominant group's intentions for change. Therefore, the positive effect of intergroup contact is unlikely to occur in the absence of strong social movements, without legal and institutional support, and in a context where the multiculturalist ideal is either non-existent or it does not apply to Roma people (Kende, Tropp, & Lantos, 2017; Lášticová & Findor, 2016; Mahoney, 2011; Podolinská, & Hrustič, 2015). Consequently, intergroup contact between non-Roma and Roma people is likely to lead to negative rather than positive experiences (Gallová Kriglerová & Kadlečíková, 2009; Rosinský, 2009). Although Váradi (2014) and Orosz, Bánki, Bőthe, Tóth-Király, and Tropp (2016) provided empirical evidence for the positive generalized effect of contact, their studies used special types of contact situations (existing intergroup friendships and trained minority participants respectively). Correlational studies report a negative association between contact frequency and prejudice,

and point out that anti-Gypsyism is higher in areas with a higher Roma population (see, e.g., Enyedi & Todosijevic, 2002).

The negative effect of intergroup contact may also be related to threat based on realistic conflict (the connection between threat and conflict is described by the integrated threat theory by Stephan & Stephan, 2000). A higher concentration of Roma in particular geographical locations often coincides with higher unemployment and poverty rates, resulting in conflicts based on limited available resources (Mušinka, Škobla, Hurrle, Matlovičová, & Kling, 2014). Commonly held stereotypes reinforce the idea that Roma people are a threat to society. Loveland and Popescu (2016) argue that social distance with Roma people is dependent on the institutional and individual adoption of the so-called "Gypsy Threat Narrative" portraying Roma people as a danger and burden to society.

Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ (2010) list the macro factors – increase in size, multiple distinguishing characteristics, and leading politicians endorsing anti-out-group sentiments – that contribute to increased threat levels for high contact groups, and to reduced chances of generalizable experiences of positive contact. They suggest that the degree of segregation and the perceived size of the out-group determine whether contact with a large minority group leads to positive or negative outcomes. Roma people are often subject to the combined influence of forming relatively large, but spatially segregated communities (Kligman, 2001; Rusnáková & Rochovská, 2014). Furthermore, the unclear size of the Roma population may contribute to this effect. Census data based on self-identification tends to underestimate for fear of ethnic registration, while politicians and the media tend to overestimate the number in order to exaggerate the problem and threat (Clark, 1998). In sum, quality of contact may be a more accurate predictor of anti-Gypsyism than contact frequency (Hewstone et al., 2008; Paolini et al., 2012).

Anti-Gypsyism has a third element that is less likely to appear in prejudice research, which is mainly concerned with negative stereotypes and discrimination. ***The absence of cultural recognition,*** or the misrecognition of Roma people creates barriers for inclusion on top of more traditional forms of prejudice. Cultural recognition is not identical to folklorizing Roma culture, equating Roma people with an innate talent for music or maintaining a romantic image of the carefree life of "nomadic" Roma people (López Catalán, 2012; Villano et al., 2017). Even if these images tend to be positive, they tie Roma people to the past and culturally distance them (Kligman, 2001; Sigona, 2005). Cultural recognition, on the other hand, acknowledges the cultural autonomy of Roma people, encouraging, rather than ignoring

cultural heritage without assuming identities that they do not identify with, or do not identify with in every context (see Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011).

Although Roma people are a culturally and linguistically diverse group (Kemény & Janky, 2006), majority societies disregard the internal variability and the dynamic nature of Roma cultures (Stewart, 2013). Cultural stereotypes either folklorize them by emphasizing traditional culture, or depict them through cultural deficits: the culture of poverty or being uncivilized (Weinerová, 2014). Pérez, Moscovici, and Chulvi (2007) describe the situation of Roma people across Europe through the process of ontologization (i.e., replacing the human category with a non-human category), which excludes the Roma from the human ingroup, and places them with nature on the nature-culture dimension. This exclusion justifies discrimination and prevents intergroup contact by representing it as unnatural (see Chryssochoou & Marcu, 2005). Villano et al. (2017) revealed the two-dimensional nature of attitudes toward the Roma in the Italian context, suggesting that their negative image on the morality dimension (i.e., stereotypes about criminality and laziness) is supplemented by a more positive and romantic, yet distancing image of cultural differences.

This need for distinction through ethno-cultural differentiation is strongly connected to national identity and nationalism (Dimitrova, Buzea, Ljujic, & Jordanov, 2015). This is especially the case in contexts where the majority population has an unstable and threatened national identity (Breakwell, 2010; Stejskalová, 2012), resulting in exclusive rather than inclusive group identity (Minescu, Hangdoorn, & Poppe, 2008; Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, & Schmidt, 2012). The concept of threatened identity and the prevalence of exclusive ingroup identification has been used in the Eastern European context, as a place caught between the East and the West, characterized by a history of occupations and repressions (Bigazzi & Csertő, 2015; Minescu et al., 2008).

In sum, there are three principal features of anti-Roma attitudes that warrant the attention of social psychologists: (a) the role of dominant social norms in shaping attitudes toward the Roma, (b) the role of contact in connection with a large minority group that lives in various degrees of separation, and (c) the role of national identity in defining the perception of the Roma out-group.

Measurement of Attitudes toward the Roma in Previous Studies

Anti-Roma attitudes have mostly been measured using generic scales, such as Bogardus's scale of social distance, the feeling thermometer (for both see, e.g., Enyedi et al., 2004),

dehumanization scale (Kteily, et al. 2015), or the modern racism scale (Orosz et al., 2016). Although some studies developed scales for the purpose of grasping the specific characteristics of anti-Gypsyism in terms of emotions (Hnilica & Radová, 2013; Ljujic et al., 2013), and stereotypes (Lášticová & Findor, 2016; Dunbar & Simonova, 2003; Váradi, 2014), these scales were not created with the goal of revealing all aspects of anti-Gypsyism described in previous literature, nor were they tested for validity.

Nonetheless, previous studies offer valuable insights into anti-Gypsyism. Ljujic et al. (2013) found that negative emotions toward Roma people are strongly related to economic and symbolic threat, and to nationalism among Serbian adolescents. Dunbar and Simonova (2003), and Enyedi and Todosijevic (2002) highlighted the importance of right-wing authoritarianism in predicting negative stereotypes and approval of discrimination. Surveys from Hungary and Slovakia reveal an overall high level of prejudice among the general population (e.g., Csepeli, 2010; Enyedi, Fábián, & Sik, 2004; European Commission, 2015; Ljujic et al., 2012; Vašečka, 2002), and among specific ideological (such as the extreme right, see Bernát, Juhász, Krekó, & Molnár, 2012; Halász, 2009), and professional groups (the police: Székelyi, Csepeli, & Örkény, 2001; health care professionals: Babusik, 2005; teachers: Kusá, Kostlán, & Rusnáková, 2010; Rosinský, 2009).

While research in Eastern Europe has focused on the negative stereotypes and open hostility toward Roma people, studies from Italy reveal the two-dimensionality of attitudes toward the Roma. It is found to encompass both the negative stereotypes related to criminality, and a romantic ideal of free and nomadic people (Villano et al., 2017). This culturally distancing positive image of the Roma also functions as a justification for their marginalization (Sigona, 2005). Bigazzi (2012) analyzed the social representations of Roma people in both Hungarian and Italian samples. Her findings pointed out important differences in the group's representations, not only in terms of content but also in the sense that the (hegemonic) representation of Roma people is an integral part of the Hungarian national identity; while in Italy, it focuses on the intergroup relationship between right-wing and left-wing people (as a polemic representation) and includes both positive and negative elements.

We set out to investigate attitudes toward Roma people in two Eastern European cultural contexts: Hungary and Slovakia. Both of these countries have a large Roma minority population (around 5-10% of the population). Both countries are members of the European Union, adopted anti-discrimination laws, and participated in the "Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015" program to improve the socio-economic status and the overall integration of Roma people.

Despite governmental and non-governmental initiatives, Roma people are disadvantaged and discriminated against in the area of education, employment, and health care. Moreover, violence against them is on the rise as political conditions such as populist ideologies encourage rather than combat the expressions of hate (see EU-MIDIS Report, 2009, FXB center for Health and Human Rights, 2014).

Research on anti-Gypsyism in these two countries of Eastern Europe is justified by the fact that the Roma constitute a large and severely discriminated minority group in this region, and that efforts to tackle social problems related to the group have been largely unsuccessful or non-durable. Furthermore, a better understanding of anti-Gypsyism in Hungary and Slovakia can shed light on a more general phenomenon related to the openly hostile expression of prejudice within social contexts that consider themselves egalitarian but still approve of some specific negative attitudes. Anti-Muslim prejudice in Western societies is a case in point. Prejudice against Muslim people is not simply on the rise; since 9/11 it is increasingly expressed in the form of open hostility as a result of changing social norms and public discourse on Muslims (for a review of US opinion poll data see Panagopoulos, 2006; for a summary on the state of anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe see Allen & Nielsen, 2002; and for an overview on the level of prejudice based on the European Values Survey see Strabac & Listhaug, 2008).

The purpose of the current research is to investigate the specific psychological mechanisms of prejudice against Roma people in the Eastern European social context, considering that Roma constitute a large and severely marginalized minority group, and egalitarian social norms are generally weak in these countries. We therefore hypothesized a stronger association between prejudice and internal, rather than external motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), as a reflection of the lack of societal norms and pressure to be non-prejudiced. We also predicted that quality rather than quantity of intergroup contact would be associated with lower levels of prejudice, and contact frequency would predict higher prejudice, especially in the presence of high perceived threat (Pettigrew et al., 2010). We expected that in the context of Hungary and Slovakia, both national identity and nationalism would predict anti-Gypsyism, indicating that a distinction from the Roma out-group is an important element of a restrictively defined national identity (Dimitrova et al., 2015). We aimed to test these hypotheses on student and community samples from Hungary and Slovakia.

Study 1

Participants

We initially collected data in Hungary, where Roma people constitute the largest ethnic minority group. In the 2011 census, 315 thousand people declared their Roma ethnicity (approximately 3% of the population, KSH, 2014), while demographers estimate that the Roma population is around 3 times higher than official statistics reflect, 8 to 10 percent of the overall population (Pásztor & Pénzes, 2013).

We recruited 427 students from a large Hungarian university, who completed the questionnaire for course credit. We also included a subsample of 109 special education teachers who participated voluntarily. We expected that special education teachers would have a lot of personal contact with the Roma because of the overrepresentation of Roma children in special education institutions (Kende & Neményi, 2006). Furthermore, the ethos of special education includes the endorsement of diversity, and working closely with children with different backgrounds (see e.g., Hornby, 2012; Gay, 2002). We therefore supposed that special education teachers worked within a less prejudiced immediate normative context than the average population. This call for participation was posted in Facebook groups of special education teachers. As a third subsample, we recruited 162 respondents from four counties in Northern Hungary, where the Roma population is higher than the national average. According to official statistics, it is 5-8% of the population (KSH, 2014), but the actual percentage is estimated to be at least two times higher (Pásztor & Pénzes, 2013). This context does not only provide opportunities for more contact, but it is also an area with more social tensions connected to the generally lower socio-economic status, higher unemployment rate, and the consequent realistic conflict. Previous research established that prejudice is higher in this region than in other parts of Hungary (Csepeli, Örkény, & Székelyi, 2001). Respondents were approached through email, social media groups, and a snowballing technique with the help of psychology students of Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest. Recruiting students were either permanent residents of this region, or originally came from the region, and therefore had personal connections.

We present the descriptive statistics of the most important variables for the Hungarian subsamples separately to highlight the similarities and differences between these groups, and present the statistical testing of our hypotheses for the three subsamples together. The combined sample size of the Hungarian sample was 698 (M_{age} = 24.79, SD_{age} = 8.91, 77% female).

Another set of data was collected in Slovakia to increase the generalizability of our findings in line with recent efforts toward replications of social psychological research (e.g., Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012). We used this data collection to test our hypotheses in a similar, nevertheless not identical social context. According to the last census (Štatistický úrad SR,

2011), 106 thousand (2%) Slovak citizens declared their ethnicity to be Roma, making Roma the second largest ethnic minority in Slovakia after Hungarians. However, according to expert estimates (Mušinka et al., 2014), the number of Roma in Slovakia can be up to four times higher (approximately 7.5% of the population). Social distance between the majority population and the Roma is higher than for any other ethnic group (Vašečka, 2002). Their marginalization is exacerbated by the spatial segregation of many Roma settlements (Rusnáková & Rochovská, 2014). The 385 participants consisted of either social science students of a large Slovak University participating for course credits ($n = 96$), or were recruited by students mostly through personal channels of communication (email) ($n = 289$). The students were instructed to recruit a demographically heterogeneous community sample. Information on the subsamples is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Information on the three Hungarian subsamples and the sample from Slovakia

	Hungarian students	Special education teachers	Residents of Northern Hungary	Slovak student and community sample
N	432	109	162	385
Age: Mean (SD)	21.6 (2.09)	40.29 (10.6)	25.59 (8.94)	27.58 (11.43)
Gender (Female)	77.1%	94.8%	64.8%	61.6%
Permanent residence	34.7% Budapest 42.3% town 17.8% village 3.3% abroad	26.8% Budapest 49.5% town 20.2% village 1% abroad	32.1% town 56.8% village 11.1% missing	39% Bratislava 58% town 3% abroad
Level of education	100% current university students (24.8% psychology major)	100% special education degree	31.2% university 41.8% secondary 13.9% lower than secondary	35.5% university 62.3% secondary 2.3% lower than secondary

Measures

Attitudes Toward Roma Scale. For the development of an acceptable measure of attitudes toward the Roma, we collected data using a 40-item questionnaire compiled from previously used scales, and additional items generated for the purpose of the study.[2] All items were measured on a 7-point scale from 1:completely disagree to 7:completely agree, unless otherwise indicated. The scale can be found in English and in Hungarian in Appendix A.

We administered the following scales:

• An 11-item anti-Roma bias scale measuring negative stereotypes (Dunbar & Simonova, 2003).

• A 10-item anti-Gypsyism scale, reflecting negative stereotypes about the group, approval of discrimination, and cultural differences e.g., the acknowledgement of musical talent or a more traditional lifestyle (Enyedi et al., 2004).

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[2] The 40-item questionnaire compiled from previous anti-Roma measures and our own items was administered only in the student sample. We administered the 32-item version of the questionnaire in the two additional subsamples following the results of the factor analysis conducted on the data from the student sample.

- A 7-item modern prejudice scale by adopting items from Pedersen, Beven, Walker, and Griffiths's (2004) scale on attitudes toward aboriginal people in Australia. The scales consisted of items measuring undeserved benefits, being demanding, perceived discrimination, and poor work ethic.

- A 6-item aversive prejudice scale was included based on the concept of aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). We generated items to measure anti-affirmative action attitudes and selection preferences. These items did not depict Roma people using negative stereotypes, but reflected commonly held beliefs about the Roma taking advantage of the welfare system (Lášticová & Findor, 2016).

- We created 6 new items about musical and artistic talent and Roma people's sense of freedom based on the study of Bigazzi (2012). These items were largely missing from the existing measures, although some of the anti-Roma measures included references to cultural differences.

Predictors. We administered the 10-item version of the *motivation to respond without prejudice* scale by Plant and Devine (1998), with two subscales: a 5-item external (EMS), and a 5-item internal motivation scale (IMS). Two items were omitted for lack of fit from both subscales: *"If I acted prejudiced toward Roma people, I would be concerned that others would be angry with me"* from EMS, and *"According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Roma people is OK."* from IMS.

We used one item to measure *frequency of contact* (from 1: never to 7: very frequently), and one to measure *quality of contact* (from 1: very impersonal to 7: very personal).

National identity was measured adapting the 3-item scale of Becker, Tausch, Spears, and Christ (2011) as identification with the national ingroup, and *nationalism* using 4 items from Csepeli, Örkény, Székelyi, and Poór (2004), for example *"Hungary/Slovakia should pursue its own interests even if it leads to conflicts with other nations."*

Additional variables for validation. We used the 10-item *SDO*-6 scale (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) to test general attitudes toward the acceptance of social hierarchies. We asked respondents to *estimate* the percentage of Roma people in the country. *Threat perceptions* were measured by 11 items using Kteily and colleagues' (2015) adaptation of the integrated threat scale to the anti-Roma context. We measured *responsibility attribution* by one item, *"To what extent are Roma people responsible for their problems?"*, as a key variable affecting prejudice expression (Crandall et al., 2001). *Essentialist beliefs* were measured using the 8-item scale of

Haslam, Bastian, Bain, and Kashima (2006). Self-placement on *political orientation* scales – left/right, liberal/conservative – was measured by a 7-point semantic differential scale (ESS, 2012).[3]

Additionally, we asked respondents' age, gender, level of education, and place of residence.

Procedure

Data was collected using the online questionnaire platform of Qualtrics. All originally English items were translated and backtranslated to Hungarian and Slovak. We relied on the published English translations of scales used in other languages as the basis of the translation/backtranslation process. We conducted all the statistical analysis using IBM SPSS version 22.0 and AMOS (Arbuckle, 2011).

Results

Factor analysis. To identify the most suitable measure and create an integrated Attitudes toward Roma Scale (ATRS) based on previous scales and our own items, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis using the student sample on 32 items with maximum likelihood extraction and direct oblimin rotation. We removed 8 items that did not load onto either factor. We used the Hungarian student sample for the factor analysis and checked the reliability of the scale after the inclusion of the samples from special populations. We relied on the student sample for the factor analysis because it provided an adequate sample size (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999) and was assumed to be closer to the general population than the two additional subsamples that were included precisely because they had unique characteristics. We chose an oblique rotation method because it seemed likely that the emerging factors would correlate. We found an acceptable – and theoretically meaningful – factor structure, revealing three factors with factor loadings between .33 and .83. The first covered blatantly expressed stereotypes referring to criminality, laziness, and threat and we named it *Blatant Stereotyping*. The second factor consisted of items suggesting that Roma people receive too many benefits and preferential treatment. We named this second factor *Undeserved*

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[3] We included other measures to test the correlations between some of the most widely used measures of prejudice in previous research on attitudes toward Roma people, such as the one-item *Feeling thermometer* on a scale from 0 to 100, and in the student sample a one-item *Bogardus scale* (1925) with 5 scale points (1: accepting as a member of the family, 2: colleague, 3: neighbor, 4: inhabitant of my town, 5: none of the above). With exploratory purposes we also included a scale of *acculturation expectations*, measured contact intentions (2 items) and attitude toward culture maintenance (3 items) following Zagefka and Brown (2002), based on Berry's (1980) taxonomy.

Benefits. The third factor consisted of items referring to an essentially different traditional culture that makes them superior in arts, also including items about mobility and freedom. We named this the *Cultural Difference.*

Cultural Difference was not significantly related to the other two factors (with Blatant Stereotyping: $r = .04$, $p = .406$; with Undeserved Benefits: $r = -.001$, $p = .983$), but there was a strong correlation between Blatant Stereotyping and Undeserved benefits ($r = .77$, $p < .001$). We therefore tested whether this distinction had any added value to the interpretation of the dimensionality of Roma-related beliefs. We conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using structural equation modelling (SEM) procedure in Amos (Arbuckle, 2011). Three models were tested, and their fit indices compared. The three-factor solution showed a substantially better fit than either the two- or a one-factor alternative as shown on Table 2.

Table 2. Model fit statistics for the CFA and measurement invariance test models

Models	χ^2	df	CFI	RMSEA	AIC
Hungarian sample - 32 items - One-factor solution	1538.37	464	.839	.073	1730.37
Hungarian sample - 32 items - Two-factor solution	1261.24	463	.881	.063	14.55.24
Hungarian sample - 32 items - Three-factor solution	1050.33	461	.913	.054	1248.33
Hungarian sample - 16 items - One-factor solution	617.36	104	.833	.107	713.36
Hungarian sample - 16 items - Two-factor solution	354.68	103	.918	.075	452.68
Hungarian sample - 16 items - Three-factor solution	234.19	101	.957	.055	336.19
Slovak sample - 16 items - One-factor solution	477.13	104	.833	.097	573.13
Slovak sample - 16 items - Two-factor solution	330.24	103	.898	.076	428.24
Slovak sample - 16 items - Three-factor solution	214.41	101	.950	.054	316.41
Common model with structural invariance	442.92	202	.954	.038	646.92
Common model with metric invariance	502.19	218	.946	.040	674.16
Common model with scalar invariance	818.05	218	.886	.058	990.05

Table 3. Results of the Exploratory Factor Analysis on 16 Items

Item	Hungarian student sample Factor			Slovak sample Factor		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Roma people tend to make more criminal acts than other people.	.79			.77		
There are very little proper or reasonable Roma people.	.79			.58		
Roma people do not have a positive relationship to work, they are lazy.	.78			.52	.35	
The growing Roma population threatens the security of society.	.71			.79		
Roma people usually have a lot of children, for which they do not give enough care.	.68			.40	.31	
It is only right that there are still clubs where Roma people are not allowed to enter.	.53			.84		
I think that Roma people in this country are given preferential treatment in certain aspects.		.73			.78	
Roma people are given more government money than they should be given.		.70			.81	
The real damage is caused by organizations which offer an undeserved advantage to Roma people.		.67			.56	
The only racial discrimination in Hungary these days is in favour of Roma people.		.59			.39	
Roma people are very vocal and loud about their rights.		.53			.57	
Music and dancing is something Roma children already learn in the womb.			.68			.62
The musical talent of Roma people is superior to that of non-Roma Hungarians.			.63			.56
The love of freedom is much stronger among Roma people than among non-Roma Hungarians.			.61			.49
There is more respect for traditional family values among Roma people than among non-Roma people.			.40			.43
We can only envy Roma people's freedom.			.40			.36
Proportion of Explained Variance (%)	*39.84*	*13.80*	*6.34*	*33.03*	*3.45*	*8.29*

Note. Only coefficients above .30 are shown. Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood; Rotation method: Direct Oblimin

Further reduction of items was carried out with the purpose of maintaining the original meaning of these factors while achieving a manageable set of items for future data collections. Items were selected with the highest factor loadings, but at the same time to also reflect the diversity of items within each factor. If two items had a highly similar meaning, we kept the item with the higher factor loading and removed the other. Thirteen items were omitted from the Blatant Stereotyping subscale, two items from Undeserved Benefits, and one item from the

Cultural Difference scale. To test the factorial structure of a reduced 16-item pool we followed the same procedure as in the case of the original 32-item version. Results of the first step EFA with three emerging factors where all items loaded principally on the expected factors with factor loading between .40 and .79 (KMO = .92, $p < .001$, total variance explained: 60.22%) are presented in Table 8. CFA again showed that the three-factor solution was more appropriate than either the two-factor or the one-factor alternatives (see Table 2). Reliability was acceptable to good: Blatant Stereotyping, 6 items, $\alpha = .90$; Undeserved Benefits, 5 items, $\alpha = .85$, and Cultural Differences, 5 items, $\alpha = .67$. The items of the final scale – as well as the original sources of these scales – are available in English, Hungarian, and Slovak as supplementary material. After inclusion of the subsamples from the two special populations from Hungary, the short ATRS still had acceptable to good reliability: Blatant Stereotyping, $\alpha = .90$; Undeserved Benefits, $\alpha = .84$, and Cultural Differences, $\alpha = .70$.

Comparison of the factor structures in the Hungarian and the Slovak sample. As a first step, the factorial structure of the questionnaire was checked by an exploratory factor analysis on the Slovak sample using the same method as in the case of the Hungarian student sample. Three factors emerged, and the items loaded primarily on the same factors as in the Hungarian sample (we present the items of the 16-item scale with factor loadings in Table 3). We replicated the CFA, and results again indicated that the three-factor solution had a better fit than either the two- or the one-factor model (model fit statistics and invariance tests are presented in Table 2).

A common multi-group three-factor model was built to test multi-group invariance. The model in both samples had the same factorial structure but corresponding parameters (factor loadings, variances, covariances, and intercepts) were allowed different estimates. This common model supported the assumption of structural equivalence across the samples.

Measurement invariance was also tested: firstly, metric invariance by restricting factor loadings to be equal in the two groups. This multi-group model showed a poorer fit than the previous model. $\Delta\chi^2$–based invariance tests for single parameter estimates showed measurement non-invariances for the factor loadings on 6 items. Secondly, a scalar invariance test was conducted by restricting item intercepts to be equal in the two samples. This common model also showed a poorer fit than the model with only structural invariance. Subsequent $\Delta\chi^2$–based invariance tests for single items indicated metric invariance for three items (for the specific items showing non-invariance see the Supplementary material). Although scalar invariance was not supported and only partial metric invariance was detected, the factorial structure of ATRS was identical across the Hungarian and the Slovakian samples.

Reliability was good for Blatant Stereotyping: $\alpha = .89$, and Undeserved Benefits, $\alpha = .78$, but low for Cultural Differences, $\alpha = .61$. We kept the last subscale in accordance with Schmitt's (1996) argument that a measure with low reliability can sometimes be used if it has meaningful content which we assumed on a theoretical basis (see Villano, et al., 2017; Weinerová, 2014), and following the findings from the Hungarian sample. The first two factors were strongly correlated ($r = .66$, $p < .001$), while the third factor showed a weak positive correlation only with Undeserved Benefits ($r = .13$, $p = .011$).

Descriptive statistics. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between factors of ATRS and other variables are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The level of prejudice showed differences across the Hungarian subsamples in line with the expectations for the different contexts of data collection. We found the highest level of prejudice among respondents from Northern Hungary: Blatant Stereotyping: $F(2, 695) = 47.27$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .12$; Undeserved Benefits: $F(2, 695) = 37.82$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .10$; and Cultural Difference: $F(2, 695) = 3.15$, $p = .043$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. Post-hoc comparison did not support that the subsamples differed on the Cultural Difference subscale (for means and post-hoc comparisons, see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Levels of anti-Roma prejudice in the samples of the three subsamples of Study 1, and their differences based on post-hoc comparisons. * *p* < .05

Table 4. Scale reliabilities, scale points, means, standard deviations, and correlations with the three subscales of ATRS in the Hungarian sample

	α	Scale points	Mean	SD	Blatant stereotyping	Undeserved benefits	Cultural difference
						Correlations	
Blatant stereotyping	.90	1-7	4.34	1.60	1	.75**	-.02
Undeserved benefits	.84	1-7	4.35	1.50	.75**	1	.01
Cultural differences	.70	1-7	3.50	1.26	-.02	.01	1
Contact frequency		1-7	4.97	1.54	.08*	.15**	.06
Contact quality		1-7	3.25	1.63	-.36**	-.22**	.18**
Threat	.89	1-7	3.74	1.34	.86**	.76**	-.03
Responsibility attribution		1-7	5.04	1.52	.52**	.45**	-.04
Estimation		0-100	23.03	14.13	.19**	.21**	.14**
SDO	.80	1-7	2.89	1.07	.43**	.30**	.01*
EMS	.75	1-7	2.87	1.26	.23**	.14**	.10**
IMS	.86	1-7	4.44	1.54	-.72**	-.59**	.11**
Essentialism	.87	1-7	3.65	1.12	.34**	.29**	.16**
Left-right		1-7	4.27	1.35	.41**	.36**	-.10*
Liberal-conservative		1-7	3.63	1.53	.36**	.38**	.06
National identity	.81	1-7	5.32	1.50	.22**	.23**	.15**
Nationalism	.78	1-7	4.21	1.63	.46**	.46**	.14**
Acculturation: culture maintenance	.78	1-7	4.63	1.42	-.54**	-.45**	.15**
Acculturation: contact	.89	1-7	3.68	1.82	-.64**	-.55**	.14**
Feeling thermometer		0-100	41.10	22.51	-.66**	-.50**	.18**

Note. ** $p < .001$, * $p < .05$

Table 5. Scale reliabilities, scale points, means, standard deviations, and correlations with the three subscales of ATRS in the Slovak sample

	α	Scale points	Mean	SD	Correlations Blatant stereotyping	Undeserved benefits	Cultural difference
Blatant stereotyping	.89	1-7	4.66	1.34	1	.66**	-.01
Undeserved benefits	.78	1-7	4.87	1.23	.66**	1	.13*
Cultural differences	.61	1-7	3.89	1.01	-.01	.13*	1
Contact frequency		1-7	4.13	1.55	.17**	.22**	.16**
Contact quality		1-7	3.87	2.88	-.04	.01	.14**
Threat	.88	1-7	4.29	1.10	.87**	.72**	.10*
Responsibility attribution		1-7	5.47	1.50	.40**	.38**	.01
Estimation		0-100	20.75	18.26	.17**	.20**	.13*
SDO	.81	1-7	3.22	0.91	.61**	.42**	-.04
EMS	.79	1-7	3.10	1.15	.15**	.14**	.17**
IMS	.86	1-7	4.10	1.35	-.63**	-.50**	.11*
Essentialism	.87	1-7	4.23	0.95	.27**	.22**	.06
Left-right		1-7	3.31	1.59	-.08	-.05	.04
Liberal-conservative		1-7	3.35	1.66	.19**	.20**	.07
National identity	.86	1-7	5.04	1.39	.34**	.34**	.06
Nationalism	.73	1-7	4.10	1.29	.41**	.43**	.23**
Acculturation: culture maintenance	.78	1-7	4.26	1.31	-.58**	-.45**	.08
Acculturation: contact	.64	1-7	4.36	1.33	-.53**	-.42**	.10
Feeling thermometer		0-100	35.18	21.50	-.67**	-.47**	.12*

Note. ** $p < .001$, * $p < .05$

Overestimation of the Roma population was present in all three Hungarian subsamples, exceeding not just official statistics, but also scientific estimations twice over. The student sample showed the lowest, but still substantial overestimation ($M = 20.84\%$, $SD = 12.11$), while special education teachers estimated the size of the Roma population as somewhat, but not significantly higher ($M = 24.83\%$, $SD = 14.69$). Overestimation was significantly higher in the community sample from Northern Hungary than in the student sample ($M = 28.48\%$, $SD = 17.30$, $F(2, 629) = 16.92$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$, Games Howell post-hoc test showed a mean difference of 7.64, $p < .001$, 95% CI [3.76, 11.20]). Overestimation in Slovakia was similarly high, 2-3 times higher than official statistics suggest ($M = 20.75\%$, $SD = 18.26$).

To test the potential influence of demographic factors, we looked at the effect of gender on attitudes toward the Roma, and found that in the Hungarian sample men scored higher on Blatant Stereotyping (M_{men} = 4.79, SD_{men} = 1.61, $M_{women,}$ = 4.17, SD_{women} = 1.57, $t(657)$ = 4.25, $p < .001$) and Undeserved Benefits (M_{men} = 4.60, SD_{men} = 1.53, $M_{women,}$= 4.23, SD_{women} = 1.48, $t(657)$ = 2.68, $p = .008$), while women scored higher on Cultural Difference (M_{men} = 3.20, SD_{men} = 1.11, $M_{women,}$= 3.57, SD_{women} = 0.05, $t(657)$ = -3.19, $p = .001$). Respondents' younger age was weakly associated with higher Blatant stereotyping ($r = -.11, p = .003$) and lower endorsement of Cultural Difference ($r = .10, p = .012$). There was no correlation between age and Undeserved Benefits ($r = -.02, p = .618$).

In the Slovak sample, we found no gender differences in Blatant Stereotyping (M_{men} = 4.69, SD_{men} = 1.42, $M_{women,}$ = 4.64, SD_{women} = 1.30, $t(376)$ = 0.39, $p = .695$) and Undeserved Benefits (M_{men} = 4.81, SD_{men} = 1.36, $M_{women,}$= 4.91, SD_{women} = 1.13, $t(376)$ = -0.77, $p = .441$), but women scored higher on Cultural Difference (M_{men} = 3.69, SD_{men} = 1.02, $M_{women,}$= 4.01, SD_{women} = 0.97, $t(376)$ = -3.03, $p = 003.$). Age did not correlate with either the Blatant Stereotyping ($r = .06, p = .259$) or the Undeserved Benefits ($r = .07, p = .146$) subscales, but showed weak significant correlations with the Cultural Difference subscale ($r = .13, p = .009$).

Predictors of attitudes toward Roma people. In order to validate the ATRS, we ran a regression analysis for both samples.[4] Results data from Hungary (presented in Table 6) revealed that IMS was the strongest predictor of Blatant Stereotyping, followed by nationalism, responsibility attribution, quality of contact, essentialism, SDO, conservative political orientation, EMS and frequency of contact, explaining 66.4% of variance ($F(11, 654) = 117.42$, $p < .001$). Both IMS and quality of contact predicted lower agreement with Blatant Stereotyping while all other variables predicted higher agreement.

Undeserved Benefits had somewhat different predictors: IMS was again the strongest predictor, followed by nationalism, responsibility attribution, conservative political orientation, frequency of contact, and national identity. These variables explained 49.8% of variance ($F(11$,

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[4] We tested the linear regression model entering gender in the first round to control for its potential influence considering that we found significant differences between men and women on all the subscales of ATRS in the Hungarian sample. Although gender was a significant predictor when entered alone in the model ($R^2 = .02, F(2, 417) = 5.70, p = .004$), it did not remain significant when all other variables were entered. Therefore, in order to simplify the presentation of our models, we report the analysis in which only the relevant predictors are entered.

654) = 60.96, $p < .001$). IMS again predicted a lower level of agreement with undeserved benefits, while all other variables predicted higher agreement.

Cultural Difference was predicted most strongly by essentialist beliefs, quality of contact, left wing political orientation, nationalism, national identity, and EMS, explaining only 12% of variance ($F(11, 654 = 9.21, p < .001$). All of these variables predicted higher agreement with the items of the Cultural Differences subscale.

Table 6. Predictors of the three subscales of ATRS in the Hungarian sample using linear regression analysis.

	Outcome variable: Blatant Stereotyping					Outcome variable: Undeserved benefits					Outcome variable: Cultural Difference				
	B	S.E.	β	t	p	B	S.E.	β	t	p	B	S.E.	β	t	p
(Constant)	3.17	.34		9.78	.000	3.12	.39		8.05	.000	1.78	.43		4.12	.000
SDO	0.12	.04	.08	3.16	.002	0.27	.05	.01	0.37	.709	-0.04	.05	-.03	-0.80	.424
Responsibility	0.19	.03	.18	6.85	.000	0.18	.03	.18	5.54	.000	-0.03	.03	-.03	-0.77	.442
Contact frequency	0.06	.03	.06	2.28	.023	0.09	.03	.09	2.85	.005	-0.02	.03	-.02	-0.60	.548
Quality of contact	-0.12	.03	-.12	-4.23	.000	-0.02	.04	-.02	-0.66	.510	0.13	.03	.17	3.77	.000
EMS	0.07	.03	.06	2.40	.017	0.01	.04	.01	0.32	.752	0.09	.04	.09	2.45	.015
IMS	-0.47	.03	-.45	-14.97	.000	-0.40	.04	-.41	-11.27	.000	0.06	.04	.07	1.48	.140
Essentialism	0.12	.04	.08	3.42	.001	0.03	.04	.05	1.76	.079	0.19	.04	.17	4.24	.000
National identity	0.03	.03	.02	1.00	.335	0.07	.03	.06	2.07	.039	0.10	.03	.12	2.91	.004
Nationalism	0.20	.03	.21	7.56	.000	0.18	.03	.20	5.90	.000	0.10	.03	.13	2.86	.004
Right wing political orientation	-0.02	.03	-.02	-0.69	.492	-0.04	.04	-.03	-0.92	.357	-0.15	.04	-.16	-3.58	.000
Conservative political orientation	0.07	.03	.07	2.76	.006	0.13	.03	.13	3.97	.000	0.04	.04	.05	1.19	.235

Table 7. Predictors of the three subscales of ATRS in the Slovak sample using linear regression analysis.

	Outcome variable: Blatant Stereotyping					Outcome variable: Undeserved benefits					Outcome variable: Cultural Difference				
	B	S.E.	β	t	p	B	S.E.	β	t	p	B	S.E.	β	t	p
(Constant)	2.49	.49		5.11	.000	2.92	.58		5.38	.000	1.93	.55		3.51	.000
SDO	0.50	.07	.34	7.70	.000	0.15	.07	.10	2.03	.043	-0.07	.07	-.06	-0.99	.321
Responsibility	0.11	.03	.12	3.22	.001	0.13	.04	.15	3.40	.001	-0.03	.04	-.05	-0.83	.406
Contact frequency	0.08	.03	.10	2.74	.006	0.11	.03	.14	3.29	.001	0.09	.04	.14	2.67	.008
Quality of contact	-0.02	.02	-.05	-1.43	.153	-0.00	.02	-.00	-0.04	.960	0.04	.02	.10	2.00	.046
EMS	0.14	.04	.12	3.36	.001	0.13	.05	.12	2.84	.005	0.8	.05	.09	1.75	.081
IMS	-0.36	.04	-.37	-8.43	.000	-0.28	.05	-.31	-5.81	.000	0.11	.05	.14	2.20	.028
Essentialism	0.01	.05	.01	0.18	.860	0.02	.06	.02	0.43	.664	0.09	.06	.09	1.61	.109
National identity	0.11	.04	.11	2.88	.004	0.09	.04	.10	2.09	.038	-0.01	.04	-.02	-0.32	.751
Nationalism	0.09	.04	.08	1.91	.057	0.16	.05	.17	3.16	.002	0.18	.05	.24	3.68	.000
Right wing political orientation	-0.04	.03	-.05	-1.33	.184	-0.06	.03	-.07	-1.65	.099	-0.01	.03	-.02	-0.32	.752
Conservative political orientation	-0.03	.03	-.03	-0.82	.411	0.03	.03	.01	0.28	.781	0.03	.03	.05	0.93	.352

In the Slovak sample regression analysis (presented in Table 7) revealed that IMS was the strongest predictor of Blatant Stereotyping, followed by SDO, responsibility attribution, EMS, national identity, and contact frequency, explaining 61% of variance ($F(11, 347) = 49.38$, $p < .001$). Undeserved Benefits was also predicted most strongly by IMS, followed by nationalism, responsibility attribution, contact frequency, EMS, SDO, and national identity, explaining 40.9% of variance ($F(11, 347) = 23.48$, $p < .001$). Cultural Difference had only positive predictors: nationalism, IMS, contact frequency, and contact quality, explaining 10.6% of variance ($F(11, 347) = 4.85$, $p < .001$).

We measured the two-way interaction of threat and contact on prejudice to test part of the second hypothesis. In this hypothesis we assumed that contact frequency would predict higher prejudice in the presence of high perceived threat and predict lower prejudice in the presence of low perceived threat. In the Hungarian sample we found that in the presence of high threat more contact predicted higher Blatant Stereotyping, while in the presence of low threat less contact predicted higher level of Blatant Stereotyping ($F(1, 695) = 8.24$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .012$). However, the interaction effect on Undeserved Benefits was only marginally significant ($F(1, 695) = 3.17$, $p = .075$, $\eta_p^2 = .005$), suggesting no difference between the effect of contact frequency on prejudice in the presence of high or low threat. The interaction effect was similarly only marginally significant in case of the Cultural Difference subscale. It is noteworthy that the pattern was different, in the context of low threat, lower frequency predicted higher agreement with the items of the Cultural difference subscale ($F(1, 695) = 3.18$, $p = .075$, $\eta_p^2 = .005$).

Frequency of contact was a significant predictor in the Slovak sample of all subscales and therefore showed main effects on prejudice, while threat and contact showed only a marginally significant interaction effect on Blatant Stereotyping ($F(1, 381) = 3.33$, $p = .07$, $\eta_p^2 = .009$), and a non-significant interaction for Undeserved Benefits ($F(1, 381) = .39$, $p = .535$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$), and Cultural Difference ($F(1, 381) = 1.34$, $p = .247$, $\eta_p^2 = .004$), suggesting no differences in the effect of contact in the presence of high or low threat.

Hypothesis testing using SEM. To check the connection between (a) contact frequency and quality and the three subscales of ATRS, (b) internal and external motivations to respond without prejudice and ATRS, and (c) national identity and nationalism and ATRS, we used Structural Equation Modelling in AMOS (Arbuckle, 2011). For a visual presentation of our results see Figures 2 and 3.

Figure 2. Frequency and quality of contact, IMS, EMS, national identity, and nationalism as predictors of the 3 factors of ATRS in the Hungarian sample. Standardized regression coefficients and correlations are displayed with probability values. ***$p < .001$

Figure 3. Frequency and quality of contact, IMS, EMS, national identity, and nationalism as predictors of the 3 factors of ATRS in the Slovak sample. Standardized regression coefficients and correlations are displayed with probability values. ***$p < .001$

We relied on the same model for the Hungarian and the Slovak samples, and tested the patterns of predictors in the two samples. Both models showed acceptable fit. In the Hungarian sample model fit was $\chi^2(477) = 1499.03$, $p < .001$, CFI = .900, NFI = .861, RMSEA = .055. As predicted, contact was a weak predictor of negative attitudes, and quality of contact a somewhat stronger, but still a weak predictor of positive attitudes. In line with the predictions, IMS was an strong negative predictor of prejudice while EMS was a much weaker or non-significant predictor. Finally, national identity only significantly predicted the Cultural Difference subscale, and no other subscales of ATRS, while nationalism was a stronger predictor of all three subscales, especially Blatant Stereotyping and Undeserved Benefits.

Results from the Slovak sample also showed an acceptable fit $\chi^2(477) = 824.82$, $p < .001$, CFI = .928, NFI = .847, RMSEA = .044. The pattern of predictors was similar, but not identical. Contact was a weak predictor of prejudice, while quality of contact only weakly predicted the Cultural Difference subscale. IMS was a strong predictor of less agreement with all three

subscales of ATRS, while EMS was a weaker predictor of prejudice. National identity did not, while nationalism predicted all three subscales of ATRS.

Discussion

Our results confirmed that anti-Gypsyism can be grasped through openly expressed negative beliefs about Roma people that include both widely held negative stereotypes concerning criminality and laziness, and the idea that Roma people receive undeserved benefits. Although the items of the Undeserved Benefits subscale were mostly adopted from measures of modern racism that reflect realistic threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), agreement with this subscale can also be interpreted as a colorblind attitude toward Roma people, interpreting the situation of the Roma mainly as a welfare issue (Weinerová, 2014).

The level of agreement with strong negative statements about Roma people confirmed that anti-Gypsyism in the Eastern European context is an overtly expressed form of prejudice. We found strong correlations between Blatant Stereotyping and Undeserved Benefits, suggesting that the first two subscales tap into the general negative orientations based on widely held stereotypes about criminality and laziness and the idea that Roma are a burden on the welfare system. These two subscales also showed high correlations with threat (for a threat-prejudice connection see Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). From the perspective of the integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), these results are hardly surprising in Hungary and Slovakia, where Roma people are perceived as representing economic, physical (Loveland & Popescu, 2016), as well as symbolic threat (Bigazzi & Csertő, 2015; Dimitrova et al., 2015).

Alongside these overtly expressed negative beliefs, we found another subscale reflecting the romantic idea that Roma people have a unique and essentially different culture. Agreement with items of this subscale reflects a tendency to folklorize the Roma group through identifying them with their traditional culture (see Weinerová, 2014). Findings related to this subscale indicated that these items were independent from general prejudicial attitudes, and constituted a different dimension of attitudes (in line with Villano et al., 2017). The Cultural Difference subscale showed no or only weak correlation with the other two subscales, and showed somewhat different connections with other variables. Based on the findings, we presume that the acknowledgement of cultural differences can be the reflection of overemphasizing and essentializing differences both out of threat (Loveland & Popescu, 2016) and out of exoticism (Andreescu & Quinn, 2014). Perception of such differences in countries without multicultural

norms and multicultural traditions can turn insistence on cultural difference into exclusion from the shared group identity.

Predictors of the Cultural Difference subscale suggested that endorsement of this romantic ideal of Roma people was more typical among those who held essentialist beliefs about human nature, identified strongly with the nation, and endorsed nationalist ideas. However, this endorsement was also predicted by left wing political orientation in the Hungarian sample, and external motivations to appear non-prejudiced. We therefore assume that respondents did not consider these statements as expressions of prejudice. This finding is in line with previous research on aversive racism that is prevalent among people who entertain an egalitarian self-concept (Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005).

We must acknowledge the possibility that this factor occurred merely on the basis of a wording effect, as these items have a positive wording while items of the other two scales are all negatively worded. This suggestion is supported by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) who found a Cultural Difference subscale with lower reliability than other subscales and with low discriminatory power.

The results from both the Hungarian and the Slovak data collection confirmed our hypothesis that internalized anti-prejudicial norms influenced prejudice expression to a greater extent than external motivations. This finding underlines that in the absence of non-prejudicial social norms, external pressure plays a less important role in suppressing overt expressions of prejudice.

In line with the prediction of our second hypothesis, we found a positive connection between contact frequency and prejudice, suggesting that within suboptimal conditions for intergroup contact, more frequent contact is a source of conflicts rather than of prejudice reduction. At the same time, in the Hungarian context, more personal contact predicted more positive attitudes; therefore the quality rather than the quantity can be important for reducing prejudice. We also found a significant interaction effect in the Hungarian sample between threat and contact frequency on Blatant Stereotyping, suggesting that the paradoxical connection between contact and prejudice was indeed moderated by threat perceptions in the cases of most openly expressed negative stereotypes (as described by Pettigrew et al., 2010). However, in the Slovak sample the influence of contact was not moderated by the level of threat. This result indicates the more general tendency that contact under suboptimal conditions (i.e., without common goals, equal status, and supportive authorities, see Lášticová & Findor, 2016;

Podolinská, & Hrustič, 2015) is associated with higher and not lower levels of prejudice (Pettigrew at al., 2010).

Finally, we found that both national identity and nationalism are closely linked to attitudes toward Roma people; however, in both samples, but especially in the Slovak sample, nationalism was a stronger predictor of prejudice than national identity. Therefore, we need to refute our third hypothesis, which stated that both national identity and nationalism would predict negative attitudes toward Roma people. This finding indicates that distance from Roma people is connected to defining the national ingroup in exclusive rather than inclusive terms (see Minescu et al., 2008; Wagner et al., 2012). Interestingly, national identity and nationalism predicted Cultural Differences more similarly than the other subscales of ATRS in both samples, suggesting that beliefs in the essential cultural differences between the Roma minority and the non-Roma majority groups can serve as the solidification of national identity and the exclusion of Roma people from the national ingroup more generally.

Overestimation of the country's Roma population was typical in both studies. The largest overestimation was unsurprisingly in the region with the highest Roma population in Hungary, where both contact frequency and prejudice were the highest (in line with Pettigrew et al., 2010). However, the special education teacher's sample also greatly overestimated the size of the Roma population, and as overestimation correlated with prejudice, this finding suggests that perception of the size of the group was not a reflection of actual contact, but rather the negative orientation toward the group.

Responsibility attribution was a key predictor of Blatant Stereotyping and Undeserved Benefits, while essentialist beliefs were central in predicting Cultural Difference. These target perceptions can deepen and stabilize the intergroup status quo and lead to blaming the out-group for their marginalization (e.g., Crandall et al. 2001; Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006). SDO was a strong predictor of only one subscale, the Blatant Stereotyping in the Slovak sample, while in all other regression models SDO was a weak or nonsignificant predictor. This result suggests that attitudes toward the Roma are practically independent from general beliefs of dominance. The lack of connection between SDO and the Undeserved Benefits subscale – which directly refers to competition over resources – highlights that stereotypes about the Roma are more widely accepted than individual differences in the level of SDO would suggest.

Limitations and Future Directions

The measure of attitudes toward the Roma that we used in the current research (ATRS) was created by compiling items of existing measures. Following the factor analysis and item reduction, we were left with 11 negatively and 5 positively worded items that loaded onto two negatively and one positively worded factor. Future research should establish whether the same subscales can be maintained as theoretical and not just methodological subscales following the introduction of both positively and negatively worded items on all three subscales.

Our aim was to address some of the unique aspects of attitudes toward the Roma in these societies, but using convenience samples, our research was not suitable for measuring the prevalence and level of anti-Gypsyism in Hungary and Slovakia. We relied on specific subsamples to gain insights into the effects of contact and social norms, however we could not account for the potential influence of demographic variables, which needs to be tested in larger scale or representative surveys.

Conclusions

Previous research acknowledged the uniqueness of anti-Gypsyism (see, e.g., Ljujic et al., 2012; Loveland & Popescu, 2016), but did not directly test it. Our research moved beyond assumptions that attitudes toward the Roma can be measured on the basis of commonly held stereotypes, and relied on a wider range of previously used scales and generated items to develop a measure with acceptable construct validity. Beyond describing the psychometric characteristics of ATRS, our findings confirmed that blatant expression of prejudice is made possible by social contexts that approve of these beliefs and provide social environments in which contact increases rather than decreases prejudice. Our study also showed that even the seemingly positive dimension of this bias (the romantic ideal of free, natural, and artistic people) creates an unbridgeable gap between Roma and non-Roma individuals, contributing to the exclusion of Roma people from the national ingroup (as shown by Villano et al., 2017 in the Italian context). We therefore argue that prejudice and discrimination against Roma people can only be effectively reduced by addressing the normative appropriateness of anti-Roma bias, by altering perceptions of threat, and by contributing to the development of a more inclusive national identity.

Prejudice creates social distance and resistance to change in intergroup relations: Evidence from six European countries[5]

Roma people are frequent targets of hate crimes and discrimination in interpersonal and institutional contexts (FRA, 2016). Anti-Gypsyism is present in all European countries (FRA, 2018). Yet, European politics only recently recognized the importance of identifying the unique constituents of this form of prejudice (European Commission, 2004), and an obstacle of Roma integration efforts. Even social psychologists, despite their commitment to studying intergroup processes and prejudice, have paid little attention to anti-Gypsyism as a form of ethnic and racial prejudice (for exceptions see Bigazzi & Csertő, 2016; Dalsklev & Kunst, 2015; Dunbar & Simonova, 2003; Kende, Hadarics, & Lášticová, 2017; Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015; Ljujic, Vedder, Dekker, & van Geel, 2013; Orosz et al., 2018; Pérez, Moscovici, & Chulvi, 2007; Urbiola, Willis, Ruiz-Romero, & Moya, 2018; Váradi, 2014; Villano, Fontanella, Fontanella, & Di Donato, 2017) and its connection with the lack of progress in Roma inclusion. This neglect is problematic because various national and European-level policies on Roma integration resulted in little overall improvement in the situation of the Roma (see Sándor et al., 2017). Although there are areas of progress, the gap between Roma and non-Roma populations keeps widening: Roma people continue to be systematically disadvantaged in housing, employment, education, health, and life-expectancy (see Bojadjijeva, 2015; Cook, Wayne, Valentine, Lessios, & Yeh, 2013).

Prejudice may be at the core of this failure: the widespread homogenizing negative attitudes toward Roma people may be both a psychological burden (see Csepeli & Simon, 2004) and a source of legal and institutional discrimination (FRA, 2018). An analysis of government strategy documents promoting Roma inclusion in Romania, for example, revealed that despite its explicit progressive goals, the association between Roma people and criminality uncritically appeared in all of the documents and created an invisible obstacle to social inclusion (Popoviciu & Tileagă, 2019). These results suggest that macro-level efforts to change in the situation of Roma people in society may fail on individual level prejudice toward Roma people that results in resistance to Roma integration efforts. Nevertheless, empirically supported explanations of

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[5] The chapter is based on the following publication: Kende, A., Hadarics, M., Bigazzi, S., Boza, M., Kunst, J. R., Lantos, N. A., ... & Urbiola, A. (2020). The last acceptable prejudice in Europe? Anti-Gypsyism as the obstacle to Roma inclusion. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 1368430220907701.

how prejudice creates obstacles to Roma integration are largely missing in both academic and policy-making domains. Therefore, the aim of our research is to explore the characteristics of anti-Gypsyism and to show how prejudice predicts majority members' preference for contact with the Roma and their culture maintenance (i.e., Roma integration) in six different European countries.

Anti-Gypsyism across Europe

Decades of research suggest the prevalence of modern (McConahay, 1983), subtle (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), implicit (Banaji & Greenwald, 1994), and aversive (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986) expressions of ethnic and racial prejudice over old-fashioned, blatant, explicit, and hostile forms in contemporary democratic societies. However, evidence about prejudice and hate crimes against the Roma suggests otherwise: anti-Gypsyism remains hostile and openly negative (for a critique of interpreting overt forms of prejudice as a phenomenon of the past see Kende & McGarty, 2019; Leach, Peng, & Volckens, 2000). For instance, Kende et al. (2017) showed that prejudice against the Roma is expressed overtly in East-Central Europe because societal norms approve of it. However, Roma people are sometimes treated with a severe disregard for human rights even in countries with stronger egalitarian norms. For example, Italy has been condemned for relegating Roma people to nomadic camps (ERRC, 2000), and a survey revealed the commonness of open, direct, and racist attitudes on the one hand, and dehumanization on the other, even among less prejudiced individuals (Fontanella, Villano, & Di Donato, 2016). Similarly, France has been heavily criticized for collectively criminalizing and deporting Roma people (Castle & Bennhold, 2010). According to an opinion poll (Dahlgreen, 2015), the Roma minority is the most negatively viewed ethnic group in the Nordic countries of Europe too, with a negative perception ranging from 40 to 72% of the population within those four countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland). Therefore, it seems reasonable to ask whether and how anti-Gypsyism differs from other forms of ethnic and racial prejudice.

There have been attempts to identify the unique characteristics of anti-Gypsyism (Ljujic, Vedder, Dekker, & van Geel, 2012a), but even these attempts acknowledge that anti-Gypsyism stems from the same psychological motivations as other forms of prejudice. Therefore, most studies acknowledge the importance of general tendencies for prejudice in explaining anti-Gypsyism, such as authoritarianism (Dunbar & Simonova, 2003; Todosijevic & Enyedi, 2002), social dominance orientation (Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011), and nationalism (Csepeli, 2010). Beyond the general tendencies, there is an agreement that anti-Gypsyism contains

negative stereotypes about criminality and laziness (e.g., Enyedi, Fábián, & Sik, 2004), and depicts the Roma as an incompetent and cold out-group within the framework of the stereotype content model (e.g., Bye, Herrebrøden, Hjetland, Røyset, & Westby, 2014). The prevalence of overtly negative attitudes fits with the treatment of Roma people across Europe (Ng, 2017), which is overtly hostile regardless of existing regional differences in the endorsement of multiculturalism (see e.g., Tremlett & Messing, 2015), and in norms regarding the expression of prejudicial attitudes (for the effect of changing norms on prejudice expression in Western Europe, see Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; for a direct comparison of the normative context and prejudice cross-nationally in Europe see Hello, Scheepers, & Gijsberts, 2002).

Roma people in Eastern Europe are often seen as taking advantage of the welfare system by receiving too many and undeserved benefits, creating the perception of a realistic group conflict (Sherif, 1966) between the majority and the Roma minority (e.g., Cooper, 2001). The idea that limited resources are distributed unfairly, favoring the minority group, corresponds with the concept of modern racism (McConahay, 1983). Modern racism is often justified by meritocratic beliefs suggesting that benefits need to be earned and not handed out unconditionally (see Coenders, Scheepers, Sniderman, & Verberk, 2001; Kuklinski et al., 1997). Furthermore, these ideas fit with the specific stereotypes about the Roma regarding criminality and laziness. The prevalence of these stereotypes in East-Central Europe may be reinforced by the characteristics of the respective cultural contexts: Roma people constitute a large minority group (often close to 10% of the population), and the population of Roma people is growing more rapidly than that of the majority population. Perceived growth of a minority population has been identified as a source of growing prejudice (in line with the concept of realistic threat, Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and overestimation of the population is often used to justify constrictions against a minority group (Clark, 1998). Therefore, attitudes toward Roma people, in countries with a large Roma population, can be shaped by the belief that Roma people are a financial burden to society (Loveland & Popescu, 2016). This may be particularly pivotal if citizens consider their economic resources limited and themselves poor, such as in the case of East-Central Europe, which includes the poorest countries of the continent (European Union, 2019).

Finally, some studies revealed stereotypes about cultural differences that reflect a romantic image of the carefree life of Roma people that the non-Roma majority living in modern, urban, and industrialized social contexts can idealize (Villano et al., 2017). However, this seemingly positive image may have negative consequences as it ties Roma people to the

past and culturally distances them (Kligman, 2001; Sigona, 2005). Although Roma people are associated with musical talent everywhere, their perception as a culturally different out-group has been found mostly outside East-Central Europe (Bigazzi, 2012). Here, ethno-cultural stereotypes are often combined with anti-immigrant sentiments because the Roma minority consists of both a historical Roma minority population (i.e., a more romanticized "nomadic" Roma group) and recent immigrant groups from Eastern Europe (López Catalán, 2012). In sum, studies from different regions of Europe have shown that anti-Gypsyism can consist of (a) traditional negative stereotypes about violations of moral principles wherever Roma people live, (b) depict the Roma as unfair competitors for limited resources in Europe's poorer countries where Roma people constitute a large minority group, and as (c) a culturally different out-group mostly outside East-Central Europe where Roma people constitute a small minority group, some members of which maintain a traditional lifestyle (corresponding with our earlier findings in Kende et al., 2017). Although this conceptualization synthesizes the main findings of anti-Gypsyism research, it focuses mostly on prejudice content. Admittedly, there are other ways of characterizing prejudice against Roma people, for example, by focusing more directly and specifically on intergroup emotions (for research on threat, see Ljujic et al., 2013), or measure the level of dehumanization (Bruneau, Szekeres, Kteily, Tropp, & Kende, 2019). Both constructs can predict behavioral intentions, but capture the specific characteristics of anti-Gypsyism less.

Acculturation Preferences from a Majority Perspective

Berry's acculturation model (Berry, 1997) is undoubtedly the most influential theory describing the psychological processes of intercultural influence. According to this model, immigrant groups can experience four types of acculturation outcomes – integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization – based on (a) preferences for maintaining their original culture and (b) the desire for contact with members of the majority. Integration (i.e., the desire to maintain one's original culture and to have contact with the majority) is related to better psychological and health outcomes than all other acculturation strategies (e.g., Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind, & Vedder, 2001), and it is associated with more positive intergroup attitudes (Zagefka & Brown, 2002; Zagefka, Brown, Broquard, & Martin, 2007). It is equally important that it corresponds with the dominant values of western societies, such as egalitarianism, universalism, and multiculturalism. Therefore, it is also politically the most favorable form of intergroup relation between majority and minority groups. The term integration is often replaced by "inclusion" and "access" in policy documents to emphasize that

majority institutions need to contribute to contact and culture maintenance more (Carrera, 2016).

Because of the power asymmetry between majority and minority groups, acculturation outcome for minority groups is considerably determined by the preferences of the majority, as shown in the case of Roma people (Ljujic, Vedder, Dekker, & van Geel, 2012b). There is vast empirical support for the association between majority members' intergroup attitudes and acculturation preferences for minority groups, suggesting that prejudice is associated with a preference for low contact and culture maintenance of the out-group (e.g., Kunst, Sadeghi, Tahir, Sam, & Thomsen, 2016; Piontkowski, Florack, Hoelker, & Obdrzálek, 2000; Zick, Wagner, van Dick, & Petzel, 2001). In sum, a prejudiced majority group can obstruct the integration efforts of the minority group.

Intergroup prejudice has been considered the outcome of acculturation preferences in cross-sectional studies, especially when it focused on recent immigrant groups (e.g., González, Sirlopú, & Kessler, 2010; Zagefka, Brown, & González, 2009). Yet, other studies viewed acculturation preferences as outcomes of prejudice (Kunst et al., 2016). Considering that intergroup attitudes toward the Roma are deeply historically embedded and stable over time (see Stokes, 2015), we tested the effect of prejudice on acculturation preferences to help understand how integration efforts continue to fail when majority members endorse anti-Gypsyism. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that general attitudes toward integration can also affect prejudice (as shown by longitudinal evidence, Zagefka et al., 2014) by providing a justification for acculturation preferences. However, cross-sectional survey research cannot determine causal influence, as is the case in our research.

Roma people comprise mainly settled communities, therefore the dynamic relationship described in the original description of acculturation theory in connection with immigrant groups may not be directly applicable to the Roma minority. However, one of the main challenges in improving the lives of Roma people and create access to mainstream education, housing, health care and the labor market is the geographical and institutional segregation that Roma people experience in all European countries (European Commission, 2004). Segregation creates an obstacle for contact, and consequently a preference by members of the majority that Roma people either continue to live in segregation (isolation) or to assimilate into the majority society by abandoning their Roma culture and identity. Showing a willingness to engage in contact with Roma people and acknowledge the importance of maintaining Roma culture and identity reflect preferences about mutual cultural adaptation that are in contradiction with

centuries of mainstream practices that maintained segregation and marginalization. This suggests that despite the settled status of these groups, acculturation remains a relevant construct for understanding intergroup relations between non-Roma majority and Roma minority groups, as shown by previous research (Ljujic et al., 2012b).

Historical evidence (Barany, 2000) and (populist) political mobilization strategies suggest that many majority members of European nations have a preference for assimilation and segregation when it comes to Roma people (e.g., Stewart, 2012). These preferences are in stark contrast with efforts of integration (i.e., a preference for both cultural maintenance and contact) that appear in EU directives, some national policies and the work of NGOs (Marushiakova-Popova & Popov, 2015). Therefore, the aim of our study is to understand the connection between anti-Gypsyism and acculturation preferences in countries from different European regions, specifically in Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Norway, Italy, and Spain.

Negative attitudes toward Roma people are widespread in all of these countries according to opinion poll data about social distance, the experience of discrimination, and hate crimes (see e.g. European Commission, 2015). Nonetheless, there are notable differences between them. The countries differ in the size of their Roma population, history of Roma people, cultural heterogeneity of Roma communities, wealth and the strength of the norms of egalitarianism and multiculturalism. Hungary, Romania and Slovakia have high Roma populations, consisting almost exclusively of settled communities who have lived in the region's countries since the middle ages. It is estimated that in all of these countries, the Roma make up 5 to 10% of the overall population. However, data is unreliable because of the lack of official ethnic registry, and people preferring not to identify as Roma in censuses (on the estimated size of the Roma population in Hungary, see Pásztor & Pénzes, 2013; in Romania, see Roma Education Fund, 2012; in Slovakia see Mušinka et al, 2014). Both Italy and Spain have an indigenous Roma population as well as a Roma population from Eastern Europe who arrived following the EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 (Magazzini & Piemontese, 2016). The size of the Roma population is estimated 0.25% in Italy (European Commission, 2018), and around 1% in Spain (López Catalán, 2012). Although Norway too can trace back the presence of Roma people (i.e., "Norwegian Travellers") to the middle ages, the current Roma population consists mainly of recent immigrants from Eastern Europe. It is estimated to be between 0.08 and 0.2% of the overall population (Rosvoll & Bielenberg, 2012).

There are vast differences between the countries included in this research in terms of economic well-being: Norway is one of the richest countries in Europe; Hungary, Slovakia and

Romania are among the poorest; Italy and Spain also face economic hardships and instability, but their GDP is significantly higher than the GDP of East-Central European countries (European Union, 2019). Cross-cultural research indicates that the countries also differ in values that are associated with egalitarianism and openness to cultural differences (see e.g. Schwartz & Bardi, 2001) and indicators of multiculturalism (see e.g. differences in MIPEX scores in connection with migrant integration; Huddleston, Bilgili, Joki, & Vankova, 2015). Generally, Roma people tend to live in larger numbers in poorer countries with weaker egalitarian values.

Hypotheses

We formulated our hypotheses based on the three main dimensions of attitudes toward the Roma in different European countries: (a) blatantly negative stereotypes about criminality and laziness, (b) perception of the Roma as the recipients of undeserved benefits, and (c) a culturally different out-group (for these three aspects of attitudes toward Roma people, see Kende et al., 2017).

H1. We hypothesized that blatant negative stereotyping would predict preferences for low contact and low culture maintenance (i.e., rejecting integration) in all cultural contexts.

H2. We expected that ideas about receiving undeserved benefits would be a stronger predictor of low contact and culture maintenance in East-Central Europe than outside this region, as any policy favoring Roma people are often interpreted as realistic conflict there (Cooper, 2001; Weinerová, 2014).

H3. Ideas about positive cultural difference would be more important predictors for integration outside East-Central Europe, predicting higher contact and cultural maintenance preferences in Southern and Northern Europe (Sigona, 2005), considering that the cultural dimension of Roma representations is more typical outside East-Central Europe (see e.g., Bigazzi, 2012).

Study 2

Participants

The target sample size was calculated for the confirmatory factor analysis of the anti-Gypsyism measure. A priori sample size calculations for Hungary and Slovakia were made for the development of the Attitude Toward the Roma Scale using a rule of thumb in the absence of earlier research. Results of scale development partially (using parts of the current dataset

from Hungary and Slovakia) were published in Kende et al., 2017. Forty items were included in the first version of the scale, therefore we attempted to recruit 400 participants (the process of scale development is described in Kende et al., 2017). For the additional four countries of the current research, we determined the optimal sample size based on the results from Hungary and Slovakia. Besides the number of variables, communalities are recommended to be taken into account for calculating sample size for factor analysis (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999). With the low communalities of some of the items (>.2), the adequate sample size for the three-factorial solution was $N > 300$. This was not reached in Norway, therefore results from this sample need to be treated with caution.

We used different forms of compensation in the different contexts which may have influenced social desirability bias, although instructions made it clear that the compensation is independent from the answers provided in the questionnaire, and compensation was relatively low (for ethical and practical consideration of participant payment see Largent, Grady, Miller, & Wertheimer, 2012). Convenience sampling was used in all six contexts, but some samples were more diverse than others. We could have opted for recruiting only students for the study making multi-group comparisons more feasible. However, because of the well-known limitations of relying exclusively on student samples for the study of complex social issues such as intergroup prejudice (see Sears, 1986), we aimed for the inclusion of more diverse participants. Nevertheless, we kept two samples in the study consisting of only students. Data from Hungary consisted of students from all disciplines where participants completed the questionnaire for course credit. This sample did not differ from the general population in their level of anti-Gypsyism (based on the scores of the feeling thermometer in this sample: $M = 41.05$, $SD = 21.36$ on a scale of 0 to 100, in comparison with data from nationally representative samples, $M = 4.27$, $SD = 2.25$ on a scale of 0 to 10 from database used in Kende et al. (2017), $t(1469) = 1.30$, $p = .194$), therefore, their inclusion in the study seems justified. In Spain, the questionnaire was completed by psychology and social work students who either received course credit or participated for a 100 euros raffle prize. Because this sample consisted of a special subgroup of students, we treat findings from this group with caution and discuss how it may have affected the results in the Discussion. In Romania, Slovakia, Norway and Italy, data was collected partly among university students and partly by students aiming to recruit a more diverse sample in terms of age, gender, level of education and settlement type. Respondents in Norway and Italy did not receive compensation, students in Romania and Slovakia received

course credit. For basic demographic information on the participants and additional information about the questionnaire, see Table 8.

Table 8. Information on data collection and participants across the samples

	Hungary	Romania	Slovakia	Norway	Italy	Spain
The word for Roma people in the different translations of the questionnaire	Roma	Rrom/i	Rómovia	Romfolk	Zingaro	Gitano
Date of data collection	November, 2015	May-June, 2018	April-May, 2016	April-October, 2016	February-May, 2018	November-December, 2017
N	432	443	385	214	318	297
Gender (% women)	77.1	55.3	61.6	61.7	61.4	86.9
Age in years[a]	21.06 (2.09)	37.58 (11.65)	27.58 (11.43)	n=125: 29.28 (11.83) n=76 67.1% <25 21.1% >25	32.90 (12.55)	21.44 (3.31)
Level of education (% university/ongoing university)	100	38.8	35.5	58.4	55.7	100
Political orientation (1=left to 7=right)	4.20 (1.30)	4.21 (1.65)	3.31 (1.59)	3.76 (1.56)	3.69 (1.84)	3.11 (1.46)
Frequency of contact with Roma[b] (% rare or no contact)	26.3	42.5	36.1	45.8	59.3	73.7

Note. [a]To ensure anonymity, in Norway only information on the frequency in different age-groups was collected for part of the sample. [b]Rare or no frequency of contact is the cumulative percent of responses never, very rarely and rarely to a question about frequency of contact with Roma people.

Procedure

We relied on omnibus surveys in Hungary and Slovakia (Kende et al., 2017), we present the results of the Attitudes toward the Roma Scale in both papers), and used a shorter survey to answer the research question of the current paper in the four additional countries.

Data was collected using the Qualtrics online questionnaire platform between 2015 and 2018 (exact dates are shown in Table 1) with IRB approval from the universities involved in the research (Kende et al., 2017). Items of the questionnaire were translated from English to all six languages and back-translated by independent translators. We report all results and data exclusions connected to our research question; the databases are available at https://osf.io/789vp/?view_only=2f30870801574e52b4 a40ab6f68fed7b. We included the responses of all participants who answered the items related to the variables of the hypotheses (additional variables and demographic information were presented later in the questionnaire). Missing values were either negligible or none in all samples, and they were missing at random according to Little MCAR analysis ($p > .05$). We checked for outliers using Z-scores. Responses three standard deviations above and under the means were inspected but kept in the analysis as they did not seem to be data errors, and their number was low (under 0.01% in all samples). We conducted all the statistical analysis using IBM SPSS version 22.0 and AMOS (Arbuckle, 2011).

Measures

We administered the *Attitudes Toward the Roma Scale* (ATRS) consisting of 16 items (Kende et al., 2017).[6] Items of the scale were borrowed from previously used measures of anti-Gypsyism (direct adaptation of items of Dunbar & Simonova, 2003; Enyedi et al., 2004), measures of modern racism (adapted to the context of Roma from Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Pedersen, Beven, Walker, and Griffiths, 2004), and developed based on non-survey research (Bigazzi, 2012; Lášticová & Findor, 2016). Items of the main variables of the study are presented in the Appendix A and B. Respondents expressed their agreement with the items on a 7-point scale from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 7 (*completely agree*) on all measures, unless otherwise indicated. The advantage of using this scale as opposed to non-specified measures of prejudice is that, on the one hand, it contains both overt and veiled prejudice items (similarly to

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[6] We measured the additional items administered in the original study from Hungary and Slovakia, in case the factors needed to be updated or improved following the new data collection. These items are available in the open access database, but were eventually not used in the study.

the blatant and subtle subscales of Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), and on the other hand, it contains items that are specific for anti-Gypsyism based on previous research in this intergroup context. However, the disadvantage of using ATRS is that it does not allow us to compare prejudice level and the relationship patterns between variables with other intergroup contexts.

We relied on Zagefka and Brown's (2002) 5-item acculturation preferences scale of majority groups consisting of two subscales: *preference for contact* and *preference for culture maintenance*. We used the subscales as continuous variables in line with Zagefka et al. (2007) and as recommended by other studies (e.g., Kunst et al., 2016; Rudmin & Ahmadzadeh, 2001), rather than creating the four acculturation outcome categories of Berry's taxonomy.

Additionally, we administered measures of prejudice to check the validity of ATRS across cultural contexts. We measured social distance with the *Bogardus scale* (Bogardus, 1925) where respondents indicated the closest social relationship that they would personally accept with a Roma person using 5 scale points (1 = accepting as a member of the family, 2 = colleague, 3 = neighbor, 4 = inhabitant of my town, 5 = none of the above). It must be noted that although the Bogardus scale has been used to measure prejudice for almost a century, it in fact measures relationship closeness which can be interpreted as a form of contact. Therefore, correlations between this scale and the study variables were checked to rule out the possibility that measures of prejudice and measures of acculturation preferences reflect identical psychological constructs. We used a single-item *feeling thermometer* to measure likability on a 0 (*very unlikeable*) to 100 (*very likeable*) scale. We used the 10-item *SDO*-6 scale (by Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, shortened by Duckitt, 2001) to test support for between-group hierarchies. In addition, we administered the 10-item version of the *motivation to respond without prejudice* scale by Plant and Devine (1998), with two subscales: a 5-item external (EMS), and a 5-item internal motivation scale (IMS) in order to check how different subscales of anti-Gypsyism are associated with genuine (non)prejudice, or alternatively, with the effort to appear politically correct. (One item of EMS was omitted for lack of fit in the Hungarian sample, and consequently removed from all other samples: *"If I acted prejudiced toward Roma people, I would be concerned that others would be angry with me".*)

Analytic procedure. Our analysis comprised two parts. To test whether anti-Gypsyism qualitatively differs between samples, we conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and tests of measurement invariance following the procedures outlined by Vandenberg and Lance (2000). Second, we used a multi-group path-model to test the associations between the different dimensions of anti-Gypsyism and acculturation preferences across the samples.

Results

Factor analysis. We tested measurement invariance of the three-factor structure of ATRS (see Kende et al., 2017) across the samples. We set up four different multigroup CFA models to test for measurement invariance (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). Configural invariance was tested by a model where the basic factorial structure was constrained to be invariant across samples. This model showed an appropriate fit to our data (see Table 9) suggesting the same factorial structure in all six samples. However, higher levels of measurement invariance were not satisfied because the multigroup model with metric invariance (with constrained factor loadings) showed a significantly worse fit than the previous model, and the model with scalar invariance (with constrained factor loadings and intercepts) showed an even worse fit than the model with metric invariance. The fourth model with full uniqueness across our samples (with constrained factor loadings, intercepts, and error variances) showed the worst fit, significantly worse than the model with scalar invariance (see Table 9). In sum, because configural invariance was achieved, we can assume that participants from different countries conceptualized the three main dimensions of attitudes toward the Roma similarly, enabling us to investigate further the correlates of these dimensions, but not allowing direct comparisons in the level of anti-Gypsyism.

Table 9. Fit indices of the measurement invariance models

Model	χ^2	df	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	AIC	$\Delta\chi^2$ (Compared to the previous model)	Δdf (Compared to the previous model)	p ($\Delta\chi^2$ tests)
Multigroup - Configural Invariance	1281.45	606	.939	.023	.068	1893.45	-	-	-
Multigroup - Metric Invariance	1663.22	686	.912	.026	.101	2115.22	381.77	80	<.001
Multigroup - Scalar Invariance	3977.27	766	.711	.045	.075	4269.27	2314.05	80	<.001
Multigroup - Full Uniqueness	4657.54	846	.658	.046	.075	4789.54	680.28	80	<.001

Descriptive statistics. Information on the internal consistency of the scales, means, standard deviations, as well as correlations between the variables can be found in Table 10. Because of the lack of metric and scalar equivalence across samples, we did not conduct direct comparisons cross-culturally. However, the means of the feeling thermometer and the Bogardus scale reflect a higher rejection of Roma people in the Hungarian, Romanian, and Slovak samples than in the other three contexts, and according to these measures, the lowest level of prejudice was in the Spanish sample, followed by the Norwegian and Italian samples.

Table 10. Scale reliability information, descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables of the study in all six samples.

Hungary	α	M	SD	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1. Blatant	0.85	4.14	1.52	.76**	-.01	-.62**	-.54**	.26**	-.71**	.43**	-.71**	.62**
2. Undeserved	0.90	4.10	1.47		-.01	-.56**	-.45**	.17**	-.62**	.33**	-.53**	.50**
3. Cultural	0.67	3.46	1.15			.14**	.09	.13**	.08	.01	.14**	.03
4. Contact preference	0.82**a	3.70	1.77				.40**	-.15**	.61**	-.33**	.59**	-.51**
5. Cultural maintenance	0.78	4.73	1.35					-.18**	.39**	-.31**	.45**	-.27**
6. EMS	0.74	2.96	1.21						-.01	.14**	.14**	-.20**
7. IMS	0.78	4.16	1.36							.43**	.66**	.55**
8. SDO	0.82	2.92	1.06								-.35**	.29**
9. Feeling thermometer		41.05	21.36									-.52**
10. Bogardus		2.46	1.31									

Romania	α	M	SD	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1. Blatant	0.83	4.77	1.15	.60**	-.04	-.35**	-.27**	.14**	-.47**	.37**	-.44**	.42**
2. Undeserved	0.70	4.60	1.07		-.03	-.31**	-.18**	.19**	-.31**	.24**	-.34**	.28**
3. Cultural	0.63	3.86	1.06			.27**	.16**	.10*	.16**	-.02	.21**	-.02
4. Contact preference	0.50**a	4.75	1.23				.39**	-.19**	.45**	-.39**	.37**	-.30**
5. Cultural maintenance	0.73	5.17	1.20					-.08	.32**	-.27**	.21**	-.09
6. EMS	0.80	3.40	1.17						-.08	.20**	-.06	.19**
7. IMS	0.81	4.47	1.11							.47**	-.39**	-.41**
8. SDO	0.76	3.08	0.90								-.23**	.35**

	α	M	SD	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
9. Feeling thermometer		41.57	22.69									-.39**
10. Bogardus		3.10	1.21									

Slovakia	α	M	SD	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1. Blatant	0.89	4.66	1.33	.67**	-.01	-.53**	-.58**	.15**	-.67**	.61**	-.67**	.63**
2. Undeserved	0.78	4.87	1.22		.13**	-.42**	-.45**	.14**	-.52**	.42**	-.47**	.47**
3. Cultural	0.62	3.89	1.00			.10*	.08	.17**	.10	-.04	.12*	-.02
4. Contact preference	0.48**a	4.36	1.33				.54**	.03	-.54**	.49**	-.48**	-.45**
5. Cultural maintenance	0.78	4.26	1.31					-.01	.53**	-.50**	.49**	-.47**
6. EMS	0.79	3.10	1.15						.01	.07	-.10*	.16**
7. IMS	0.82	4.22	1.21							-.60**	.59**	-.57**
8. SDO	0.81	3.22	0.91								-.49**	.51**
9. Feeling thermometer		35.18	21.50									-.61**
10. Bogardus		3.18	1.39									

Norway	α	M	SD	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1. Blatant	0.85	3.52	1.14	.57**	-.20**	-.43**	-.51**	.23**	-.49**	.55**	-.63**	.50**
2. Undeserved	0.76	3.18	0.99		-.05	-.26**	-.32**	.25**	-.34**	.47**	-.46**	.31**
3. Cultural	0.67	3.30	0.90			.25**	.30**	.09	.28**	-.25**	.18*	-.10
4. Contact preference	0.58**a	4.92	1.30				.38**	-.05	.48**	-.49**	.43**	-.37**
5. Cultural maintenance	0.81	4.66	1.33					-.07	.50**	-.55**	.43**	-.36**
6. EMS	0.83	2.91	1.18						.03	.22**	-.21**	.21**
7. IMS	0.84	4.74	1.21							-.62**	.52**	-.44**

	α	M	SD	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
8. SDO	0.84	2.69	0.95								-.49**	.43**
9. Feeling thermometer		50.43	21.04									-.51**
10. Bogardus		2.21	1.28									

Italy	α	M	SD	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1. Blatant	0.86	3.48	1.52	.62**	-.04	-.48**	-.48**	.14*	-.56**	.48**	-.60**	.53**
2. Undeserved	0.76	3.59	1.35		.07	-.29**	-.30**	.11	-.39**	.30**	-.41**	.41**
3. Cultural	0.65	2.76	1.12			.20**	.23**	.17**	.12*	-.06	.22**	-.06
4. Contact preference	0.69**a	5.00	1.65				.46**	-.03	-.51**	.41**	.51**	-.43**
5. Cultural maintenance	0.77	5.32	1.51					-.01	.52**	-.36**	.44**	-.34**
6. EMS	0.69	2.56	1.31						.04	.18**	-.05	.22**
7. IMS	0.78	4.87	1.42							.50**	.57**	-.48**
8. SDO	0.77	2.51	1.03								-.42**	.44**
9. Feeling thermometer		39.43	22.42									-.52**
10. Bogardus		3.21	1.30									

Spain	α	M	SD	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1. Blatant	0.82	2.48	1.06	.56**	.21**	-.17**	-.35**	.37**	-.56**	.37**	-.56**	.46**
2. Undeserved	0.71	3.25	1.01		.17**	-.05	-.18**	.24**	-.44**	.30**	-.36**	.33**
3. Cultural	0.66	3.40	1.02			.01	.01	.17**	-.18**	.14*	-.04	.09
4. Contact preference	0.46**a	5.23	1.24				.21**	-.14*	.22**	-.18**	.16**	-.11
5. Cultural maintenance	0.87	5.95	1.07					-.29**	-.32**	-.33**	-.34**	-.33**
6. EMS	0.82	2.53	1.22						.31**	.36**	-.23**	.27**

7. IMS	0.80	5.61	0.97		-.52**	.40**	-.35**
8. SDO	0.77	1.98	0.76			-.19**	.26**
9. Feeling thermometer		62.54	20.29				-.44**
10. Bogardus		1.63	0.96				

Note. ** $p < .001$. [a] To check internal consistency, we calculated correlations coefficients for the two items of preference for contact.

Across the samples, we found a similar pattern of correlations between the variables that inform us about the validity of ATRS: blatant negative stereotypes and undeserved benefits were positively correlated in all samples, and negatively with preference for contact and cultural maintenance. They also both positively correlated with other measures indicating prejudicial attitudes (i.e., feeling thermometer, Bogardus scale, SDO, EMS, IMS), although more weakly in case of undeserved benefits. Correlations between the Bogardus scale and the measure of contact suggest that these are related, but distinct constructs with correlations ranging from nonsignificant to $r = .51$, $p < .001$. However, patterns varied greatly across contexts regarding the correlations between the cultural difference dimension and other variables. To start with, cultural difference was independent from the other two ATRS factors in most samples, only weakly positively correlated in Slovakia and Spain. In Hungary, Slovakia and Romania cultural difference correlated positively with the feeling thermometer and EMS, and not with IMS, suggesting that endorsement of these positive cultural difference stereotypes may be an attempt to appear non-prejudiced, rather than the expression of genuinely positive attitudes. The pattern was similar in the Italian sample, however, it also positively correlated with IMS, suggesting that endorsement of these positive stereotypes may reflect more genuinely positive attitudes. Higher acceptance of positively phrased cultural difference items reflected genuinely non-prejudiced attitudes among Norwegian participants based on the positive correlation with IMS, not EMS, and the opposite pattern of correlations in comparison with the other two subscales. Only in the context of Spain, positive cultural stereotypes about the Roma seemed to be an expression of negative attitudes as the pattern of correlations was the same as the other two negative subscales, and cultural difference correlated positively with EMS, and negatively with IMS.

Hypothesis testing. Using a path model, we checked how the three subscales of attitudes toward the Roma predicted the two dimensions of acculturation preferences. We controlled for the effect of SDO to rule out measuring the effect of a general prejudicial tendency, and also controlled for demographic variables, such as gender, age, and level of education. The model was also tested without control variables and the pattern of connection remained the same (the model without control variables is available in the supplementary materials). The results are presented in Figure 4, and statistical details are shown in Table 11.

Figure 4. Path model describing the relationship between the three factors of antigypsyism and acculturation preferences using standardized coefficients. Unstandardized coefficients, exact p values and confidence intervals are shown in Table 11.

Notes. SDO, age, gender and level of education are controlled in the model. *** $p <$ .001, * $p < .05$. HU=Hungary, RO=Romania, SK=Slovakia, NO=Norway, IT=Italy, ES=Spain.

Table 11. Information on the regression paths of the model in all six samples including SDO, age, gender, and level of education as control variables

Predictor→Outcome	β	B	SE	p	LLCI	ULCI
Hungary						
Blatant stereotyping→Contact preference	-.43	-.51	.07	<.001	-.64	-.36
Blatant stereotyping→Culture maintenance	-.43	-.38	.06	<.001	-.49	-.26
Undeserved benefits→Contact preference	-.21	-.26	.07	<.001	-.39	-.11
Undeserved benefits→Culture maintenance	-.08	-.08	.06	.156	-.18	.03
Cultural difference→Contact preference	.14	.21	.06	<.001	.11	.32
Cultural difference→Culture maintenance	.10	.11	.05	.041	.02	.21
Romania						
Blatant stereotyping→Contact preference	-.13	-.13	.06	<.001	-.25	-.02
Blatant stereotyping→Culture maintenance	-.18	-.19	.06	.003	-.32	-.05
Undeserved benefits→Contact preference	-.16	-.18	.06	.002	-.30	-.06
Undeserved benefits→Culture maintenance	-.02	-.02	.06	.712	-.14	.10
Cultural difference→Contact preference	.25	.29	.05	<.001	.18	.38
Cultural difference→Culture maintenance	.14	.15	.05	.003	.04	.27
Slovakia						
Blatant stereotyping→Contact preference	-.28	-.28	.06	<.001	-.41	-.15
Blatant stereotyping→Culture maintenance	-.35	-.34	.06	<.001	-.47	-.22
Undeserved benefits→Contact preference	-.12	-.13	.06	.031	-.26	-.01
Undeserved benefits→Culture maintenance	-.12	-.13	.06	.024	-.24	-.02
Cultural difference→Contact preference	.12	.16	.06	.004	.05	.28
Cultural difference→Culture maintenance	.10	.13	.05	.019	.02	.23
Norway						
Blatant stereotyping→Contact preference	-.24	-.27	.09	.001	-.49	-.05
Blatant stereotyping→Culture maintenance	-.33	-.38	.08	<.001	-.59	-.16
Undeserved benefits→Contact preference	.07	.10	.10	.289	-.12	.31
Undeserved benefits→Culture maintenance	.06	.08	.09	.408	-.13	.25
Cultural difference→Contact preference	.13	.18	.09	.040	<-.01	.36
Cultural difference→Culture maintenance	.18	.27	.09	.002	.07	.44
Italy						
Blatant stereotyping→Contact preference	-.39	-.43	.07	<.001	-.59	-.24
Blatant stereotyping→Culture maintenance	-.36	-.36	.06	<.001	-.53	-.21
Undeserved benefits→Contact preference	-.01	-.01	.07	.992	-.17	.15
Undeserved benefits→Culture maintenance	-.03	-.03	.07	.606	-.19	.11
Cultural difference→Contact preference	.18	.27	.07	<.001	.11	.41
Cultural difference→Culture maintenance	.21	.29	.06	<.001	.14	.41

Spain						
Blatant stereotyping→Contact preference	-.18	-.21	.08	.013	-.37	-.03
Blatant stereotyping→Culture maintenance	.30	-.30	.07	<.001	-.45	-.16
Undeserved benefits→Contact preference	.09	.11	.08	.211	-.06	.28
Undeserved benefits→Culture maintenance	.05	.05	.07	.487	-.09	.19
Cultural difference→Contact preference	.04	.05	.07	.500	-.10	.19
Cultural difference→Culture maintenance	.09	.10	.06	.087	-.02	.22

The regression paths indicate that across all samples blatant negative stereotyping predicted a lower preference for contact and culture maintenance for the Roma. Regression coefficients were the highest in the Hungarian and the Italian samples, and weakest in the Romanian sample. Undeserved benefits predicted contact preferences negatively only in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, and culture maintenance only among Slovak participants. The cultural difference subscale predicted contact intentions and culture maintenance weakly positively in Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Norway, and Italy, but seemed unrelated to acculturation in Spain. Differences in the strengths of the coefficients were tested with constrained paths (for information on the fit of the constrained models see Table 12). Only the paths between blatant stereotyping and preference for contact, and undeserved benefits and preference for contact differed significantly.

Table 12. Model fit information with constrained paths regarding the model of Figure 4.

Path	X^2	df	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	ΔX^2	Δdf	p
Blatant Stereotyping → Contact preference	20.04	5	.995	.038	.014	20.04	5	.001
Blatant Stereotyping → Culture maintenance	7.38	5	.999	.015	.005	7.38	5	.194
Undeserved benefits → Contact preference	17.21	5	.996	.340	.011	17.21	5	.004
Undeserved benefits→ Culture maintenance	5.50	5	1	.007	.003	5.50	5	.358
Cultural difference → Contact preference	9.05	5	.999	.020	.001	9.05	5	.107
Cultural difference → Culture maintenance	6.79	5	.999	.013	.009	6.79	5	.237

Explained variance (see Figure 4) also showed variation across samples; more than 28% of variance of preference for contact was explained by the three dimensions of ATRS in all samples except for Spain, which showed a mere 5%. Explained variance in preference for culture maintenance was quite low in Romania ($R^2 = .13$) and Spain ($R^2 = .18$), but above 29% in all other samples.

Discussion

This study was a first attempt to investigate the different aspects of anti-Gypsyism cross-culturally and identify how they relate to acculturation preferences. The research was conducted with the aim of investigating the potential individual level psychological obstacles to Roma integration efforts among majority members in different societies. This was necessitated by the lack of previous empirical evidence about acculturation preferences of members of the national majorities of Europe and information about the predictors of these preferences (for an exception, see Ljujic et al., 2012b). Our data clearly indicated that anti-Gypsyism is an important predictor of acculturation preferences cross-culturally, but policy decisions on Roma inclusion should take into account the specific nature of Roma–non-Roma relations in each region of Europe, rather than pursue a "blanket approach" assumed to work across Europe.

Using confirmatory factor analysis, we identified that the three subscales of ATRS can adequately capture the distinct aspects of anti-Gypsyism within different cultural contexts. This finding supports the idea that attitudes toward the Roma across societies are shaped, on the one hand, by traditional negative stereotypes reflecting ideas about violations of moral principles (e.g., beliefs about laziness, criminality). These beliefs resemble old-fashioned prejudice, which research on racism suggested was declining since the 1980s (see McConahay, 1980). The fact that Roma people are still seen through traditionally negative stereotypes may be explained by the specific target perceptions (i.e., prejudice content) that the majority population have about the Roma which can justify the overt expression of prejudice (for a review on target perceptions and prejudice expression, see Kende & McGarty, 2019). On the other hand, the undeserved benefits subscale of ATRS which contains items mostly adopted from scales of modern racism, reveals that Roma people are also considered competitors for limited resources and therefore represent a tangible threat (see Stephan & Stephan, 2000). This seems particularly relevant in the sample from the three East-Central European countries that are poorer and have a higher Roma population. Therefore, participants from these countries may be more likely to consider any kind of effort to improve the situation of Roma people as an unfair advantage and therefore

a threat to their own well-being. Finally, a third independent factor was identified in all contexts that contains recognition of traditional Roma culture. Although this subscale contains positively worded items, it is only weakly associated with some of the positive attitude measures, and not related to most others. Except for Spain, in all other contexts, it was (weakly) positively correlated with external motivations to respond without prejudice. This suggests that agreeing with these positively phrased cultural difference items may simply reflect a wish to appear non-prejudiced.

In line with our hypothesis, we found that the inhibition to engage in contact with members of the Roma minority and to accept Roma culture are most strongly and negatively predicted by blatantly negative stereotypes in all six contexts (H1). Stereotypes about Roma people receiving too much and undeserved benefits appeared as a less powerful predictor of acculturation preferences. Specifically, it only appeared as a weak, but significant predictor of contact preferences in the three East-Central European countries in line with our hypothesis (H2). These results suggest that Roma integration strategies may be primarily rejected on the basis of morally-framed stereotypes about criminality and laziness, but in the East-Central European context, Roma—non-Roma relations are also interpreted as a realistic conflict. This perception of the intergroup situation is in line with previous research suggesting that economic competition is an important element of acculturation preferences (Zagefka et al., 2007). It is also connected to the political and economic reality of Europe, namely that Roma people constitute a large percentage of the population in those countries where majority members feel relatively deprived themselves compared to countries of Western Europe (a phenomenon often described by the two-speed Europe concept, Yanniris, 2017). The relative importance of undeserved benefits in predicting acculturation preferences in these countries also fits with the assumption that, when prejudice is high, people rely on justifying ideologies, such as meritocracy beliefs (i.e., benefits should be earned and not received unconditionally) to reject integration efforts (see Coenders et al., 2001; Kuklinski et al., 1997).

We measured cultural differences with the expectation that it can either be an expression of positive attitudes (i.e., an appreciation of cultural diversity) or a veiled expression of prejudice (i.e., by suggesting that Roma people are tied to cultural stereotypes from the past, Kligman, 2001; Villano et al., 2017). Insistence on cultural differences has been identified as a veiled form of racism by previous research. That is, when overtly racists stereotypes do not predict attitudinal outcomes, beliefs in cultural difference may continue to do so (Leach et al., 2000). Our results showed that both of these patterns can be found, along with a more

ambivalent interpretation of cultural differences in some contexts, but the cultural difference dimension did not or only very weakly predicted acculturation outcomes. In sum, the cultural difference dimension may not be a general measure of anti-Gypsyism in the sense that blatant negative stereotyping and undeserved benefits are, but it is a context-dependent measure that can reflect psychological distancing from the group as well as a genuine endorsement of cultural diversity. Therefore, we did not receive support for our third hypothesis, as we expected that recognition of cultural differences would be a positive predictor of integration preferences mostly in the contexts of Southern and Northern Europe, but not in East-Central Europe; however, it seems that cultural difference was a weak positive predictor in all contexts, except for Spain. Indeed, cultural differences did not play a central role in accepting or rejecting Roma integration.

Limitations

Firstly, we need to acknowledge that our choice of measures has both strengths and limitations. As we have already explained in the introduction section on anti-Gypsyism across Europe, we conceptualized anti-Gypsyism based on the main characteristics of attitudes toward Roma people highlighted by previous research. This approach is reflected in the way ATRS operationalizes anti-Gypsyism, but it does not include other, possibly similarly relevant attitude dimensions. Furthermore, we relied on a five-item scale of acculturation which measures contact preferences through the limited lens of friendships and interpersonal encounters, and were therefore unable to capture the complexity of intergroup contact with Roma people. It may thus be desirable to use a more complex measure of contact preferences in future research.

We collected data in six European countries and aimed to recruit diverse samples wherever possible. Nonetheless, these samples are not representative of the respective populations, and participants had a higher than average level of education in all six contexts. This possibly affected our results, for example, by lower overall levels of prejudice or higher intentions to appear non-prejudiced (see Hello et al., 2002). The sampling method may have affected the data from Spain most strongly (who were psychology and social work students), where participants showed the lowest level of anti-Gypsyism and lowest frequency of contact. The suboptimal sample size of Norway also necessitates the inclusion of larger and more diverse samples from Northern Europe for more generalizable findings. Specifically, the finding regarding cultural difference as an expression of positive attitude in Norway as opposed to negative attitudes in Spain should therefore be treated with caution.

Despite the important insights that can be drawn from countries with different normative contexts and different historical presence and demographic patterns of Roma populations, the inclusion of more countries (e.g., Western European countries with a Traveller or Sinti population and Canada with a recent immigrant minority) could allow for better identification of context-specific versus transnational trends in Roma inclusion and increase the validity of the present research.

Finally, despite collecting data in six countries and measuring identical constructs, because of the lack of metric and scalar equivalence, our data was not suitable to offer direct cross-cultural comparisons. Future research may therefore aim to further adjust the ATRS to achieve higher levels of measurement equivalence, for example, by generating items that are less sensitive to linguistic differences.

Conclusions

Our study about attitudes toward Roma people and acculturation preferences in six European countries highlighted that blatant negative stereotyping, that is, hostile and traditional negative stereotypes about the group, are robust predictors of acculturation preferences among majority members of society. However, in East-Central Europe, where the Roma constitute a large minority group and the countries are relatively poor, to some extent, Roma people are also rejected on the basis of realistic conflict, associated with the belief that the Roma do not deserve the benefits they receive. It seems that European values of universalism, humanism, and the consequent norms of egalitarianism and fairness are questioned when it comes to intergroup relations between European national majority groups and Roma people. However, appreciation of traditional Roma culture – that also fits with commonly held stereotypes about the Roma – appears neither as an obstacle towards, nor a real driver of integration. We believe that these results point to the importance of recognizing anti-Gypsyism – a highly neglected yet extremely relevant form of ethnic prejudice – as an important element of the resistance to Roma inclusion across Europe. Finally, we conclude that any regional differences in predicting acculturation preferences conditioned by anti-Gypsyism indicate that the effectiveness of integration interventions would have to be more context-specific rather than pan-national and general.

Reducing prejudice by changing social norms[7]

The Roma severe discrimination, social marginalization, and segregation can be found in all countries of Europe, however, according to international polls, they are particularly severe in East-Central Europe. Despite the existence of anti-discrimination laws, without strong egalitarian and non-prejudicial social norms, blatant prejudice and even hate-speech are socially sanctioned and widespread (Vidra & Fox, 2014). In Hungary's demographically segregated and highly unequal society, positive intergroup contact is atypical, while the level of anti-Gypsyism has been identified as the strongest and most openly expressed form of intergroup hatred (Enyedi, Fábián, & Sik 2004). In this context, contact between non-Roma and Roma people is more likely to predict negative rather than positive attitudes (Kende, Hadarics, & Lášticová, 2016), making it particularly challenging to find effective strategies to combat prejudice. We present a quasi-experiment to test the potential strengths and limits of a contact-based prejudice reduction intervention under these suboptimal societal conditions.

Intergroup Friendship as a Method of Prejudice Reduction

One prejudice reduction strategy that has received a great deal of research attention in recent years involves the development of intergroup friendship (Davies, Tropp, Aron, Pettigrew, & Wright, 2011; see also Pettigrew, 1998). Optimal conditions for successful intergroup contact – such as equal status and cooperation between members of different groups (Allport, 1954, Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) – are exemplified in intergroup friendship (Wright, Aron, & Brody, 2008). A great deal of research evidence also demonstrates an association between intergroup friendship and positive intergroup attitudes, whereby key elements such as enhanced closeness and mutual self-disclosure can contribute to reducing prejudice between groups (Davies et al., 2011, Turner, Hewstone, & Voci, 2007).

Greater closeness between members of different groups typically develops over repeated contact experiences, but it can also be developed during a very short procedure of reciprocal self-disclosure – sometimes referred to as the "Fast Friends" method (see Aron, Melinat, Aron, Vallone, & Bator, 1997). These newly formed relationships are evaluated as significantly closer and more positive than relationships developed in the same amount of time without reciprocal self-disclosure, and they can lead to experiences and levels of prejudice reduction comparable

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[7] This chapter is based on the following publication: Kende, A., Tropp, L., & Lantos, N. A. (2017). Testing a contact intervention based on intergroup friendship between Roma and non-Roma Hungarians: Reducing bias through institutional support in a non-supportive societal context. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *47*(1), 47-55.

to longer-standing friendships (Aron et al., 1997; Davies, Wright, Aron, & Comeau, 2013). It should also be noted that intergroup friendships are especially likely to reduce prejudice on affective dimensions (such as feelings or emotions toward the out-group), while less prejudice reduction may be observed on more cognitive dimensions (e.g., beliefs or stereotypes about the out-group; see Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005).

Intergroup Friendship in Hostile Intergroup Contexts

Although the notion that intergroup friendships can reduce prejudice has received considerable empirical support (see Davies et al., 2011), little research has considered whether such a prejudice reduction strategy would be effective in contexts where groups are segregated and hostile intergroup norms prevail (see Hewstone et al., 2004). Questions remain as to whether interventions involving the building blocks of intergroup friendship can be effective in reducing prejudice when embedded in broader societal contexts that reinforce prejudice, such as in Hungary. A recent study conducted in Hungary has suggested that anti-Gypsyism can be reduced through contact with trained volunteers (Orosz, Bánki, Bőethe, Tóth-Király, &Tropp, 2016), yet it is still unknown whether contact interventions – and particularly those based on building intergroup friendship – can be effective when tested among non-trained members of the Hungarian public.

In segregated societies, physical separation becomes an additional barrier to the development of such close relationships (Festinger, Back, & Schachter, 1950). In the case of Roma people who face segregated demographic and institutional practices in Hungary (Greenberg, 2010; Kende, 2000; Kovács, 2012), permissive legislation allows school segregation and leads to an almost complete absence of Roma pupils in higher education institutions (Kertesi & Kézdi, 2011). Nonetheless, historical examples – such as the African American Civil Rights Movement, the end of the Apartheid system in South Africa, the Troubles in Northern Ireland, and attempts at reconciliation in post-war Bosnia – all point out that close, positive relations between members of different groups can lead to positive outcomes even in the context of severe intergroup hostility, segregation, and conflict (e.g., Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008; Cook & Sellitz, 1955; Dixon et al., 2010; Hewstone et al., 2004). In particular, the causal relationship between intergroup contact and positive shifts in intergroup attitudes is underlined by successful interventions in major conflict zones (see Al Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013). Therefore, we implemented a contact-based intervention, based largely on the "Fast Friends" procedure (see Davies et al., 2013[1]) to test whether intergroup friendship can

lead to prejudice reduction even in the highly segregated and hostile context of relations between Roma and non-Roma in Hungary.

The Role of Supportive Institutional Norms in Prejudice Reduction

Moreover, the present research adds to prior work by testing the effectiveness of a friendship-based contact intervention in this highly segregated and hostile context while also testing how institutional norms of non-prejudice might moderate the effects of the contact intervention. Institutional norms can define both opportunities for positive intergroup contact and the consequent effects of contact on attitude change (Ata, Bastian, & Lusher, 2009; Lewis, Chesler, & Forman, 2000). Given the structure they provide to interactions between groups, institutional norms play an important role in achieving positive attitude change and reinforcing other conditions for positive contact, such as cooperation and equal status (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Consistent with Allport's (1954) analysis at a time when racial segregation was widely accepted in the U.S., institutional norms that explicitly support contact between groups can help to reduce prejudice. Thus, even in the midst of intergroup segregation and hostility that exemplify non-supportive societal contexts, interventions that encourage contact between groups should be especially likely to yield reductions in prejudice to the extent that they highlight institutional norms of non-prejudice.

Research Goals

The present research examines these issues by testing the effects of a contact intervention based on intergroup friendship between Roma and non-Roma in Hungary. Using a modified version of the "Fast Friends" procedure (Aron et al., 1997)[8], we tested whether building friendship between non-Roma and Roma university students could lead non-Roma Hungarians to develop more positive attitudes toward Roma people, and whether the effect of the intervention can be reinforced by the perception of supportive institutional norms.[9]

Despite the limited opportunities for casual contact between non-Roma and Roma students in higher education, the "Fast Friends" procedure seemed suitable because it involved interpersonal contact that was relatively easy to attain, and that we expected to be acceptable to

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[8] The study was presented by Davies and Aron at the SPSSI-EASP Small Group Meeting on Proactive Behavior across Group Boundaries in Port Jefferson, NY, in 2012. Details of the procedure acquired from Kristin Davies personally.

[9] We were particularly concerned with the problem of prejudice against Roma people and focused primarily on the attitude change of non-Roma Hungarians. Therefore, we did not analyze the influence of the intervention on Roma participants, but debriefed them after the intervention

Hungarian students who are otherwise reluctant to engage with Roma or be confronted with the issue of anti-Gypsyism. Moreover, the university context, and especially the particular course from which non-Roma participants were recruited, provided an opportunity for this rare intergroup contact while offering institutional support that might counter the effect of the dominant prejudicial societal norms and public discourse.

Given the context, some adjustments to the "Fast Friends" intervention were necessary. We had to frame the intervention as a meeting between psychology students and members of a Roma university organization; this was necessary because of the low proportion of Roma students in any particular university group. This meant that both the intergroup nature of the contact intervention, and the shared identity of being university students would be salient. While the enhanced salience of ethnic identities and a common group identity could promote the generalization of any positive change in attitudes (see Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), the explicit intergroup nature of the intervention could also potentially activate reluctance or reactance given the generally hostile attitudes toward Roma people in society (see, e.g., Cavazza & Butera, 2008; Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2007). We take these potential effects into account in the interpretation of the results.

Hypotheses

Consistent with earlier work (see Davies et al., 2011), we predicted that a positive contact experience elicited through the friendship-based contact intervention would increase Hungarians' positive feelings toward Roma people and create an openness toward future contact with Roma. We also tested whether such a positive contact experience would affect Hungarians' negative beliefs about Roma people. More specifically, we expected a condition x time interaction effect, such that Hungarian participants assigned to the contact intervention condition would report a more positive change in attitudes toward Roma following the intervention than participants assigned to the control condition. Additionally, we tested whether perceived institutional norms would moderate the effects of the contact intervention, such that those who participated in the intervention and perceived stronger institutional norms supporting non-prejudice would show greater attitude change than those who perceived weaker institutional norms supporting non-prejudice. We included perceived norms in the study as a moderator based on the expectation that pre-existing norm perceptions independent from the contact situation also play a role in how the intervention affects attitude change.

Study 3

Study Design and Procedure

The study was carried out in 2015, following IRB approval. We used a 2 (condition) x 2 (time) mixed factorial design with one experimental condition (contact intervention) and one control condition (no contact), and measuring changes in intergroup outcomes over time through comparisons of pre-test and post-test scores. Introductory social psychology courses were used as sites of recruitment, and different sections (seminar groups) of the courses were randomly chosen to recruit participants for either the experimental (contact) condition or the control (no contact) condition. This procedure was used to ensure that participants in the control condition would not be aware of the contact intervention. Hungarian students enrolled in the social psychology courses were recruited as participants in the study, and they received course credit for their participation. According to the 2011 census, less than 1% of Roma people hold a higher education degree. Given that direct questions regarding ethnic background are unacceptable in the Hungarian context, we were not able to verify that none of the psychology students was of a Roma background; nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that any psychology students were Roma, and none of the psychology students indicated that they were Roma over the course of the study. Therefore, we worked from the assumption that psychology students were non-Roma.

Roma interaction partners for the intervention were recruited through a Roma university organization; they participated voluntarily, and the intervention took place at the time and location of their organization's regular meetings (see **Contact Intervention**, below).

The intervention took place either 2 or 6 weeks after the pre-test[10], and the post-test was administered 5 weeks after the second intervention for all participants. Respondents were not aware of the connection between the questionnaires and the intervention, which was ensured by administering the tests and the intervention by different researchers and recruiting participants from different course sections. All questionnaires were completed on paper, in Hungarian. Measures originally in English were translated to Hungarian and back-translated to English.

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[10] Participants joined one of the two intervention sessions only; it was for logistical reasons (e.g., students' schedules and availability) that the intervention took place on two separate occasions rather than at once.

Students in course sections randomly chosen for the experimental condition were informed that they would have an opportunity to meet a Roma student from another university, the purpose of the meeting was to get to know each other, and it required no advance preparation. They were debriefed only after completion of the post-test.

Contact Intervention

The contact intervention lasted approximately 60 minutes, during which participants in the experimental condition were randomly assigned to interact with a Roma university student. They were seated in pairs in a large hall which allowed them to engage in conversation privately; they were also informed that no recording of their conversations would be made. They were instructed to take turns in asking and answering three sets of closeness-generating questions, entailing increasing levels of self-disclosure, which were translated and adapted from Aron et al. (1997). Sample questions from the different sets include: *"What would constitute a 'perfect' day for you?"* (set 1)*, "What is your biggest fear in life?"* (set 2), and *"Alternate sharing something you consider a positive inner characteristic of your partner"* (set 3). Each set of questions was discussed for about 20 minutes.

Measures

Measures of attitudes toward Roma, anti-Roma beliefs, and contact intentions were included in both the pre-test and post-test questionnaires administered to participants.

Attitudes toward Roma were measured by a 6-item semantic differential scale. Items included the following word pairs presented on opposite ends of 5-point semantic differential scales: *cold – warm, negative – positive, hostile – friendly, contempt – respect, suspicious – trusting, disgust – admiration* ($\alpha_{pretest}$ = .81; $\alpha_{posttest}$ = .81; see Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). Higher scores correspond with more positive attitudes toward Roma.

Anti-Roma beliefs were assessed using four items from a measure widely used in Hungary (Enyedi et al., 2004), including: *"The problems of Roma people would dissolve if they had started working," "Roma people must get more help than others," "Many Roma people do not work, because they don't get work (reverse scored),"* and *"There are so many children in Roma families, because they want to live on the allowances they get for having children."* ($\alpha_{pretest}$ = .67 ; $\alpha_{posttest}$ = .75).

Contact intentions were measured using a single item developed for this study regarding willingness to encounter Roma people: *"Would you attend an informal social event with Roma*

people around?". Responses to the anti-Roma beliefs and contact intentions items were scored on 5-point scales ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree).

Pre-existing friendships with Roma people were measured by asking: *"Are there any Roma people among your close friends?"* The answer options were *yes*, *no* and *I don't know*, and the "yes" response was considered as indicative of pre-existing friendships.

Three additional items were included in the post-test questionnaire to assess students' **perceptions of anti-prejudice norms**, two in relation to institutional norms at the university and in the course (i.e., *"[The university/The social psychology course] supports interventions to decrease anti-Gypsyism"*, $r = .55$, $p < .001$), and one item in relation to Hungarian society more generally (i.e., *"In Hungary, state institutions, like courts, schools, healthcare institutions, support interventions to decrease anti-Gypsyism"*). Responses to these items were scored on 5-point scales ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree).

Finally, the post-test questionnaire included an item to assess students' **perceptions of attitude change** since the pre-test (i.e., *"Has your opinion concerning Roma people changed since you completed this questionnaire for the first time?"*). The response scale ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). We used a manipulation check to examine whether participants correctly identified their partner as a member of the Roma student organization.

In addition to pre-test and post-test questionnaires, we asked participants to complete a separate questionnaire immediately after the intervention which included five items regarding the quality of the interaction, scored on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). These items included: *"How much do you like your conversation partner?"*, *"How close would you rate the relationship between you and your conversation partner?"*, *"How much did you enjoy the conversation with your partner?"*, *"If you had the chance, would you continue the conversation with your partner?"*, and *"Can you imagine getting in contact with your conversation partner again in the future?"* ($\alpha = .71$).

Thirty four of the 53 students (64%) enrolled in sections randomly chosen for the experimental condition voluntarily participated in the contact intervention, by meeting with a Roma student at their university outside of regular university hours. The recruitment procedures and voluntary participation of participants make the design for this research a quasi-experiment rather than a randomized field experiment. Mean comparisons revealed that there were no significant differences in pre-test scores between those who chose to participate in the intervention ($n = 34$) and those who chose not to participate in the intervention ($n = 19$) in terms

of attitudes toward Roma ($M = 2.49$ and 2.54, respectively, $t = -0.27$, $p = .79$), anti-Roma beliefs ($M = 3.13$ and 3.44, respectively, $t = -1.35$, $p = .31$), and contact intentions ($M = 3.18$ and 2.79, respectively, $t = 1.25$, $p = .39$).

Of those who agreed to participate in the study, 7 participants in the experimental (contact intervention) condition and 2 participants in the control condition did not complete the post-test questionnaire; this left a total of 27 participants in the experimental condition and 35 participants in the control condition. Based on estimates of the effects of friendship contact provided by meta-analytic results of Pettigrew and Tropp (2006; mean $r = .246$) and Davies and colleagues (2011; mean $r = .258$), the optimal sample size for observing a similar effect would have been around 130 participants. Thus, the current sample size is smaller than what the G-power analysis for the expected effect size would suggest (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009); consequently the results of our tests should be viewed conservatively.

Results

Responses to the manipulation check showed that all psychology students in the contact intervention correctly identified their partner as a member of the Roma student organization. The results of the brief questionnaire administered immediately after the intervention showed that, overall, psychology students evaluated their contact experiences with Roma partners positively ($M = 4.26$, $SD = 0.46$ on the 5-point scale). In addition to asking psychology students to rate the quality of their interaction, Roma partners were asked to complete the same 5-item measure to rate the quality of the interaction. Roma partners who volunteered to interact with psychology students were even more positive in their evaluations of their interactions ($M = 4.53$, $SD = 0.42$; $t(60) = -2.47$, $p = .017$).

Scores on the pre-test questionnaire showed that psychology students' initial attitudes toward the Roma were fairly negative. Moreover, pre-test scores did not significantly differ between participants in the contact intervention and control conditions in terms of attitudes toward Roma ($M = 2.44$ and 2.67, respectively, $t = -1.61$, $p = .11$, *Cohen's d* $= .41$), anti-Roma beliefs ($M = 3.16$ and 2.78, respectively, $t = 1.81$, $p = .08$, *Cohen's d* $= .46$), and contact intentions ($M = 3.11$ and 3.15, respectively, $t = -1.46$, $p = .15$, *Cohen's d* $= .37$).

Reported pre-existing friendships with Roma also did not differ between participants in the contact intervention condition (11.5%) and the control condition (14.7%, $\chi^2(1) = 0.13$, $p = .72$). We conducted the analyses that follow both with and without controlling for pre-existing

friendships with Roma people; the results were virtually identical, and here we report the analysis without controlling for friendship to simplify the presentation of results.

Separate 2 (condition: intervention vs. control) x 2 (time: pre- vs. post-test) repeated-measures mixed model analyses of variance were then conducted to predict each of the main dependent measures (attitudes toward Roma, anti-Roma beliefs, and contact intentions), and we compared the post-test scores of the contact and the control conditions to test our hypothesis about the effect of the intervention. Descriptive statistics for the two conditions are presented in Table 13, and ANOVA results in Table 14.

Table 13. Means and standard deviations of the variables measured in the pre- and post-test

	Pre-Test *Mean (SD)*	Post-Test *Mean (SD)*
Attitudes toward Roma		
Contact Group	2.44 (0.61)	2.89 (0.72)
Control Group	2.67 (0.50)	2.77 (0.42)
Anti-Roma Beliefs		
Contact Group	3.16 (0.83)	2.94 (0.86)
Control Group	2.78 (0.80)	2.65 (0.74)
Contact Intentions		
Contact Group	3.11 (1.15)	3.44 (1.08)
Control Group	3.50 (1.01)	3.35 (1.15)

Table 14. Effects of condition and time on dependent variables

	F	p	*partial $\eta2$*
Attitudes toward Roma			
condition	0.21	.65	.00
time	16.38	.00	.22
interaction	6.68	.01	.10
Anti-Roma Beliefs			
condition	3.03	.09	.05
time	5.90	.02	.09
interaction	0.30	.58	.01
Contact Intentions			
condition	0.32	.58	.01
time	0.77	.39	.01
interaction	5.09	.03	.08

Attitudes toward Roma. The analysis predicting attitudes toward Roma showed a significant main effect of time ($F(1, 59) = 16.38$, $p < .001$, *partial η^2 = .22*), but no main effect for condition ($F(1, 59) = 0.21$, $p = .65$, *partial $\eta^2 < .01$*); these effects were qualified by a significant condition x time interaction ($F(1, 59) = 6.68$, $p = .01$, *partial $\eta^2 = .10$*). Post-hoc comparisons showed that participants in the intervention condition reported more positive attitudes toward the Roma following the contact intervention ($M_{pre} = 2.44$, $M_{post} = 2.89$, $t = -3.47$, $p = .002$, *Cohen's d = .67*), while there was no significant difference in attitudes toward Roma over time among participants in the control condition ($M_{pre} = 2.67$, $M_{post} = 2.77$, $t = -1.89$, $p = .068$, *Cohen's d = .32*).

Anti-Roma Beliefs. The analysis predicting anti-Roma beliefs showed a significant main effect of time ($F(1, 59) = 5.90$, $p = .02$, *partial η^2 = .09*), but no main effect for condition ($F(1, 59) = 3.03$, $p = .09$, *partial $\eta^2 = .05$*), and there was no significant condition x time interaction ($F(1, 59) = 0.30$, $p = .58$, *partial $\eta^2 = .01$*). Post-hoc comparisons showed that beliefs about Roma did not change significantly over time either in the contact intervention group ($M_{pre} = 3.16$, $M_{post} = 2.95$, $t(60) = 1.70$, $p = .10$, *Cohen's d = .32*), or in the control group ($M_{pre} = 2.78$, $M_{post} = 2.64$, $t(60) = 1.68$, $p = .10$, *Cohen's d = .29*).

Contact Intentions. The analysis predicting contact intentions showed no main effect of time ($F(1, 59) = 0.32$, $p = .58$, *partial $\eta^2 = .01$*), and no main effect for condition ($F(1, 59) = 0.77$, $p = .39$, *partial $\eta^2 = .01$*). However, the condition x time interaction effect was significant ($F(1, 59) = 5.09$, $p = .03$, *partial $\eta^2 = .08$*). Post-hoc comparisons showed that participants in the contact intervention condition reported higher intentions for casual contact with the Roma following the intervention ($M_{pre} = 3.11$, $M_{post} = 3.44$, $t(60) = -2.21$, $p = .036$, *Cohen's d = .42*) while there was no significant difference over time among participants in the control condition ($M_{pre} = 3.51$, $M_{post} = 3.37$, $t(60) = 1.00$, $p = .324$, *Cohen's d = .17*).

Additionally, pairwise comparisons were conducted between participants in the contact intervention and control conditions at post-test. Although significant condition x time interaction effects were observed on both attitudes toward Roma and contact intentions, these pairwise comparisons revealed that, at post-test, mean scores on attitudes toward Roma and contact intentions did not significantly differ among participants in the two conditions (attitudes toward Roma: $t(60) = 0.57$, $p = .58$, *Cohen's d = .14*; contact intentions: $t(60) = 0.26$, $p = .80$, *Cohen's d = .07*).

Comparisons of responses to the post-test measures showed that participants in the two conditions significantly differed from each other in perceived attitude change ($M = 2.89$ and 2.29 respectively, $t(60) = 2.02$, $p = .048$, *Cohen's d* $= .51$), with the contact intervention group reporting a higher degree of attitude change, although quite low overall. Perception of societal support for non-prejudice was equally low for both groups ($M = 2.65$ and 2.63 respectively, $t(45) = 0.07$, $p = .94$, *Cohen's d* $= .02$), while perceived institutional support for non-prejudice was significantly higher among participants in the contact intervention condition than among those in the control condition ($M = 4.56$ and 3.98 respectively, $t(53) = 3.27$, $p = .002$, *Cohen's d* $= .89$).

Additionally, we tested whether perceived institutional norms would moderate the effects of the contact intervention. Two moderation models were tested to examine perceived institutional norms as a moderator in the influence of the intervention on attitudes toward Roma and contact intentions in the post-test phase with pre-test scores controlled – the two dependent variables for which significant effects of the intervention were observed. We conducted two-way regression analyses with the post-test scores of attitudes toward Roma and contact intentions entered as dependent variables, the conditions entered as independent variables, and after centering the perceived institutional norm variable, it was entered as a covariate with pre-test scores of attitudes toward Roma and contact intentions as control variables in their respective tests. Results of these analyses showed that perceived institutional norms moderated the effect of the intervention on attitudes toward Roma ($F(1, 54) = 4.32$, $p = .043$, *partial η^2* $= .08$; see Figure 5), but not on contact intentions ($F(1, 54) = 0.11$, $p = .74$, *partial η^2* $< .01$); thus, the more that participants in the contact intervention perceived non-prejudiced institutional norms, the more positive their attitudes toward the Roma at post-test.

Figure 5. Interaction effect of the intervention on post-test scores of attitudes toward Roma with low, average and high levels of perceived non-prejudiced institutional norms, with attitudes toward Roma pre-test scores controlled at $M = 2.54$. $p < .05$. Lower scores indicate more positive attitudes toward Roma people.

Discussion

The present quasi-experiment examined the effects of a contact-based intervention to determine whether intergroup friendship can promote prejudice reduction in the segregated and highly prejudicial context of relations between Roma and non-Roma in Hungary. In line with predictions, we found condition (contact intervention vs. control) x time (pre vs. post) interaction effects predicting changes in attitudes and contact intentions in relation to the Roma among non-Roma Hungarians. However, we did not find a significant condition x time interaction predicting change in anti-Roma beliefs. This finding is in line with previous research suggesting that contact-based interventions predicated on intergroup friendship are generally more likely to change attitudes toward out-group members rather than beliefs about out-group members; generally, the affective ties forged through intergroup friendships are more likely to predict affective dimensions of prejudice (e.g., liking and evaluations) than cognitive dimensions (e.g., beliefs and stereotypes; see Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005).

At the same time, results from this study showed a significant main effect of time for anti-Roma beliefs, such that beliefs about the Roma generally became less negative over time. One possible explanation for this effect is that both participants in the contact intervention and

control conditions were recruited from social psychology courses that dealt with the topic of prejudice. Coupled with the finding that participants in both conditions perceived that non-prejudicial institutional norms were high (although even higher in the contact condition), it is possible that attending the social psychology course and discussing the topic of prejudice at a broad level affected participants' responses through an enlightenment effect (Gergen, 1973).

Additionally, we found only partial support for the prediction that the effects of the contact intervention would be moderated by perceived institutional norms. Here, we found moderation only when predicting attitudes toward Roma, such that the prejudice-reducing effect of the contact intervention was especially pronounced among participants who perceived stronger institutional norms countering prejudice against the Roma. Consistent with earlier theorizing on contact effects (e.g., Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), this finding suggests that change in intergroup attitudes is especially likely to occur when groups interact in the presence of supportive institutional norms. The present research adds to prior work by testing experimentally how supportive institutional norms may bolster the effects of a contact intervention in a highly prejudicial and segregated societal context.

Along with the general effect of supportive institutional norms, instructors' encouragement to participate in the intervention may have added to participants' confidence about participating in contact, which has also been identified as a source of successful engagement in cross-group friendships (Turner & Cameron, 2016). Yet, perceived institutional norms did not moderate the influence of the intervention on contact intentions. A potential explanation is that the way we measured contact intentions had more to do with a general willingness to be around Roma rather than one's sense of efficacy or confidence about interacting with Roma people.

Results of the post-test questionnaire further reveal that participants in the contact intervention condition were more likely to report that their attitudes had changed over time relative to participants in the control condition. We also observe a pre-post change in anti-Roma attitudes and contact intentions among participants in the contact intervention, yet pairwise comparisons at post-test revealed no significant differences between the conditions. It is therefore difficult to determine the extent to which participants' perceptions of change in their attitudes actually correspond to shifts in their attitudes toward the Roma. In part, participants in the contact intervention condition may have experienced attitude change due to changes in the perceived importance of intergroup contact resulting from participation in the intervention (see, e.g., Van Dick et al., 2004). Alternatively, it is possible that participation in the intervention

made participants more conscious of anti-Roma bias, such that they developed inhibitions about openly expressing prejudicial attitudes (see e.g., Crandall & Eshleman, 2003).

Nonetheless, in this highly prejudicial societal context, our findings suggest that the contact intervention was not met with resistance among participants, but instead achieved some positive changes. This may have been precisely because it offered participants a positive *interpersonal* experience with an out-group member, while making both their distinct ethnic identities and the shared identity of being university students salient. This approach is in line with previous research suggesting that enhancing identity salience can facilitate the generalization of positive attitude change, from positive contact experiences with individual out-group members to positive shifts in attitudes toward the out-group as a whole (see Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

More broadly, we recognize that the results from this study cannot fully answer the question of whether contact interventions based in intergroup friendship (such as through the "Fast Friends" procedure) are to be recommended as an effective method for prejudice reduction in all segregated societies with openly prejudicial societal norms. The present sample consisted of university students, one of the least prejudiced subgroups of Hungarian society (Enyedi et al., 2004), and the intervention took place in a social environment where participants were likely to have had little or no prior experience of direct conflicts with members of the out-group. These facts could limit the generalizability of our findings. Nevertheless, the general level of prejudice against Roma reported by participants in the pre-test suggests that the studied population was not entirely different from the general population of Hungary (see Enyedi et al., 2004); as such, the positive intergroup contact experience elicited by this intervention could potentially have comparable effects if implemented in other university or school settings, or community contexts.

Additionally, we acknowledge that the results provide limited information regarding the durability of the contact intervention's effects. Nevertheless, the post-test measures were administered at least one month after the contact intervention, therefore clearly showing an influence beyond an immediate effect.

The results indicate that the positive contact experience established through a friendship-building exercise led to positive change in Hungarian students' attitudes and intentions toward the Roma, showing these effects at least one month after their participation in the intervention. In sum, the contact-based intervention was successful in taking initial steps toward facilitating

positive cross-group interactions and promoting non-prejudicial norms in the immediate social context, thereby enhancing the potential for generalized attitude change.

Exclusive vs. inclusive definitions of the ingroup as antecedents of anti-immigrant prejudice[11]

Immigration from Muslim countries has become the central topic of European politics since the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and the refugee crisis of the same year, consistently referred to as "a crisis for Europe" (Chouliaraki, Georgiou, Zaborowski, & Oomen, 2017). However, hostility toward Muslim immigrants has been highest in countries unaffected by immigration and terrorism, such as in the countries of Eastern Europe (Strabac, Aalberg, & Valenta, 2014). This contradiction suggests that hostile attitudes may be better explained from a social identity perspective than by considering Muslim immigration as a realistic conflict or threat.

The goal of this paper is to reveal some of the psychological mechanisms of rejecting immigrants and Muslim people in the post-2015 political context, that is, shortly after Europe faced the largest influx of refugees in its post-Second World War history. We aim to do that by examining the double identification of Hungarians as members of their national ingroup and of Europe.

Two Modes of Identification

Extending the original statement of social identity theory about deriving positive self-esteem from identification with the ingroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), we can distinguish between identification that serves one's positive self-esteem based on feelings of connectedness and the endorsement of the group's values, and a blind and uncritical commitment to the ingroup (see e.g. de Zavala, 2011). This distinction is reflected in what Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan (2006) describes as two modes of identification. In this theory, attachment refers to the emotional tie and identification with the ingroup, while glorification entails not just a strong emotional bond and affective commitment to the ingroup, but also the belief "that the in-group is better and more worthy than other groups" (Roccas et al., 2006, p. 700).

Ingroup glorification is relevant to intergroup conflicts for two reasons. Firstly, glorification intensifies in the context of intergroup conflicts (de Zavala, 2011). Secondly, glorification itself becomes the source of conflicts through increased cognitive bias, stereotyping, moral disengagement (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Dugas et

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[11] This chapter is based on the following publication: Kende, A., Hadarics, M., Szabó, Z. P. (2019) Inglorious glorification and attachment: National and European identities as predictors of anti- and pro-immigrant attitudes, *British Journal of Social Psychology, 58,* 569-590, doi: 10.1111/bjso.12280

al., 2017), sensitivity to threat (Leidner & Castano, 2012; Rovenpor, Leidner, Kardos, & O'Brien, 2015; Sahar, 2008), and provocation (Steele, Parker & Lickel, 2015). In sum, higher ingroup glorification is associated with higher out-group derogation.

This dual conceptualisation of identity is particularly relevant in connection with the nation. The nation can be defined as an imagined community (Anderson, 1983) with shared history, culture, and laws (Smith, 1991). National identification can emerge in the form of patriotism and in the form of nationalism (see Li & Brewer, 2004; Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, & Schmidt, 2012). This division is rooted in Adorno's concept of genuine and pseudo-patriotism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Stanford, 1950), and it is also reflected in concepts such as blind vs. constructive patriotism (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999). Genuine or constructive patriotism is based on the psychological need to belong and to derive positive esteem from group membership (see e.g., Bar-Tal, 1993) and it allows for constructive criticism toward the ingroup with intentions for improvement (Schatz et al., 1999; Staub, 1997). In contrast, nationalism (pseudo or blind patriotism) entails the feeling of superiority that is also typical among high glorifiers.

These two modes of national identification have different consequences for attitudes towards immigration (see Huddy, 2016). In line with findings regarding the connection between glorification and prejudice, nationalism is systematically associated with higher out-group derogation and xenophobia than national attachment (De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Golec de Zavala, Guerra, & Simão, 2017; Spry & Hornsey, 2007). However, there is contradictory evidence as to whether higher attachment with the ingroup predicts lower levels of hostility or more positive attitudes. On the one hand, identification with the nation can increase positive attitudes toward immigration by, for example, emphasising the nation's inclusive character or the endorsement of critical self-reflection (Minescu, Hagendoorn, & Poppe, 2008; Schatz et al., 1999; Wagner et al., 2012). On the other hand, patriotism tends to be positively associated with nationalism – much the same way as attachment is positively correlated with glorification, as high glorifiers are also strongly attached to their ingroup – and consequently with intergroup hostility, albeit more weakly than nationalism (De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003). There is also an association between all forms of positive attitudes toward the national ingroup and right-wing or conservative political ideologies (see e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2016), explaining the positive rather than negative correlation between national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes. Constructive patriotism is an exception to that, as it encapsulates social change efforts as well

(Schatz et al., 1999). In summary, the evidence for the connection between national attachment and prejudice is not straightforward.

Different Attitudinal Outcomes of National and European Identities

For Europeans, national identity can be considered as nested within the supranational European identity (following the terminology of Lawler, 1992). Nested identities are not necessarily incompatible, as people simultaneously identify with multiple groups and social categories. In fact, national and European identities correlate positively in all European countries with the exception of Britain, where European identity is represented as a threat to national identity (Cinnirella, 1997), a case made clear by the decision to leave the EU.

Immigration is both a national and a European issue in a political, economic, and cultural sense. Country-level political decisions must comply with the existing legal framework of the EU, and noncompliance can have political, legal, and economic consequences. Immigration from Muslim countries is often perceived as a source of threat to Europe, and not just to its nations. It can be perceived as a threat to European values (Strabac, et al., 2014), to the security of Europe (Doosje, Zimmermann, Küpper, Zick, & Meertens, 2009), and as an economic threat to the labour market and the welfare system (Billiet, Meuleman, & De Witte, 2014; Malhotra, Margalit, & Mo, 2013). Therefore, personal attitudes toward immigration may not only be shaped by national, but also by European identity.

Nevertheless, in contrast to national identity, European identity has often been found to predict positive rather than negative attitudes toward immigration. Research from the 27 EU member states showed that a stronger European identity was slightly positively associated with the acceptance of immigrants even from outside the EU, while national identity predicted higher and not lower anti-immigrant attitudes (Curtis, 2014). Sides and Citrin (2007) found that insistence on cultural unity (i.e., cultural homogeneity of the nation as opposed to diversity embedded in a European identity) was the most robust predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes – especially attitudes toward immigration from non-EU countries – in the 15 EU member states of that time and additionally in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland based on the 2002-2003 European Social Survey data. In summary, there is empirical evidence that European identity is associated with more positive attitudes toward immigration than national identity.

Paradoxically, Muslim immigration is perceived to symbolically threaten precisely those values that could reduce hostility between groups, such as equality, universalism, multiculturalism, and a respect for civil rights (for the discussion of human values and

intergroup relations, see Schwartz, 1994). Many Western European countries imposed some restrictions on Islamic religious practices to promote these values, such as a ban on Islamic headscarves in public schools, on public transport or in certain positions. These restrictions affect religious freedom, individual expression, free movement, and they are a form of discrimination in the labour market (for a summary of restrictions on Islamic clothing in 28 EU countries, see Open Society Justice Initiative, 2018). Therefore, the regulations that serve to protect basic European values, also go against them.

These contradictory outcomes of a European identity can explain why a stronger identity does not necessarily entail behavior corresponding with multiculturalist European values. Licata and Klein (2002) found that a stronger identification with Europe was in fact connected to higher xenophobia. Immigration itself is often framed as a European problem, and anti-immigrant rhetoric is often associated with a critique of the European Union (Vieten & Poynting, 2016), further weakening the potential positive association between a European identity and the acceptance of immigrants from outside Europe that some research previously found (e.g., Curtis, 2014). On the one hand, as a shared and more inclusive form of identity with values that promote non-discrimination and inclusion, European identity should be associated with more positive intergroup attitudes than national identity. On the other hand, considering immigration from Muslim countries as a threat to Europe entails more negative intergroup attitudes.

If we combine the findings about attitudes toward immigration with previous research on the two modes of identification and national and European identity, we can first assume that national glorification is associated with higher prejudice against immigrants and Muslim people as supported by research on both glorification (Roccas et al., 2006) and nationalism (De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003). We can also assume that higher national identity, not just on the glorification but also on the attachment dimension, would be associated with higher prejudice based on international surveys (Sides & Citrin, 2007), previous research in Hungary (Örkény, 2011; Simonovits & Bernáth, 2015). In contrast, attachment to Europe may protect against prejudice, because the group is perceived as diverse and inclusive with values that go against intergroup derogation, as underlined by the association between European identity and pro-immigrant attitudes (Curtis, 2014; Örkény, 2011). However, the potentially protective effect of attached identification with Europe may be reduced when identification is also based on an inflated concept of the ingroup, and European values and Europeans are perceived as superior.

We conducted two studies to reveal the connection between on the one hand, national and European attachment and glorification, and on the other, attitudes toward Muslim people and immigrants. Our focus on both national and European identity can offer insights into how identification with lower- and higher-order nested groups can affect intergroup attitudes. Therefore, we combined our question regarding intergroup attitudes related to two identity dimensions: (a) the mode of identification, and (b) identification with the nation and with Europe.

The Context of the Studies

Hungary's reaction to the refugee crisis was more restrictive, but politically in line with the reactions of other countries in East-Central Europe. Hungary was the first to openly advocate an inhospitable solution to the refugee crisis in Europe, already at the beginning of 2015 when the Charlie Hebdo attack took place in Paris (Rettman, 2015; Thorpe, 2018). The government's rhetoric depicted the country as the saviour of Europe, while European politicians criticised it for the disregard of international agreements, EU laws, and human rights in general.

Geopolitically, Hungary has shifted its alliance between the West and the East throughout its history, but accession to the EU in 2004 was in line with people's wish to be part of Europe. Eurosceptic attitudes remained marginal until 2010 when the government started to use openly anti-EU rhetoric, pulled ties with Russia tighter, and Eurosceptic attitudes started rising all over Europe (Pew Research Center, 2013). Despite a measurable deterioration, the view of the European Union remained largely positive (Bíró-Nagy, Kadlót, & Köves, 2016).

Against this political and historical background, Hungarian and European identities correlate positively (Örkény, 2011), but they should not be treated as interchangeable. Not only is Europe the higher-order category, but a European identity also represents the choice to belong to the West and to accept western values for Hungarians. Therefore, national and European identities can be considered nested, but not incompatible identities.

Anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes were high but stable until 2015, and increased after the government launched an anti-immigrant campaign, and held a referendum with the question "Do you want the European Union to be able to mandate the obligatory resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary…?" (according to international surveys and local opinion polls, e.g. Pew Research Center, 2016; 2017; Simonovits & Bernáth, 2015). Both the campaign and the referendum suggested that there was a tension between national and European Union interests.

Study 4

Hypotheses

Building on research about the two modes of identification, as well as research about the connection between national and European identity, and prejudice, we established the following hypotheses: glorification of both the nation and Europe would predict hostile attitudes toward Muslim people and immigrants (H1), however attachment with the nation and attachment with Europe would predict different attitudes. We expected that attachment with the national ingroup would still predict higher levels of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes (H2), but higher attachment with Europe would predict lower levels of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes (H3).

Procedure

We conducted an online survey in November and December 2016, relying on a mixed student and community sample following the ethical approval of Eötvös Loránd University. The questionnaire was part of an omnibus survey; we report all measures for variables related to the research question.[12] All scales were translated from English to Hungarian, and backtranslated by an independent translator, unless a translation had been published. All items were measured on a 7-point scale (from 1=completely disagree to 7=completely agree), unless otherwise stated. We removed 169 partial responses belonging to respondents who started the questionnaire but left it before answering all questions related to the current research.

Measures

National and European identities were measured by the eight-item Hungarian version (Szabó & László, 2014) of Roccas et al.'s (2006) scale. These two four-item subscales were originally named "commitment" and "superiority" in Roccas et al.'s (2008) study describing two of their four factors. The authors suggested that the commitment subscale reflected genuine attachment, and superiority was a form of glorification. Relatedly, these subscales were used as the scales of attachment and glorification by for example Szabó, Mészáros, and Csertő (2017).

We measured anti-Muslim prejudice using the eight-item affective behavioral subscale of Lee et al.'s (2013) Islamophobia scale. Anti-immigrant attitudes were measured by four items

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[12] Other parts of the omnibus survey were used to test unrelated questions to the current research, however some of the scales were used for both studies (see Kende et al., 2017)

from Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar (2017) and adapted to the Hungarian context. Items measuring identities and intergroup attitudes are presented in Appendix C.

In addition, we asked respondents how often they had contact with Muslim people (from 1=never to 7=very frequently), and general demographic information: age, gender, level of education, religion, nationality, and political orientation (self-placement on left-right).

Sample

Respondents were recruited from a university class where students participate in research for credit ($n = 409$); the student sample consisted of BA and MA students from all faculties of the university. The use of a student sample has well-known limitations (see Sears, 1986). For example, their high level of education and the normative context of the university can create social desirability bias as respondents attempt to appear non-prejudiced (An, 2014). Therefore, we recruited a smaller community sample, distributing the link to the questionnaire using social media with the help of university students ($n = 175$). Students were advised to reach out to groups that represent diverse political opinions and age groups. Sample size was determined based on the recommendations of Wolf, Harrington, Clark, and Miller (2013) for structural equation models.

Of the community sample, 6% had lower than secondary education, 22% completed secondary education, 35% ongoing third level education, and 38% completed third level education. The comparison of the two groups along demographic variables, political orientation, and religiousness revealed differences only in age ($M_{student} = 21.76$, $SD_{student} = 3.53$, $M_{community} = 26.95$, $SD_{community} = 9.01$, $t(573) = -9.94$, $p < .001$). Therefore, we combined the samples, and conducted all analyses on the full sample, $N = 584$. The age of the full sample was $M = 23.31$, $SD = 1.79$, 70% of the respondents were women, 97% had Hungarian nationality (because of the language of the questionnaire, we assume that other respondents were ethnic Hungarians holding citizenship in neighbouring countries). None of the respondents indicated that they were Muslim. Eighty three percent had no or rarely any contact with Muslim people ($M = 2.37$, $SD = 1.34$). Respondents identified themselves slightly right-wing ($M = 4.19$, $SD = 1.33$ 1=left, 7=right). Little's MCAR test suggested that data was missing at random: $\chi^2(28) = 17.04$, $p = .948$. Using casewise diagnostics and studentised deleted residuals, we identified five outliers. Outliers were removed from the analysis as suggested by Yuan and Bentler (2001) for structural equation modelling.

Results

We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to check whether European and Hungarian attachment and glorification can be treated as four independent constructs. We compared a four-factor model where European and Hungarian identification and glorification were set up as four separate but correlating factors, a two-factor model where all European identity items loaded on a factor and all Hungarian identity items on another, and another two-factor model where all attachment items loaded on one factor and all glorification items on another ($KMO = .88$, $p < .001$). The four-factor model showed the best fit to our data, and this fit was significantly better than the other two alternatives. Nevertheless, in order to achieve an acceptable fit, covariances needed to be added. Specifically, we added covariances to some of the identical items of the national and the European scales (between items 1, 4, 5, 7, and 8). We believe this was necessary because of the effect of the identical wording of the items eliciting similar responses both in connection to the nation and to Europe (for fit indices with covariances see Table 15).

Table 15. Fit indices of the CFA models of national and European identification and glorification.

Model	χ^2	df	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	AIC	$\Delta\chi^2$ (compared to the four-factor model)	Δdf (compared to the four-factor model)	P
Two-factor (European - Hungarian)	1754.58	103	.683	.167	.120	1852.68	1167.63	5	< .001
Two-factor (attachment - glorification)	1357.04	103	.759	.145	.102	1455.04	770.09	5	< .001
Four-factor	586.95	98	.906	.093	.059	694.95	-	-	-
Four-factor with covariances	242.40	93	.971	.053	.044	340.40	244.55	5	< .001

We also checked whether anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes should be treated as two independent constructs using CFA. We compared the fit indices of two models: a two-factor solution in which anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes were set up as two separate but correlating factors, and a one-factor solution in which all items loaded on a single factor.

As shown in Table 16, the two-factor solution showed a significantly better fit to our data (KMO = .92, $p < .001$), however one item from each scale needed to be removed to improve model fit, which may be explained by the different contexts in which these scales were originally validated. To achieve a good fit to our data, covariances were added between some of the items within each scale (anti-Muslim scale between items 1—6, 3—5, 4—8, 5—8, anti-immigrant scale between items 1—4).

Table 16. Fit indices of the CFA models on attitudes towards Muslims and immigrants.

Model	$\chi 2$	df	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	AIC	$\Delta\chi 2$ (compared to the two-factor model)	Δdf (compared to the two-factor model)	P
One-factor	651.79	54	.880	.138	.072	723.79	290.00	1	< .001
Two-factor	361.79	53	.938	.099	.059	435.79	-	-	-
Two-factor with covariances	170.22	49	.976	.065	.034	252.22	191.57	4	< .001
Two-factor with covariances (2 items removed)	74.70	29	.989	.052	.026	146.70	287.09	24	< .001

Note. The two-factor model with 2 items removed showed a significantly better fit than the two-factor model with all items: $\Delta\chi^2 = 95.52$; $\Delta df = 20$; $p < .001$

Scale reliabilities, descriptive statistics, and correlations between study variables are presented in Table 17. We found a strong positive correlation between national and European glorifications, and a somewhat weaker, but still strong correlation between national and European attachments. National attachment was higher than European attachment ($t(583) = 10.73$, $p < .001$), while national glorification was lower than European glorification ($t(583) = -10.10$, $p < .001$). Identity variables and negatives attitudes were all positively correlated. The strongest correlations were found between national glorification, and the weakest between European attachment and intergroup attitudes.

Table 17. Scale reliabilities, means, standard deviations for the study variables.

	α	M	SD	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. National attachment	.87	5.41	1.37					
2. National glorification	.86	3.05	1.24	.54**				
3. European attachment	.78	4.82	1.30	.50**	.35**			
4. European glorification	.82	3.47	1.24	.34**	.67**	.49**		
5. Anti-Muslim prejudice	.93	2.78	1.52	.28**	.54**	.23**	.52**	
6. Anti-immigrant prejudice	.79	4.83	1.49	.35**	.41**	.12**	.34**	.63**

Note. **$p < .001$

Hypothesis testing. Our hypothesis that glorification of the nation and Europe, as well as national attachment, would predict hostile attitudes toward Muslim people and immigrants, but attachment to Europe would predict lower anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitude was tested with Structural Equation Modelling (using AMOS 22.0). We identified the most suitable model using the model building–model trimming technique (see e.g., Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014; Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005). We built a saturated model in which national and European glorification were connected with the approval of both anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes. Such a saturated model shows a perfect fit with χ2, RMSEA, and SRMR values of 0, and a CFI value of 1. We then trimmed the non-significant paths (see Figure 6). As the sample was rather homogenous in terms of age and education, we did not control for demographic variables in the analysis. However, in order to show that there is an effect of identification beyond the effect of political orientation, we controlled for left-right political orientation in the analysis. Fit indices of the trimmed model were not significantly different from the perfect fit of the saturated model ($\chi^2 = 1.75$, $df = 2$; $CFI = .999$; $RMSEA = .001$; $SRMR = .009$; $\Delta\chi^2 = 1.75$; $\Delta df = 2$; $p = .417$).

Figure 6. Trimmed model showing relationships between European and national glorification and attachment, and intergroup attitudes in Study 4. Path coefficients are standardised regression coefficients (*** = p < .001). Left-right political orientation is controlled for in the model.

Glorification as an identification style predicted hostility in line with the assumptions of Roccas et al. (2006). Nevertheless, national glorification was a stronger predictor of both types of prejudice than European glorification, suggesting that it also mattered whether the nation or Europe was the glorified ingroup. More importantly, attachment to the national ingroup predicted greater hostility toward immigrants, while attachment to Europe predicted more positive attitudes toward immigration.

Discussion

Our results supported our first hypothesis that glorification with the ingroup, regardless of whether it referred to the nation or to Europe, would predict both anti-Muslim and anti-

immigrant attitudes (based on the literature on glorification, e.g., Roccas et al., 2006). Supporting our second and third hypothesis, we revealed that attachment to the ingroup predicted different intergroup attitudes: higher national attachment predicted higher hostility and higher European attachment higher acceptance. The different patterns related to attachment emerged despite the fact that – as expected – European and national attachments were strongly positively correlated, and there was a weak but positive correlation between European attachment and prejudice. These results show that national and European attachments are distinct, but not incompatible forms of nested identities (see e.g., Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001; Örkény, 2011), and without delineating the effect of glorification and attachment, differences in attitudinal outcomes are less apparent, as high glorifiers are also strongly attached to their ingroup (as suggested by Roccas et al., 2006). The different outcomes of national and European attachment in the SEM analysis are in line with studies that, on the one hand, revealed a connection between national identity and prejudice in Hungary and elsewhere (Sides & Citrin, 2007); yet on the other hand, found a positive association between European identity and openness toward immigration (e.g., Curtis, 2014), but contradict previous research that showed an association between European identity and prejudice (e.g., Strabac et al., 2014). Explanations for the positive outcome of European identity should take into account the political context of Hungary: higher European identification can reflect respondents' intention to show the endorsement of European values, the idea of multiculturalism, and being more cosmopolitan in general, and can consequently predict more positive attitudes toward immigration. Higher European identification may also reflect stronger support for the EU and its perceived pro-immigrant and pro-refugee policy.

Respondents expressed a higher level of attachment to the nation than to Europe, but indicated higher glorification of Europe than of the nation. This pattern may be explained by the fact that attachment only grasps the affective component, while glorification incorporates the evaluative component of identity as well (see Roccas et al., 2006). Respondents may have felt a stronger emotional tie with Hungary as a lower-level, more immediate ingroup than Europe, but nevertheless maintained a critical view of the country. The negative portrayal of the country is deeply embedded in the nation's historical narratives (László, 2013), and it is also a reflection on Hungary's status within the EU, which positions East-Central European countries as second-class members within the dichotomy of Western and Eastern Europe (see Kuus, 2004), economically operationalised in the two-speed Europe concept (Yanniris, 2017). Individual differences in the level of glorification may therefore reflect the level of endorsing

or rejecting this negative view of the country which affected the emotional tie with the national ingroup – as expressed by national attachment – less strongly.

A close association was found between anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes, signalling either the general devaluation of out-groups (Zick et al., 2008) or the acceptance of the dominant public discourse that equates Muslim people with immigration. Yet, national and European attachment were only associated with attitudes toward immigrants and not with attitudes toward Muslim people. This finding suggests that immigrants and Muslim people represented different intergroup situations for the Hungarian respondents of our study. In a study about chronic and situational salience of associating Muslims with foreigners, Belgian respondents showed less hostility toward foreigners than toward Muslims overall, unless they chronically associated foreigners with Muslims (Spruyt & Elchardus, 2012). Although we did not test respondents' association with the term immigrant, in the absence of a sizable immigrant community, we assumed that the primary association would reflect the rhetoric of the ongoing political campaign about immigration from Muslim countries. Therefore, a possible explanation for this finding is that immigrants – presumably Muslim immigrants – as a group represent a more immediate type of threat to the ingroup than Muslim people in general.

Although our findings supported our hypotheses, these results allowed us to only speculate as to why national and European attachment predicted intergroup attitudes differently, and whether or not perceived differences in the political goals of Europe and Hungary are the source of this difference. Therefore, we conducted a second study in which we measured attitudes toward the European Union as a potential mediator of the connection.

There is ample evidence for the connection between anti-EU and anti-immigrant attitudes (Azrout & Wojcieszak, 2017; de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005). The tension between immigration policies of the EU and national interest was the core argument for Brexit (Meleady, Seger, & Vermue, 2017), and disidentification with Europe predicted higher anti-immigrant sentiments around the time of the Brexit referendum (Abrams & Travaglino, 2018). National identity was identified as the key predictor of Eurosceptic attitudes, especially among citizens who perceive themselves exclusively as nationals (Hooghe & Marks, 2005). The Hungarian government has also explicitly antagonised the EU in the post-2015 period, depicting the goals of Hungary and the EU as irreconcilable on the issue of immigration (Goclowscy & Than, 2018). Therefore, we expected that attitudes toward the EU would play a key role in the relationship between identity and prejudice, and help us understand the similarities and

differences in these positively correlated, yet distinct forms of identities and their different attitudinal outcomes.

Study 5

Hypotheses

In addition to the hypotheses of Study 4, we expected that both national attachment and glorification would predict stronger opposition to the EU, which would predict negative attitudes toward Muslim people and immigrants. In contrast, we expected that attachment to Europe would predict more positive attitudes toward the EU, which would mediate the positive connection between European attachment and positive attitudes toward Muslim people and immigrants. Because of the lack of previous research about European glorification and support for the EU, we tested the mediating role of attitudes toward the EU in the connection between European glorification and prejudice as an exploratory hypothesis.

Procedure and Measures

We used the same procedure and measures as in Study 4, but in addition we measured positive attitudes toward the EU with two items from the ISSP questionnaire (International Social Survey Programme, 2014): *"Generally speaking, would you say that Hungary benefits or does not benefit from being a member of the European Union?"* using a 7-point scale (1=does not benefit at all, 7=greatly benefits) and *"Generally, do you think that the European Union should have more or less power than the national governments of its members states?"* (1=much less, 7=much more), and using one nominal item, we asked: *"If there were a referendum today to decide whether Hungary should remain or not remain a member of the European Union, would you vote in favour or would you vote against?"*

Sample

The online questionnaire was completed by 461 students and 115 respondents from a community sample using the same recruitment methods as in Study 4. Data was collected in March and April, 2017. In the community sample 1% had lower than secondary education, 30% completed secondary education, 23% ongoing third level education, and 46% completed third level education. The comparison of the two groups along demographic variables, political orientation, and religiousness revealed differences in age ($M_{student}$ =20.80, $SD_{student}$ = 2.07, $M_{community}$ = 33.76, $SD_{community}$ = 12.90, $t(106)$ = -10.32, $p < .001$, Levene's test indicated unequal variances, $F = 7.02$, $p < .001$, so degrees of freedom were adjusted from 565 to 106) and gender

(student sample: 73.7% women, community sample: 47.2% women, $\chi^2(1) = 28.11$, $p < .001$). As no other differences were found, we combined the samples for higher diversity.

The full sample ($N = 576$) had a mean age of 23.22, $SD = 7.74$, 68% of the respondents were women, 97% had Hungarian nationality. None of the respondents indicated that they were Muslim, and 82.3% indicated no or only rare contact with Muslim people ($M = 2.37$, $SD = 1.32$). The majority of respondents showed a preference for staying within the EU: 72.6% indicated that they would vote in favour of remaining in the EU, 9.9% indicated that they would vote against remaining, and 17.5% could not decide. Self-placement on the political orientation scale in the left-right spectrum was slightly above the midpoint ($M = 4.23$, $SD = 1.31$ 1=left, 7=right). Seventy partial responses were removed belonging to respondents who left the survey before answering all questions related to the current research. There was no missing data related to the main measures of the analysis.

Results

Again we checked whether the four-factor solution of measuring identity was a better fit to our data than the two-factor solutions for either the mode of identification or for distinguishing between national and European identities, and whether anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes should be measured by two subscales rather than one common attitude measure. CFA suggested that the four-factor solution for identity ($KMO = .86$, $p < .001$), and the two-factor for attitudes ($KMO = .93$, $p < .001$) were again the best fit to our data as shown in Table 18 and 19 (with the same items removed from both scales as in Study 4 and the same covariances added).

Table 18. Fit indices of the CFA models on identification and glorification

Model	$\chi 2$	df	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	AIC	$\Delta\chi 2$ (compared to the four-factor model)	Δdf (compared to the four-factor model)	p
Two-factor (European and Hungarian)	1876.98	103	.637	.175	.146	1974.98	1345.01	5	< .001
Two-factor (identification and glorification)	1457.91	103	.723	.153	.108	1555.91	925.94	5	< .001
Four-factor	531.97	98	.911	.089	.058	639.97	-	-	-
Four-factor with covariances	190.85	93	.980	.043	.042	308.85	341.12	5	< .001

Table 19. Fit indices of the CFA models on attitudes towards Muslims and immigrants.

Model	$\chi 2$	df	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	AIC	$\Delta\chi 2$ (compared to the two-factor model)	Δdf (compared to the two-factor model)	p
One-factor	470.54	54	.915	.117	.066	542.54	195.57	1	< .001
Two-factor	274.97	53	.955	.086	.054	348.97	-	-	-
Two-factor with covariances	118.42	48	.986	.051	.030	202.42	156.55	5	< .001
Two-factor with covariances (2 items removed)	78.29	29	.987	.055	.026	150.29	275.26	24	< .001

Note. The two-factor model with 2 items removed showed a significantly better fit than the two-factor model with all items: $\Delta\chi^2 = 40.13$; $\Delta df = 19$; $p = .003$

Scale reliabilities, descriptive statistics, and correlations between study variables are presented in Table 20. Similarly to Study 4, national and European glorification were highly correlated, just like national and European attachment and again national attachment was higher than European attachment ($t(576) = 9.93$, $p < .001$), and national glorification was lower than European glorification ($t(576) = -10.36$, $p < .001$). Identity variables and negative intergroup attitudes were positively correlated again. Positive attitudes toward the EU negatively

correlated with national identity (both attachment and glorification), but they were independent from European identity. Using the same technique as in Study 4, we identified and removed two outliers from the analysis for the SEM analysis.

Table 20. Scale reliabilities, means, standard deviations for the study variables

	α	M	SD	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
1. National attachment	.87	5.24	1.38						
2. National glorification	.85	3.11	1.21	.47**					
3. European attachment	.82	4.69	1.33	.52**	.28**				
4. European glorification	.80	3.58	1.16	.19**	.57**	.40**			
5. Pro-EU attitudes	r = .44**	4.43	1.28	-.21**	-.26**	.06	.03		
6. Anti-Muslim prejudice	.94	2.87	1.53	.26**	.45**	.21**	.43**	-.28**	
7. Anti-immigrant prejudice	.75	4.92	1.30	.23**	.30**	.09*	.26**	-.37**	.59**

Note. $^{**}p < .001$, $^{*}p < .05$

Hypothesis testing. Our hypotheses that European and national glorification, as well as national attachment would predict higher prejudice, while European attachment would predict lower prejudice were tested using the same method as in Study 4. This time, we also entered attitudes toward the EU as a mediator, as presented in Figure 7. Since the sample was rather homogenous, we only controlled for left-right political orientation in the analysis. After the removal of non-significant paths, we identified a trimmed model with good fit that was not significantly different from the perfect fit of the saturated model: ($\chi^2 = 6.63$, $df = 5$; $CFI = .999$; $RMSEA = .024$; $SRMR = .014$; $\Delta\chi^2 = 6.63$; $\Delta df = 5$; $p = .250$). European glorification directly predicted both forms of intergroup hostility, national glorification directly predicted only anti-Muslim attitudes, but neither European, nor national attachment predicted either form of negative intergroup attitudes directly.

Figure 7. Trimmed model showing relationships between European and national glorification and attachment, attitudes towards the EU, and intergroup attitudes in Study 5. Path coefficients are standardised regression coefficients (*** = p < .001). Left-right political orientation is controlled for in the model.

To reveal whether the relationships between glorification and attachment with the nation and Europe and attitudes toward immigrants and Muslim people were mediated by attitudes toward the EU, a series of mediational analyses was conducted with the bootstrapping technique suggested by Macho and Ledermann (2011). We requested 95% confidence intervals using 5000 resamples. Significant indirect effects are shown in Table 21. We found that both European attachment and glorification predicted a positive attitude toward the EU, and both national attachment and national glorification predicted a negative attitude toward the EU. Attitudes toward the EU mediated the connection between all forms of identification and attitudes toward Muslims and immigrants. This means that European glorification still directly predicted hostility toward Muslims and immigrants, but also predicted more positive attitudes toward the EU, and this path – in contrast to the direct path – predicted more positive attitudes toward Muslims and immigration.

Table 21. Indirect effects of national and European glorification and attachment.

Indirect Pathway	Indirect Effect (Unstandardised)	p	LLCI	ULCI
NA → EU → AMA	.03	.003	.01	.07
NA → EU → AIA	.04	.006	.01	.08
EA → EU → AMA	-.04	< .001	-.07	-.02
EA → EU → AIA	-.05	.001	-.09	-.02
NG → EU → AMA	.07	.001	.03	.11
NG → EU → AIA	.09	.001	.05	.13
EG → EU → AMA	-.05	.003	-.09	-.02
EG → EU → AIA	-.06	.003	-.10	-.03

Note. NA = National Attachment; EA = European Attachment; NG = National glorification; EG = European glorification; EU = Pro-EU attitudes; AMA = Anti-Muslim attitudes; AIA = Anti-immigrant attitudes

Discussion

In line with our predictions and the results of Study 4, both national and European glorification predicted anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes. However, in this study, mediation analyses revealed a divide between national and European identification beyond the different outcomes of attachment in Study 4, as we found a positive connection between European identity and pro-EU attitudes and a negative connection between national identity and pro-EU attitudes. These results offered an additional explanation about why both dimensions of identity matter in the attitudes about immigration, and why it is not sufficient to look at only the mode of identification or only national vs European identities.

The finding about the negative direct and the positive indirect path between European glorification and intergroup hostility may seem paradoxical. It points out that glorification may generally be a source of negative intergroup attitudes, but to the extent that it predicts more positive attitudes toward the EU, it can be associated with positive attitudes toward immigration. The opposite connection between national attachment and EU attitudes and European attachment and EU attitudes is consistent with the findings of Study 4 and offers an explanation for the different outcomes of these two forms of attachments. These results can be explained by the political discourse about the threat of immigration imposed upon Hungary by the EU (Goclowscy & Than, 2018) affecting not only those who more highly glorify the national ingroup, but also those who simply feel more attached and therefore concerned for their nation.

The disappearance of the direct negative path between national attachment and anti-immigrant attitudes and the direct positive path between European attachment and anti-immigrant attitudes after the insertion of pro-EU attitudes suggests that the EU is generally viewed as supportive of immigration, so higher support for the EU engenders higher support for immigration. It seems that immigration is supported or rejected to the extent that EU policies are perceived as compatible with the ingroup's goals. From our results, they seem compatible with European identity, but incompatible with national identity. This assumption is underlined most directly by studies explaining the outcome of the Brexit vote (see Meleady et al., 2017).

Limitations and Future Directions

Although our research tested a relatively complex model that encompasses national and European attachment and glorification, prejudice, and attitudes toward the EU, it still provided a limited view on the psychological processes related to the influence of the political climate on intergroup conflicts. We tested neither the influence of individual tendencies for out-group derogation, such as social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) nor the direct influence of dominant social norms (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), both of which would be relevant in the context of our studies.

While sample sizes were adequate, we need to generalize the findings with caution, as the sample was skewed in terms of gender. Although there is no evidence that women and men form prejudiced attitudes differently (differences were found in the expression of prejudice: Ekehammer, Akrami, & Araya, 2002; Plant & Devine, 1998; and in social dominance orientation: Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), expressed level of prejudice may have been higher if the percentage of men and women were equal. Furthermore, respondents had a higher than average level of education and were less sceptical about the EU than official statistics suggest (Bíró-Nagy et al., 2016). Therefore, respondents may have been more open or expressed less prejudice to immigrants and Muslim people than the general population (see e.g., Coenders & Scheepers, 2003; Wagner & Zick, 1995).

Although we made no assumptions about causality, we cannot rule out the possibility of causal influences in the opposite direction than the predictions presented in the mediation models, or the potential influence of third variables unaccounted for in the current studies. In order to identify the causal connection between the variables in our model, experimental or longitudinal designs should be used.

General Discussion

In two studies we investigated the connection between national and European identity, and anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes within the political context of post-2015 Europe. Our aim was to supplement previous research that established the connections between ingroup glorification and prejudice (see Roccas et al., 2006), national identity and anti-Muslim prejudice (e.g. Spry & Hornsey, 2007; Steele et al., 2015), and European identity and hostility toward immigration from outside Europe (Doosje et al., 2009; Licata & Klein, 2002). Our findings showed that the intolerance toward immigrants and Muslim people in Europe may be rooted in two distinct yet interrelated phenomena. Firstly, it can be connected to the mode of identification: we found that people who glorify their ingroup have a tendency for higher prejudice against both Muslims and immigrants. This is, of course, not new; decades of research in the tradition of Adorno's authoritarian personality showed that an inflated sense of importance and strength, the uncritical acceptance of leadership, and consequently the glorification of the ingroup are key components of intergroup hostility (e.g., Bilali, 2013; de Zavala et al., 2009; Roccas et al., 2006).

The importance of distinguishing between identities along the two dimensions was underlined by the confirmatory factor analyses showing that a four-factor solution was a better fit to our data than either distinguishing only the mode of identification or only between the nation and Europe. Although we did not directly ask about the values and norms respondents attached to the Hungarian and the European ingroup, we can assume that the different content of identities provides the most probable explanation for the differences in attachment with the two different ingroups. Europe represents an inclusive group with politics and values that promote openness toward non-members. Therefore, attachment with Europe was a source of positive, not negative attitudes. This result is in line with studies about positive intergroup attitudes related to constructive, genuine patriotism or inclusive national identity (Schatz et al., 1999; Spry & Hornsey, 2007; Wagner et al., 2012). However, in the post-2015 period, Hungary was highly hostile in its rhetoric and policies toward immigrants; therefore, higher attachment to the ingroup was associated with higher prejudice. National attachment did not include a critical element that is necessary for the desire to change current practices (Roccas et al., 2008). Moreover, the different predictions based on European and Hungarian attachment were mediated by attitudes toward the EU, suggesting that respondents may have perceived the policies of the EU to be in line with European group goals, but in opposition to Hungarian group goals. This pattern indicates that national identity is not simply a subcategory of European

identity, but these two identities are not incompatible either. They are related but distinct forms of nested identities (see Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001).

Xenophobia in Hungary may be the highest in Europe (Wike, Stokes, & Simmons, 2016), limiting the generalization of our findings to other societal contexts, but the rise of anti-immigrant attitudes is found in countries in both Eastern and Western Europe. Moreover, the strong association between Eurosceptic attitudes and both national glorification and hostile attitudes toward Muslim people and immigrants is an indication that anti-immigrant rhetoric can have a strong impact on the European Union, especially in the presence of nationalism.

Our findings revealed that negative attitudes toward the EU can indeed be associated with increased hostility toward both immigrants and Muslim people, stemming from the perceived contradiction between the nation and the EU. It is for this reason that Eurosceptical rhetoric can be used for the political mobilization against immigrants and Muslim people. This finding is important for understanding the political success of right-wing nationalist movements. Furthermore, our results also showed that interventions to reduce hostility toward immigrants and Muslim people should strive to influence both the causes of glorification, and the values and norms of the social categories that people identify with, as both can become the source of intergroup hostility.

Developing more inclusive identities can increase intergroup solidarity[13]

Introduction

The way in which high status, privileged, ethnic majority members of society act toward minorities has a huge impact on the situation of disadvantaged groups and on society as a whole. In recent years we witnessed a rise in volunteerism and various forms of pro-social behavior toward members of disadvantaged minority groups, such as refugees (see e.g., Hamann & Karakayali, 2016). At the same time, there has also been a rise in intolerance (Pew Research, 2016), open hostility and hate crimes (Pew Research, 2017; Williamson, 2016), and protests of nationalist white supremacy groups both in Europe and in the US (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017). These changes can be explained by the increasing acceptability of these attitudes and behaviors (Crandall, Miller, & White, 2018). The aim of the current study is to understand how different definitions of the nation can predict and influence intergroup behavioral intentions of majority group members toward minorities, specifically with regard to the Roma ethnic minority group and Muslim immigrants in Hungary. We consider this issue particularly important in the current social and political context of Europe where Roma people are treated as second rate citizens, and terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists have almost all been committed by second or third generation immigrants, pointing to substantial problems with the social inclusion of immigrants in the national ingroup.

Definitions of the nation

The nation can be defined as an imagined community (Anderson, 1983) with shared history, culture, and laws (Smith, 1991). There are two chief mechanisms that describe the conditions of membership in the national ingroup, generally referred to as ethnic vs. civic definitions of citizenship (Brubaker, 1996; Kohn, 1944). Although the actual content of civic vs. ethnic definitions varies historically and across countries, there is ample empirical evidence

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[13] Kende, A., Lantos, N. A., & Krekó, P. (2018). Endorsing a civic (vs. an ethnic) definition of citizenship predicts higher pro-minority and lower pro-majority collective action intentions. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *9*, 1402.

for the continuing validity of this distinction despite the fact that the legal systems of all countries include both definitions to some extent. This evidence suggests that an ethnic definition of citizenship considers ancestry as the most important criterion of inclusion (i.e., *jus sanguinis* or the right of blood). An ethnic definition also entails that members of the nation have a common cultural heritage, language, and religion, and the group can be identified unambiguously (Smith, 1991). In contrast, a civic definition entails that citizenship can be gained by efforts to join the group and adherence to legal norms (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). The civic definition of citizenship can be exemplified by the concept of French nationhood that is strongly connected to the ideals of the French revolution resulting in France becoming a melting pot of nations with a disregard of ethnicity (see Berdah, 2006). It does not follow that legal requirements are not important for ethnic citizenship, it simply indicates that legal compliance and efforts are not sufficient. This expectation of legal adherence within both citizenship concepts implies that the two approaches are not entirely antagonistic, and tend to correlate positively rather than negatively (see Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). Endorsement of either of the two definitions of citizenship can be grasped on an individual level and on macro or cultural levels. Members of ethnically and culturally relatively homogenous countries are more likely to rely on ethnic definitions than civic ones (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010).

These two approaches to citizenship have entirely different consequences for immigrants and members of ethnic minority groups. The concept of ethnic citizenship denies acceptance into the national ingroup for people who are ethnically different, while civic citizenship permits the acceptance of those who comply with the legal requirements of being or becoming a citizen. Therefore, a predominantly ethnic definition of citizenship can lead to higher hostility toward non-ethnic immigrants (Mepham & Verkuyten, 2017; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009; Reijerse, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, & Fichera, 2012; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2015), and within the framework of ethnic citizenship the connection between national identity and prejudice against non-members is stronger (see Örkény, 2005; Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009). Politicians often rely on this connection and use the concept of ethnic citizenship or some variation of it to promote anti-immigrant policies. This has been the case with most European right-wing populist parties that built their support by presenting immigrants as an ethnic threat (see Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012), but perhaps a better-known example is the anti-immigrant rhetoric used by Trump's 2016 presidential campaign focusing on American national identity (see Knowles & Tropp, 2018).

However, some minority groups are closer to the ingroup than others because of a shared history or smaller perceived cultural distance. Therefore, traditional ethnic minority groups with a shared history may be perceived as less distant than ethnically different, new immigrant groups (Parker, 2010). This is important because perceived intergroup distance can have consequences for moral obligations toward members of the out-group (Coryn & Borshuk, 2006; Hadarics & Kende, 2018), and high perceived distance limits their potential inclusion. Thus, both the definition of citizenship and perceived intergroup distance can influence whether ethnic majority citizens consider members of immigrant and ethnic minority groups as potential citizens.

Besides different definitions of citizenship and consequently who is included in or excluded from the national ingroup, we can also distinguish between different modes of identification with the nation. Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan (2006) used the terms attachment and glorification to label two distinct psychological mechanisms of group identification. People feel attachment with their ingroup if the group merely represents a source of positive self-esteem in line with the original claims of the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Glorification, on the other hand, means that members consider their group superior to other groups resulting in uncritical loyalty to the group by its members. These two modes of identification are manifested in different forms of national identity and reflected in the distinctions between patriotism and nationalism (see Li & Brewer, 2004; Heinrich, 2016; Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, & Schmidt, 2012), genuine patriotism and pseudo-patriotism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Stanford, 1950), and blind and constructive patriotism (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999). These terms all reveal a distinction between one's positive emotional tie to the nation and the uncritical belief in its superiority.

Predictably, these two modes of identification with the nation have different consequences for attitudes towards the integration of minorities and toward immigration in general (for an overview see Huddy, 2016). There is ample empirical evidence that blind / pseudo-patriotism or nationalism is associated with higher xenophobia (Spry & Hornsey, 2007), and lead to the escalation of intergroup conflicts through increased cognitive bias, stereotyping, moral disengagement (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Dugas et al., 2017), and sensitivity to threat and provocation (Leidner & Castano, 2012; Rovenpor, Leidner, Kardos, & O'Brien, 2015; Sahar, 2008; Steele, Parker & Lickel, 2015). Research has also shown that nationalism is more systematically associated with out-group derogation than national

attachment or constructive patriotism (for a review see Golec de Zavala, Guerra, & Simão, 2017).

Evidence for the connection between nationalism and intergroup hostility is straightforward. However, it has been more difficult to demonstrate that attachment with the ingroup or constructive patriotism is associated with positive rather than negative attitudes toward immigrants and ethnic minorities (Parker, 2010). The difficulty of establishing the connection between genuine patriotism and positive out-group attitudes has at least three key reasons. Firstly, it has to do with the basic assumptions of social identity theory that suggests an inherent need for positively differentiating the ingroup even at the cost of discriminating against the out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Secondly, it can be explained by the association between all forms of positive attitudes toward the national ingroup and right-wing or conservative political ideologies (see e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2016; with the exception of constructive patriotism, the operationalization of which includes the endorsement of social change efforts and shows no association with political ideology or political party identification, see Schatz et al., 1999). And thirdly, this difficulty may be explained by different outcomes of genuine patriotism toward different types of out-groups. According to Parker's (2010) study, blind patriotism of US respondents predicted hostility toward a number of out-groups, such as African Americans, Jews, and Arabs, but symbolic patriotism promoted positive rather than negative attitudes mostly toward "domestic out-groups." Thus, the positive association was much weaker for Arab people than for African Americans or Jews. Nevertheless, there is evidence that positive identification with the nation can increase positive attitudes toward immigration by, for example, emphasizing its inclusive character (Minescu, Hagendoorn, & Poppe, 2008; Wagner et al., 2012). In summary, nationalism is associated with the derogation of out-groups, such as immigrants and ethnic minorities, while at least some forms of patriotism can function as a protection from these forms of hostilities.

Blind patriotism or nationalism does not simply reflect a mode of identification, it also implies an essentialist view of the ingroup (Leyens et al., 2003). Therefore, ethnic citizenship is closely associated with nationalism, having similar consequences in terms of attitudes toward non-ethnic immigrants and ethnic minority groups. Schmidt, Raijman, and Hochman (2016) showed that higher endorsement of the ethnic definition of citizenship predicted a higher level of exclusion from rights of non-ethnic migrants in Germany while this connection was not found with the civic definition. Sides and Citrin (2007) found that insistence on cultural unity (i.e., belief in a culturally homogenous concept of the nation) was the most robust predictor of

anti-immigrant attitudes in the 15 EU member states of that time and in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland based on the 2002-2003 European Social Survey data. Mepham and Verkuyten (2017) found that civic as opposed to ethnic concepts of citizenship predicted greater support for immigrant rights, and this relationship was mediated by the perceived indispensability of immigrant groups for the ingroup. These results suggest that personal endorsement of ethnic citizenship and nationalism has similarly negative consequences for intergroup attitudes, and personal endorsement of civic citizenship and genuine patriotism both have similarly positive consequences.

Intergroup attitudes of advantaged, majority group members toward minority groups are undeniably important and central elements of intergroup relations. Openly hostile attitudes can lead to discrimination or the rejection of ally activism (Çakal, Hewstone, Güler, & Heath, 2016), and more subtle forms of prejudice can create obstacles to recognizing intergroup injustices (Becker, & Wright, 2011; Case, Hensley, & Anderson, 2014; Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt 2005). However, general attitudes such as prejudice are not very accurate predictors of actual behavior. For this reason, we analyzed the influence of different definitions of citizenship on behavioral intentions that are better predictors of behavior than attitudes (in line with the theory of reasoned action by Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, and the theory of planned behavior by Ajzen, 1991) by measuring pro-minority and pro-majority collective action intentions rather than intergroup attitudes. While there is a well-known gap between behavioral intentions and actual behavior that should be taken into considerations (Sheeran's 2002 review revealed that intention strength can predict 28% of the variance of actual behavior), expressing intentions to engage in a certain type of intergroup behavior can also influence social norms of behavior. These norms are, in turn, a strong predictor of actual behavior (see Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990, Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Griskevicius, & Goldstein, 2008). Therefore, the point of studying behavior intentions is not simply related to the fact that these intentions may be realized as actions, but also to the fact that they can serve as descriptive norms of behavior for others. Research on collective action clearly suggests that actual participation is strongly influenced by the perceived behavior intention of others (e.g., Bolsen, Leeper, & Shapiro, 2014). This fits into our interest in social movements, such as the politically antagonistic pro-minority movements and right-wing nationalist movements that shape intergroup relations in Europe.

Motivations for Pro-Majority and Pro-Minority Collective Action

People engage in collective action to escape a negative social identity by improving the intergroup situation for the benefit of their group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990), especially if the group suffers from unjust disadvantages (van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011). Consequently, collective action signals the social change efforts to eliminate threats to the positive identity of the ingroup. It can be considered a form of social competition that members of groups engage in against those individuals, groups, or authorities whom they identify as responsible for the unjust intergroup situation (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

Collective action research has been primarily concerned with and informed by progressive movements of minority groups and civil rights movements. For this reason, pro-majority collective action (i.e., populist radical right movements, white supremacy movements, or extreme right-wing movements) have fallen outside the scope of social psychological research on collective action. However, both structurally disadvantaged and advantaged members of society can experience that their group was treated unfairly, in an unjust way, or it is affected by relative deprivation (see Runciman, 1966). Consequently, members of the majority can also develop intentions to engage in collective action based on similar psychological motivations to improve the situation of their ingroup, regardless of their otherwise advantaged position in society (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007).

In fact, white supremacy or populist majority movements may not be that different from, for example, civil rights movements when they demand equal rights for white people, the restoration of perceived injustices, and refer to disadvantages suffered by the majority group (Blee & Creasap, 2010). Nevertheless, this form of collective action was mostly examined within research on right-wing extremism focusing on the individual psychology of followers (in line with Adorno et al., 1950; see e.g., Simi, Blee, DeMichele, & Windisch, 2017), and explained by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA, Altemeyer, 1988), the role of psychological distress and experience of threat (e.g., Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, & Hobfoll, 2009), and bias in social cognition, such as processing of fake news and information on conspiracies (Van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Paollet, 2015). While these approaches provide valuable insights into individual differences in the appeal of nationalist, pro-majority movements, they overlook group processes that may be more similar in both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Putting

together the argument of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the special characteristics of followers of right-wing extremist movements, we can conclude that nationalist, pro-majority social movements emerge as a result of perceived injustices and relative deprivation experienced by those members of the majority group who are particularly sensitive to identity threats by for example the presence and influence of minority groups and immigration.

The interconnectedness of nationalism, perceived threat, and intergroup hostility has been shown by research conducted following terrorist attacks (e.g., Coryn, Beale, & Myers, 2004; Slone, 2002), and in more stable situations as well. Perceived threat to the nation was found to increase xenophobic attitudes, especially among people who already identified strongly with the nation (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004). However, this is not a one-way process, threat does not only increase hostility toward out-groups, but it also strengthens national identification and thus contributes to the vicious circle of conflict escalation (see Blank & Schmidt, 2003). This circular connection suggests that nationalism may increase threat perceptions related to out-groups, and at the same time the connection between nationalism and intergroup hostility may be increased in the presence of threat. These different processes highlight that while it may be more meaningful to conceptualize the role of threat as a mediator in the process, it can also be considered a moderator. In summary, members of the majority ethnic group may show higher intentions to engage in pro-majority collective action if they feel that their national identity is threatened by out-groups (in line with Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, & Pedahzur, 2010; Mudde, 2004). Furthermore, perceived threat related to ethnic minorities or non-ethnic immigrants may be especially high among people who endorse the more essentialized and fixed ethnic rather than the more flexible civic definition of citizenship.

Intergroup hostility and nationalist movements against minorities are only one side of the coin though, and do not grasp the political and social context of contemporary intergroup issues in its entirety. The same situations that evoke fear among some people evoke empathy in others. For example, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some members of the majority white population in the US pleaded for racial tolerance and condemned the vicarious retaliation against Muslim people and immigrants (Reed & Aquino, 2003). When people feel empathy with victims of injustice, they recognize their suffering and feel motivated to engage in collective action as if they experienced injustices on behalf of their ingroup (Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2015; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). Majority group members can feel empathy and become aware of social injustices suffered by members of an out-group as a

result of intergroup contact (Selvanathan, Techakesari, Tropp, & Barlow, 2017) or because these injustices violate their own moral principles. This recognition motivates people to eliminate the violation through politicized identification with the relevant ingroup (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012). The relevant ingroup may be an opinion-based group that provides a different form of identity than ethnic or national groups (Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007), but motivates collective action participation more strongly than other forms of group identification (McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009).

People more readily feel empathy with members of their own group than nonmembers, and this difference has an impact on behavioral intentions, such as helping (Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006). Therefore, ideas of citizenship can increase or decrease empathy and intergroup action intentions by affecting both perceptions of similarity among members and the permeability of group boundaries (for the connection between global citizenship, empathy and intergroup helping see Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013). As we have seen, those who perceive entry into the national ingroup in more flexible ways and consider the nation as an inclusive category may feel more empathy with members of ethnic minorities or immigrants compared to those who define the national ingroup in more rigid and exclusive ways. Therefore, we expect that different definitions of citizenship can elicit higher or lower empathy with members of out-groups, and mediate the connection between definitions of citizenship and intergroup action intentions. However, empathy becomes even more important when injustices are caused by the actions of one's own advantaged ingroup. It leads people to engage in social change actions to reduce their collective guilt (Calcagno, 2016) and to improve the moral image of their ingroup (Täuber & van Zomeren, 2013). Consequently, in the presence of empathy and injustice awareness, majority group members may be motivated to engage in collective action as allies. Therefore, definitions of citizenship may elicit intergroup action tendencies differently in the presence of high or low empathy with the out-group, thus functions as a moderator in the relationship as well.

Putting together the results of previous research on national identity, intergroup emotions, and collective action presented in the introduction, we argue that the treatment of disadvantaged ethnic minority groups, as well as ethnically different immigrant groups, are dependent on ideas about the nation. People who endorse an ethnic definition of citizenship are more likely to feel threatened by ethnic minority and immigrant groups, with this threat would motivate engagement in pro-majority collective action. Clearly, empathy with people whose suffering is caused by the ingroup would be hindered by ideas about ingroup superiority among nationalists

and that the ingroup can do no wrong. In contrast, people who endorse civic citizenship can have a more critical awareness of social injustices even if their ingroup is responsible for them and are therefore more likely to feel empathy for minorities, which then motivates them for collective action as allies. These predictions fit into the literature on emotions and specifically on intergroup emotions suggesting that emotions have antecedents and consequences (Iyer & Leach, 2008).

Research question and hypotheses

Our research questions are whether the endorsement of different definitions of the nation predicts pro-social and hostile intergroup behavioral intentions differently, and whether the connection between the definition of the nation and intergroup behavioral intentions is mediated by empathy and threat. Specifically, we hypothesized that the endorsement of an ethnic definition would predict lower pro-minority and higher pro-majority collective action, and this connection would be mediated by higher threat and lower empathy. In contrast, we hypothesized that the endorsement of a civic definition would predict higher pro-minority and lower pro-majority collective action, and that this connection would be mediated by lower fear and higher empathy. However, both threat and empathy can stem from experiences not directly connected to citizenship, yet affect intergroup behavioral intentions. Therefore, these two intergroup emotions can potentially be treated as moderators as well, thus not mediating, just amplifying or weakening the connection between citizenship and action intentions.

As most research related to this issue focused on ethnically different immigrant groups, and not on historical ethnic minorities or specifically the Roma, we did not make specific predictions regarding differences in collective action intentions related to these two out-groups, but generally predicted that the pattern would be identical for the Roma and the immigrant out-groups.

We tested these connections in two studies to establish both the association between the study variables and their causal connections. In Study 6, we conducted an online survey to show the connection between different definitions of citizenship and both pro-minority and pro-majority action, and show whether empathy and fear mediate this connection. In Study 7, we manipulated the concept of citizenship by making an ethnic or a civic definition salient, and tested whether it affected pro-minority or pro-majority collective action tendencies. We also

checked whether the connection is different in the presence of high or low empathy and fear. Both studies were conducted following the IRB approval of Eötvös Loránd University.

The context of the current studies

The idea of multiculturalism and tolerance has never been adopted in Eastern Europe, and despite the cultural and linguistic diversity of the region, most contemporary nation states are rather homogenous ethnically and endorse ethnic definitions of citizenship (Reijerse et al., 2012). The idea of ethnic citizenship has been central to the current right-wing government of Hungary too. They have held so-called national consultations since 2011 in which they communicated their program and political visions (Government of Hungary, 2017). These national consultations served the purpose of direct public legitimation for the government (see a reflection on one of the national consultations by Bearak, 2017). The first two national consultations are relevant for the current research as they were concerned with defining the members of the national ingroup and its enemies, putting forward an ethnic definition and emphasizing the impermeability of its boundaries by, for instance, claims such as the following: "There are people who suggest that Hungary's new constitution should express the value of national belongingness with Hungarians living outside the borders, while others suggest that it is not important" or "There are people who suggest that Hungary's new constitution should defend our national resources, especially the land and water." (referring to a ban on foreign ownership).

This social and political context creates a hostile environment for the Roma, the largest ethnic minority group in Hungary. Although Roma people have lived in Hungary since at least the 15th century, they continue to be treated as second class citizens in mainstream political discourse, resulting in institutional discrimination, social marginalization, and poverty (Feischmidt, Szombati, & Szuhay, 2013; Kovarek, Róna, Hunyadi, & Krekó, 2017). Their history in Hungary can be characterized by swings between forced assimilation and extreme forms of discrimination starting with their settlement in the 18th century, culminating in the Porrajmos, the Roma Holocaust in the Second World War (Hancock, 2004). Negative stereotypes about the Roma include criminality and laziness, suggesting that their rejection from the majority society is dependent on their lack of efforts to become accepted members of society (Kende, Hadarics, & Lášticová, 2017).

The rhetoric of ethnic citizenship was utilized in the anti-immigrant propaganda that started in 2015 (Tremlett & Messing, 2015). This propaganda included different waves of national consultations, media campaigns with messages of threat about illegal Muslim immigration, and a referendum against immigration. Eventually, anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes exceeded any other form of intergroup hostility in Hungary, including prejudice against the Roma (Simonovits & Bernáth, 2015; Wike, Stokes, & Simmons, 2016). These changes took place despite the fact that Hungary has not been the target of any terrorist attacks of Islamic extremists, nor does it have a significant or visible Muslim or non-ethnic Hungarian immigrant population.

Study 6

Sample

Originally, we relied on a sample of 1080 participants from an online participant pool using a multiple-step, proportionally stratified, probabilistic sampling method resulting in a sample demographically similar to the Hungarian population in terms of age, gender, level of education, and type of settlement. The recruitment was carried out by a professional public opinion company. We did not conduct sample size calculations based on a priori estimations of effect size, but targeted $N = 1000$ that is typically used in opinion poll surveys relying on representative samples of Hungarian society (for the accuracy of estimating election results in Hungary using different sample sizes see Poll of polls, 2018). Using this sample allowed us to test our hypotheses on an extensive and diverse sample of the Hungarian population. Eleven participants declared that they belonged to the Roma minority. They were removed from the analyses which left us with $N = 1069$. The sample was randomly split: half of the respondents received a questionnaire related to the Roma ($n = 517$), and the other half related to Muslim immigrants ($n = 552$). We used the term Muslim immigrant ("muszlim bevándorló") throughout the questionnaire to refer to the group of people that represent the most recent wave of immigrants mostly from the Middle East and Africa in order to distinguish this group from a large group of ethnic Hungarian immigrants from neighboring countries. We avoided the term refugee, migrant or illegal immigrant as these terms are heavily politicized in the Hungarian context. However, this group can include non-Muslim immigrants too, such as for example Christians from Syria, therefore we refer to them as immigrants in the paper. The sample consisted of 52.2% women and 47.1% men, and the mean age was 46.8 years ($SD = 15.67$, 18-

79). In terms of education level, 34.1% had a higher education degree, 44.1% had secondary education, and 21.9% lower than secondary education; 15.4% lived in the capital city, 54.3% in another city, 29.2% in villages, and 1.1% abroad. All participants were Hungarian nationals. No participants indicated that they were Muslim. On a one to seven scale of self-placement from left-wing to right-wing, the mean score was 4.23 ($SD = 1.74$)

Measures

Scales in the questionnaire for the Roma and immigrant out-groups were identical, but slightly rephrased to adapt to their different contexts where it was necessary. Additionally, some attitude scales were presented in both questionnaires and analyzed for the full sample, and variables not related to out-groups were all identical. Data collected for the current study was part of an omnibus survey. Respondents were informed that the survey would consist of questions related to social and political issues. Questions of citizenship were asked immediately after the demographic questions, not preceded by any other scales. Following the question of citizenship, we asked about the approval or disapproval of hostile political discourse against either the Roma or immigrants for the purpose of another study. This may have focused respondents' attention to the situation of these out-groups within the political climate of the country rather than within other (non-politicized) context that we found favorable for the current study. These questions were followed by the question of empathy and threat. Questions regarding collective action were asked immediately after questions about threat. All other scales were presented following the scales of the current study. We present all variables and data exclusions related to the current research question. Answers were indicated on a 7-point scale (from 1=completely disagree to 7=completely agree) on all items, unless otherwise indicated.

For the ethnic and civic perception of citizenship, we relied on the items derived from the scale of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, 2014) with one item indicating *ethnic citizenship* ("to have Hungarian ancestry"), and one item indicating *civic citizenship* ("to feel Hungarian") following the original ISSP instruction "Some people say that the following things are important for being truly Hungarian. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is...". Complex constructs such as ideas of citizenship are ideally not tested using a single-item scale (Bergkvist, 2014). The ISSP scale may be the most widely used measure of these two forms of citizenship, but the scale does not

yield to an acceptable two-factor model in the Hungarian context[14]. Problems with the operationalization of these two forms of citizenship is also supported by critiques suggesting that language and religion may not be so strongly connected to the concept of citizenship (e.g., Reijerse, Van Acker, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, & Duriez, 2013). Therefore, we made a theoretical decision to rely on individual items that best reflected ethnic and civic definitions in the context of Hungary. Ancestry has been shown to be the core component of ethnic citizenship, and "to feel Hungarian" was the strongest component of civic citizenship in the cross-cultural comparative study of Reeskens and Hooghe (2010). Furthermore, "to feel Hungarian" is the most liberal definition of citizenship in the sense that it sets no external limits to gaining entry into the group, but solely relies on individuals' wish to join the group. Hence, it seemed the most suitable item for testing whether these two approaches to citizenship predict different outcomes. Nevertheless, it must be noted that "to feel Hungarian" may be interpreted in different ways by respondents, as it captures both the affective and the cognitive component of social identity. For example, when choosing this option as an important aspect of belonging to the national ingroup, some people may put an emphasis on self-categorization as Hungarian, while others on the affective commitment to the group (for a distinction see Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwekerk, 1999). Respect for law and political institutions may be more central to the idea of civic citizenship, this item appears as an expectation within the concept of ethnic citizenship as well, shown by its high cross loading in previous studies (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). Although two other items of citizenship were included in the questionnaire ("to be born in Hungary" and "to respect Hungary's political institutions and laws"), they were not used in the analysis.

We measured *pro-minority collective action* intentions by four items asking participants about their action intentions in case Roma people / Muslim immigrants moved close to their home to make the context of the questions more real. These items were put together following the example of van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2012). Respondents could explicitly state intentions to do something against injustices ("I would support actions to protect the rights of Roma people/Muslim immigrants", "I would stand up against the segregation of Roma people / deportation of Muslim immigrants", "I would sign a petition to stand up for the rights of Roma

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[14] Based on calculations made using the publicly available database retrieved from http://www.issp.org, using Maximum Likelihood analysis with Promax rotation we could not identify a two-factor solution, but found three factors with eigenvalues about one. However, religion and feeling Hungarian created single-item scales, while all other scales loaded onto the mixed ethnic-civic factor.

people / Muslim immigrants", "I would encourage my acquaintances to participate in protests for the right of Roma people / Muslim immigrants" Roma: $\alpha = .87$, immigrant: $\alpha = .76$).

Pro-majority collective action was measured by four items similar to the pro-minority collective action items, but adapted to the different context ("I would support actions to protect Hungarians from minorities", "I would participate in a protest for protecting the rights of Hungarians", "I would encourage my acquaintances to stand up for the rights of Hungarians", "I would not vote for a party or politician who claims to protect the rights of Hungarians rather than the rights of minorities" [reverse scored]. Because of low reliability, the reversed item had to be removed from the scale, the remaining three items had good reliabilities (Roma: $\alpha = .77$, immigrant: $\alpha = .77$).

Empathy toward the minority groups was measured using a single item asking specifically whether respondents felt empathy toward the groups in the current political context. The item "együttérzés" refers to emotional rather than cognitive empathy, and is used similarly – in some cases even interchangeably – with sympathy or compassion in everyday language. Although cognitive empathy has been identified as more closely connected to intergroup helping behavior while emotional empathy with avoidance (Einolf, 2012), we opted for the use of this term because the word "empátia" (the literal translation and technical term for empathy in Hungarian) is less known outside academia. We measured perceived *threat* based on the integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), using six items describing both symbolic and realistic threat to tap into general fear related to the minority groups (for example "Rome people / Muslim immigrants pose a health threat to Hungarians", "The cultural values of Roma people / Muslim immigrants are in opposition with Hungarian values" Roma: $\alpha = .83$, immigrant: $\alpha = .89$, based on Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015). Although we measured both symbolic and realistic threat regarding both groups, factor analysis revealed only one factor of threat in line with the findings from previous research in the same intergroup context (Kende et al., 2017). Nevertheless, we checked the results entering the two forms of threats as two separate variables in the model that yielded to a similar pattern as the model with one threat variable. The two forms of threat were highly correlated in both samples (Roma $r = .70$ $p < .001$, immigrant $r = .83$ $p < .001$). Information on the model is available in the Supplementary materials.

In order to compare attitudes toward the two groups, we used the *feeling thermometer* in both subsamples in connection with the two out-groups, using a 10-point scale (from 1=very unlikable to 10=very likeable). We also measured *intergroup distance* using two items, one

about perceiving Hungarians and the Roma / Muslim immigrants as one group in Hungary, and a second item about perceiving Hungarians and the Roma / Muslim immigrants as one group in the world (based on Riek, Mania, Gaertner, McDonald, & Lamoreaux, 2010, the correlations of the two items for the combined samples were Roma: $r = .78$, $p < .001$, immigrant: $r = .74$, $p < .001$).

Results

Descriptive statistics

Little MCAR test indicated that data was missing at random in all the variables included in the analysis (Roma: $\chi^2(36) = 34.65$, $p = .533$; immigrant: $\chi^2(13) = 11.95$, $p = .532$).

The comparison of attitudes toward the two groups showed a stronger dislike of immigrants than Roma people based on the scores of the feeling thermometer (Roma: $M = 4.07$, $SD = 2.34$, immigrant: $M = 3.32$, $SD = 2.35$, $t(1018) = 10.87$, $p < .001$), and a stronger perception of the Roma and Hungarians as one group than of immigrants and Hungarians (Roma: $M = 4.64$, $SD = 2.23$, immigrant: $M = 3.82$, $SD = 2.77$, $t(1035) = 8.45$, $p < .001$).

Descriptive statistics and correlations between all study variables are shown in Table 22. Correlations between variables suggest that in connection with the Roma out-group the acceptance (or reversely the rejection) of the *civic* definition was associated with higher empathy, lower threat, higher pro-minority and lower-pro-majority action intentions, while in connection with the immigrant out-group the rejection (or reversely the acceptance) of the *ethnic* definition showed the same pattern of connections. Empathy and threat were strongly correlated with both types of action intentions in the case of both out-groups. Civic and ethnic definitions of citizenship showed weak positive correlations in both samples.

Table 22. Means, standard deviations and correlations between all measured variables.

						Roma		
	M	SD	Ethnic	empathy	Threat	Pro-minority CA	Pro-majority CA	Political orientation
Civic	5.08	1.63	.21**	.19**	-.13**	.19**	.02	-.01
Ethnic	4.53	1.64	-	-.03	.10*	.01	.27**	.11*
Empathy	3.50	1.70		-	-.58**	.64**	-.45**	-.15*
Threat	3.95	1.24			-	-.61**	.53**	.21**
Pro-minority CA	3.08	1.39				-	-.35**	-.17**
Pro-majority CA	4.15	1.55					-	.18**
Political orientation (left-right)	4.12	1.81						-

						Muslim immigrants		
	M	SD	Ethnic	empathy	Threat	Pro-minority CA	Pro-majority CA	Political orientation
Civic	5.18	1.54	.14**	.11*	-.03	.05	.05	.10*
Ethnic	4.64	1.64	-	-.20**	-.34**	-.20**	.39**	.22**
Empathy	3.18	1.72		-	-.64**	.61**	-.47**	-.30**
Threat	4.63	1.46			-	-.66**	.64**	.42**
Pro-minority CA	2.79	1.35				-	-.41**	-.35**
Pro-majority CA	4.49	1.52					-	.40**
Political orientation (left-right)	4.31	1.68						-

Hypothesis testing

We used Structural Equation Modelling (using AMOS 22.0) to test our hypothesis that the endorsement of an ethnic definition would predict lower pro-minority and higher pro-majority collective action and that this connection would be mediated by higher fear and lower empathy, while the endorsement of a civic definition would predict the opposite. We included

political orientation as a control variable to test whether we can identify predictions beyond the effect of left-right orientation. We identified the most suitable model using the model building – model trimming technique (see Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005). We built a saturated model in which ethnic and civic definitions were allowed to predict both pro-minority and pro-majority collective action mediated by both types of emotions. Such a saturated model shows a perfect fit with χ2, RMSEA, and SRMR values of 0, and a CFI value of 1. We then trimmed the non-significant paths to create simultaneously sufficient and parsimonious models that enable us to test the effects of both the civic and the ethnic definition (for a visual presentation of the path with standardized coefficients, see Figure 8). The trimmed models still showed very good fit for both out-groups (Roma: χ^2 = 13.98, p = .082; df = 8; CFI = .993; $RMSEA$ = .038; $SRMR$ = .024; immigrant: χ^2 = 12.46, p = .029; df = 5; CFI = .994; $RMSEA$ = .052; $SRMR$ = .028).

Figure 8. Relationship between variables in Study 1 based on the mediation analysis with political orientation controlled in the model. Numbers represent standardized coefficients for both groups. The first number before the slash refers to the Roma outgroup, and the second to the immigrant outgroup. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.

To reveal whether the relationships between ethnic and civic citizenship on the one hand, and pro-minority and pro-majority on the other hand, were mediated by threat and empathy, a series of mediational analyses were conducted with the bootstrapping technique suggested by Macho and Ledermann (2011), where we requested 95% confidence intervals using 5000 resamples. An indirect effect is considered significant if the unstandardized 95% confidence

interval around the estimate does not contain 0. Significant indirect effects are shown in Table 23.

Table 23. Indirect Effects of Civic vs. Ethnic Identity on Collective Action Intentions Mediated by Empathy and Threat toward immigrants and the Roma

Target groups	Indirect pathway	B	SE	95% Confidence Interval	β	p
Immigrants	Civic def. → Empathy → Pro-minority CA	.02	.01	[.01, .05]	.03	.004
	Ethnic def. →Threat → Pro-majority CA	.10	.02	[.07, .15]	.11	.001
Roma	Civic def. → Empathy → Pro-minority CA	.07	.02	[.03, .11]	.08	.001
	Ethnic def. →Threat→ Pro-majority CA	.03	.02	[.03, .06]	.03	.046

Discussion

The weak positive correlation between ethnic and civic definitions of citizenship underlines previous assumptions that the two conceptualizations of citizenship are neither entirely antagonistic nor completely independent, but those who endorse an ethnic definition would also have expectations regarding personal efforts to be citizens (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). Nevertheless, all of our hypotheses were confirmed by the data, that is, the endorsement of an ethnic definition predicted lower pro-minority and higher pro-majority collective action, and this connection was mediated by higher fear and lower empathy; while the endorsement of a civic definition predicted higher pro-minority and lower pro-majority collective action and this connection was mediated by lower fear and higher empathy. This result is in line with previous research suggesting the importance of the role of defining the nation in inclusive or exclusive ways (see Minescu et al., 2008; Wagner et al., 2012), and the potential consequences for the integration of minorities (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Hochman, Raijman, & Hochman., 2016). As our outcome variable was pro-minority and pro-majority collective action, we were also able to show that these definitions of the nation matter for mobilization, as they predicted intergroup emotions differently, which in turn predicted both types of mobilizations in opposite ways.

However, simple correlations and the strength of these connections suggested that different aspects of the definition of the nation were important in connection with the Roma and with immigrant out-groups. In the case of the Roma, the endorsement of a civic definition was a stronger predictor of intergroup emotions and collective action, while in the case of immigrants, the ethnic definition was the stronger predictor. The distinction may be explained by several factors related to the differences in the perceptions of the Roma living in Hungary and the perception of immigrants. Our data provided evidence that immigrants were considered more distant from Hungarians than the Roma. This is similar to Parker's (2010) finding that domestic out-groups, such as African Americans or Jews, were evaluated differently than Arab people based on symbolic patriotism, but not based on blind patriotism. Furthermore, the basis of rejection of immigrants is precisely their intention to gain some form of citizenship, therefore they represent a threat particularly to those who endorse an ethnic definition of citizenship. In contrast, negative stereotypes related to Roma people mostly revolve around their lack of effort for integration and respect for majority institutions and laws (Kende et al., 2017), which can be interpreted as violations from the perspective of the civic definition of citizenship.

This study provided correlational evidence from a representative survey that ethnic and civic concepts of citizenship predicted pro-minority and pro-majority intergroup action intentions in opposite ways, and the connection was mediated by relevant intergroup emotions. In order to understand whether personal endorsement of these two concepts has a causal effect on mobilizing people for or against minorities, we conducted an experiment in which we manipulated concepts of citizenship through different positive accounts of what it means to be Hungarian. We expected that the civic, as opposed to the ethnic, manipulation would predict higher pro-minority and lower pro-majority collective action intentions. However, we expected that this effect would be strongest in the presence of high empathy with the minority groups and low fear from them. We therefore tested a moderation effect of intergroup emotions rather than a mediation effect as opposed to Study 5.

This different statistical approach was due to the different designs of the studies and the type of manipulation that we used in Study 6. In the survey we measured people's pre-existing ideas of the nation that we expected to be the basis of intergroup emotions as previous research suggested (in connection with threat see e.g. Coryn et al., 2004, Snider et al., 2004; in connection with empathy, see e.g. Calcagno, 2016; Thomas et al., 2009). However, in Study 7 we used positive accounts of the nation to increase the salience of the ethnic and civic aspects of citizenship respectively that did not contain any information directly related to minorities.

Furthermore, the manipulation was positively framed, and therefore, we did not expect that it would directly elicit empathy toward the groups or fear from them as it could have been in the case of using, for example, identity threatening manipulations that elicit intergroup emotions (e.g., Hutchinson, Jetten, Christian, & Haycraft, 2006). However, we expected that the positive text of the manipulation would resonate more strongly and increase pro-minority collective action intentions if respondents already had higher empathy toward the out-groups and lower fear from them. In contrast, we expected that the effect of the manipulation would be stronger in the absence of empathy and higher fear from the out-group. For this reason, we relied on people's preexisting intergroup emotions as the moderators of the effect of ideas about citizenship.

Study 7

Design

We used an experimental design in which we manipulated definitions of citizenship. In order to increase the personal endorsement of either the ethnic or the civic definitions, we created descriptions that presented Hungarian identity equally positively, yet the civic manipulation described the nation as an inclusive group, suggesting that inclusion was based on individual efforts, and emphasized the shared history of Hungary with other nations, and the ethnic manipulation suggested that the valuable aspects of citizenship were based on ancestry, and emphasized the uniqueness of its history (for a full description of the text and the pictures of the manipulation see the Supplementary material).

Sample

Respondents were recruited from a university class where students participate in research for credit ($N = 436$). The sample consisted of BA and MA students from all faculties of Eötvös Loránd University. Seven people failed the first attention check question which simply asked about the main topic of the text. The second attention check was related to the core aspects of the manipulation, and 23 respondents in the ethnic and 93 in the civic condition chose the wrong option, that is, they either indicated that they had not remembered the answer or chose the option that was valid for the opposite condition. These respondents were removed from the analysis, resulting in an overall sample size of $N = 320$ (civic $n = 108$; ethnic $n = 181$).

Power analysis was conducted based on the correlations from Study 6 that fell between .2 and .4 regarding the definitions of citizenship and action intentions. Relying on the weaker connection for a more conservative estimation of sample size, G*Power analysis requested $N =$

328 for 95% power to detect an effect size of Cohen's d = .4 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Our sample was therefore sufficient to test the expected connection even after the removal of participants who failed the attention check.

The original sample consisted of 77.1% women and 22.5% men, the reduced sample had 78.2% women and 21.5% men. The mean age of participants was 20.97 years (*SD* = 2.03) in the full sample, and *M* = 21.6 years (*SD* = 1.31) in the reduced sample. Self-placement from left-wing to right-wing had a mean score was 4.10 (*SD* = 1.26) in the full sample, and *M* = 4.02 (*SD* = 2.12) in the reduced sample.

Procedure

Using the Qualtrics platform, participants were randomly assigned to either the civic or the ethnic condition, and were informed that the questionnaire consisted of two independent parts: the first one was concerned with the topic of pride, and the second one with intergroup relations. Presenting the purpose of the questionnaire as a study on pride was supposed to increase the positive endorsement of the definition of the nation and mask the real purpose of the questionnaire about the connection between citizenship concepts and intergroup action intentions. Participants were presented with the text of the manipulation that was allegedly from an actor who answered an open question of a magazine about Hungary. The text was accompanied by portraits of 4 famous Hungarian people (two sportspeople, a scientist, and a singer). We used visual images to increase the priming effect as shown by for example Abraham and Appiah (2006). In the civic condition one of the sportspeople and the singer were foreign-born and gained Hungarian citizenship later in their lives, while the scientist was of Roma origin. In the ethnic condition, all pictures depicted ethnic Hungarians. One picture of an ethnic Hungarian sportsperson was identical in the two conditions.

After the presentation of the text, two attention check questions were asked to establish whether participants paid attention to the text at all, and to the core message of the text, and one question whether they agreed with the message of the text. Attention check questions were introduced so that participants who did not read the text carefully can be removed from the analysis, and agreement was measured in order to assess whether the text was equally acceptable in the two conditions, and relatedly, to identify a potential backfire effect in either of the conditions. Participants then answered the questions about citizenship that served as a manipulation check testing the effectiveness of the manipulation. They were then forwarded to

the "next" questionnaire about intergroup relations where questions about intergroup emotions and collective action intentions related to Roma people and immigrants were asked. Scales related to the Roma and immigrants were presented in a randomized order.

Measures

We checked the manipulation using the same single items of *ethnic* and *civic citizenship* as in Study 6 from the International Social Survey Programme (2014). Answers were indicated on a 7-point scale (from 1=completely disagree to 7=completely agree) on all items.

Intergroup *empathy* and *fear* were tested using single items, asking the extent to which respondents felt the listed emotions when they were thinking about the situation of Roma people / Muslim immigrants. Other emotions were listed as fillers in the scale.

Pro-minority and *pro-majority collective action* intentions were measured by the same items related to both minorities from Study 1. Pro-minority collective action with 4 items (Roma: $\alpha = .89$, immigrant: $\alpha = .92$), and pro-majority collective action with 3, however, the reversed item of the scale needed to be removed because of low reliability. The remaining two items were correlated more strongly (Roma: $r = .57$, $p < .001$; immigrant: $r = .55$, $p < .001$).

Results

Manipulation checks

The texts of the manipulation were generally accepted by the respondents, and there were no differences in the level of agreement with the text in the two conditions. We also checked whether agreement with the manipulation was different when testing it on the sample that included people who failed the attention check questions and without them, and found no differences in agreement either in the full sample (Ethnic: $M = 5.39$, $SD = 1.40$, Civic: $M = 5.61$, $SD = 1.25$, $t(434) = -1.73$, $p = .084$), or in the reduced sample (Ethnic: $M = 5.41$, $SD = 1.40$, Civic: $M = 5.63$, $SD = 1.25$, $t(287) = -1.31$, $p = .190$). This similar level of agreement suggests that the failed attention check was not likely the result of reactance or the effect of established attitudes, but rather of a lack of attention.

In terms of the direct effect of the manipulation on the concept of citizenship, following the ethnic manipulation, participants agreed more with the idea that citizenship was primarily based on ancestry, that is, with the core idea of ethnic citizenship than following the civic manipulation (Ethnic: $M = 4.79$, $SD = 1.54$, Civic: $M = 4.25$, $SD = 1.62$, $t(287) = 2.84$, $p = $

.005). However, we found no differences in the agreement with the statement that citizenship was a matter of feeling Hungarian (Ethnic: $M = 6.11$, $SD = 1.17$, Civic: $M = 6.05$, $SD = 1.16$, $t(287) = 0.45$, $p = .652$). This result suggests that the manipulation was only effective in changing the idea of citizenship in the ethnic dimension and not in the civic dimension. In sum, despite identifying some problems with the manipulation check questions that can suggest both a superficial engagement in the manipulation and the effect of preexisting attitudes, we can conclude that the texts were positively rated and were acceptable in both conditions (shown by the level of agreement), and the manipulation was effective to the extent that it created differences in accepting the ethnic citizenship idea.

Descriptive statistics

Means and standard deviations in the two conditions are presented in Table 24. Both empathy and fear scores were around the midpoint in connection with both minority groups. However, in contrast to recent public opinion polls that indicated higher hostility toward immigrants than toward Roma (see Wike et al., 2016), we found that empathy with the Roma was lower than with immigrants, while fear from the Roma was higher. These differences were confirmed by paired-sample t-tests (Empathy: $t(288) = 5.02$, p < .001, CI: .28, .65; Fear: $t(288)$ = -3.21, p = .001, CI: -.60, -.14). Action intentions in favor of both minority groups were rather low, and lower than pro-majority action intentions that were close to the midpoint.

**Table 24. Means and standard deviations in the two conditions and in total.**

	Ethnic M (SD)		Civic M (SD)		Total M (SD)	
Empathy Roma	3.44	(1.62)	3.83	(1.67)	3.59	(1.64)
Empathy immigrant	3.96	(1.66)	4.22	(1.64)	4.06	(1.65)
Fear Roma	4.39	(1.72)	4.05	(2.00)	4.26	(1.83)
Fear immigrant	3.94	(1.80)	3.80	(1.93)	3.89	(1.85)
Pro-Roma Action	2.38	(1.27)	2.87	(1.64)	2.56	(1.44)
Pro-immigrant Action	2.31	(1.38)	2.71	(1.63)	2.46	(1.49)
Pro-Majority Action	3.81	(1.68)	3.62	(1.55)	3.74	(1.63)

Hypothesis testing

Respondents in the civic condition showed significantly higher intentions for pro-minority collective action both in connection with the Roma (Ethnic: $M = 2.37$, $SD = 1.27$, Civic: $M = 2.84$, $SD = 1.67$, $t(184) = -2.69$, $p = .008$, Levene's test indicated unequal variances, $F = 14.65$, $p < .001$, so degrees of freedom were adjusted from 287 to 184) and in connection with immigrants (Ethnic: $M = 2.31$, $SD = 1.38$, Civic: $M = 2.71$, $SD = 1.63$, $t(196.5) = -2.10$, $p = .037$, Levene's test indicated unequal variances, $F = 6.09$, $p < .001$, so degrees of freedom were adjusted from 287 to 196.5). However, no differences were found in the intentions for pro-majority action (Ethnic: $M = 3.81$, $SD = 1.68$, Civic: $M = 3.62$, $SD = 1.55$, $t(287) = 0.94$, $p = .349$).

In order to test whether empathy and fear moderated the effect of priming a civic versus an ethnic definition on pro-minority and pro-majority collective action intentions, we conducted a series of general linear regression analyses with an interaction term. Firstly, we ran an analysis with pro-minority collective action intentions as the outcome variable, and entered the interaction of the condition and empathy in the model, then repeated the analysis with the interaction of condition and fear. Secondly, we ran the analyses with pro-majority collective action intentions as the outcome variable, and the same interactions. We found a main effect for empathy on pro-minority collective action intentions (Roma: $F(1, 286) = 44.87$, $p < .001$,

$\eta^2{}_p = .49$; immigrant: $F(1, 289) = 23.64$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2{}_p = .36$) and fear in opposite directions (Roma: $F(1, 289) = 11.43$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2{}_p = .20$; immigrant: $F(1, 289) = 16.56$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2{}_p = .26$), suggesting that participants had higher pro-minority collective action intentions in the presence of higher empathy and lower fear. We also identified a significant interaction effect of empathy on pro-Roma collective actions ($F(3, 285) = 6.72$, $p = .010$, $\eta^2{}_p = .02$), and a marginal effect on pro-immigrant collective action intentions ($F(3, 285) = 3.15$, $p = .077$, $\eta^2{}_p = .01$). Furthermore, fear also moderated the effect of civic vs. ethnic priming on pro-minority collective action intentions for both groups (Roma: $F(3, 285) = 4.04$, $p = .045$, $\eta^2{}_p = .01$; immigrant: $F(3, 285) = 5.42$, $p = .021$, $\eta^2{}_p = .02$). Simple slope analysis with centered empathy and fear variables revealed that respondents in the civic condition indicated higher pro-minority collective action intentions in the presence of high empathy and low fear, that is, pairwise comparisons showed that intentions for pro-minority collective action intentions were only significantly higher in the civic condition compared to the ethnic condition when empathy was high (at +1SD Roma: $F(1, 285) = 10.79$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2{}_p = .04$, immigrant: $F(1, 285) = 6.77$, $p = .013$, $\eta^2{}_p = .02$), and fear was average or low (at -1SD Roma: $F(1, 285) = 9.98$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2{}_p = .03$, immigrant: $F(1, 285) = 10.14$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2{}_p = .03$). Simple slopes with error bars for pro-minority collective action intentions with empathy and fear as moderators are presented on Figure 9.

Figure 9. Simple slopes for pro-minority (Roma and immigrant) collective action intentions with empathy and fear as moderators with error bars.

Pro-majority collective action intentions were not directly affected by the manipulations, but we still tested whether these intentions were affected differently in the presence of high or low empathy with either minority groups, and high or low fear of either groups. We found a main effect of empathy on pro-majority collective action (Roma: $F(1, 286) = 6.09$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .12$; immigrant: $F(1, 289) = 5.76$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .11$), that is, low empathy predicted higher pro-majority collective action intentions. Similarly, fear had a main effect on these intentions (Roma: $F(1, 289) = 4.76$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .09$; immigrant: $F(1, 289) = 15.94$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .25$), suggesting that higher fear predicted higher intentions of pro-majority collective action intentions. However, no interaction effect was found with either empathy (Roma: $F(3, 286) = 0.75$, $p = .388$, $\eta^2_p < .01$; immigrant: $F(3, 286) = 0.92$, $p = .761$, $\eta^2_p < .01$) or fear (Roma: $F(3, 286) = 0.48$, $p = .488$, $\eta^2_p < .01$; immigrant: $F(3, 286) = 0.54$, $p = .462$, $\eta^2_p < .01$). Therefore, the manipulation did not affect those high or low in empathy, or high or low in fear differently.

Discussion

Our second study was conducted with the intention to reveal whether different definitions of the nation can have a mobilizing effect on people to become allies of minority groups, or

mobilize to protect the ethnic majority group. Our results only partially confirmed this hypothesis, as manipulation check questions suggested that only the ethnic definition was affected by the manipulation, and the different definitions of the nation influenced pro-minority action intentions but did not affect intentions to engage in pro-majority collective action. This is in fact, good news for civil rights movements, as even a simple manipulation of presenting the nation in inclusive and civic terms could decrease the idea of ethnic citizenship and increase intentions to participate in collective action on behalf of minorities compared to presenting the nation in exclusive and ethnic terms. In contrast, the findings could be bad news for right-wing nationalist mobilization, as the manipulation was not effective in increasing collective action intentions on behalf of the majority ethnic group. However, this lack of effect also suggests that a more impactful manipulation would be needed to decrease such mobilization intentions.

Overall, our results partially confirmed the causal connection between ideas of citizenship and pro-minority collective action intentions and clearly indicated that the effect is particularly strong in the presence of empathy and in the absence of fear. These findings reinforce previous understandings of the importance of empathy in ally collective action (see e.g., Thomas et al., 2009) and supplement them by highlighting that fear is not only relevant in intergroup hostility (e.g., Coryn et al., 2004; Sniderman et al., 2004), but its absence is also a precondition for ally collective action intentions. These results indicate that the ethnic definition of citizenship can, to some extent, be manipulated relatively easily, and such an effective manipulation can lead to a change in collective action intentions. However, these results also show that interventions that simply make a positive civic rather than a positive ethnic national identity salient can primarily influence people with preexisting empathy with and lack of fear of minority groups. The importance of preexisting attitudes was also highlighted in other studies in which political orientation (Hameiri, Porat, Bar-Tal, & Halperin, 2016) and right-wing authoritarianism (Dhont & van Hiel, 2011) determined how efficient the intervention was in increasing support of intergroup reconciliation and decreasing prejudice. In fact, taking relevant moderators into account seems essential for reaching the full potential of interventions (Walton, 2014).

The lack of effect on pro-majority collective action reveals the limits of such a simple, positive manipulation, and indicates that a more complex manipulation may be needed to influence people's intentions to join nationalist movements in real life settings. An assessment of positive LGBTQA identity training warns us that even if such an intervention seems efficient in the lab, the effect might not be maintained in the long run as a result of broader, non-

supportive societal norms (Riggle, Gonzalez, Rostosky, & Black, 2014). As norms and political rhetoric may have a more substantial impact on the contents of national identities, future investigation on the effects of civic versus ethnic identity manipulation should consider both a stronger manipulation and evaluate its long-term effects.

General discussion

With the help of a survey and an experiment, we set out to understand one of the most urgent social issues of Europe and specifically of Hungary, the behavioral intentions of members of the majority group in relation to a historical ethnic minority group – the Roma – and immigrants. In Study 6 we identified that civic definition predicted higher pro-minority collective action intentions with regards to the Roma out-group, and the prediction was mediated by higher empathy and lower threat. In contrast, the ethnic definition of citizenship directly predicted pro-majority collective action intentions, and indirectly predicted both pro-minority and pro-majority action intentions mediated only by threat (in opposite ways respectively). The same study revealed an almost identical model in connection with the immigrant out-group, but in this case, the ethnic definition was a stronger predictor of both types of actions, mediated by empathy and threat in opposite ways, but directly predicting pro-majority collective action only. For the immigrant out-group, the civic definition of citizenship was only a weak indirect predictor of actions through empathy. In Study 7 we tested whether a positively framed manipulation making the ethnic or the civic definition salient can have an effect on action intentions, and found that the civic definition compared to the ethnic one increased respondents' intention to engage in pro-minority action. The effect was strongest in the presence of higher empathy and lower threat for both out-groups. These two studies provide evidence of the connection between definitions of citizenship and politically antagonistic collective action intentions, and show that empathy and fear play a role in this connection. In Study 6 we found the mediating effect of these two emotions suggesting that a civic definition can predict higher empathy and lower fear that in turn predicts action intentions, and the ethnic definition can predict lower empathy and higher fear that in turn also predicts action intentions. In Study 7 we did not expect that an increased salience of these two definitions would predict higher or lower fear and empathy because the manipulation did not emphasize majority-minority relations directly, but expected and found that the manipulation would be more successful in the presence of intergroup emotions that correspond with the collective action intentions that we measured in our study. While the role of intergroup emotions was

conceptualized differently in the two studies, both studies indicated that the connection between definitions of citizenship and collective action intentions is strengthened by empathy and fear.

Previous research on collective action pointed out the importance of group identification (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) and intergroup emotions (Thomas et al., 2009), however, definitions of citizenship had not been directly connected to collective action intentions. Bringing together these two lines of research is important both on a theoretical and on a practical level. The theoretical contribution of our research is that we have shown that civic vs. ethnic citizenship ideas are not only important in shaping intergroup attitudes as previous research suggested (Mepham & Verkuyten, 2017; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2015), but also relevant for intentions to engage in action on behalf of minorities, and to join nationalist, pro-majority movements. These findings bridge the gap between research on citizenship and research on collective action. We have also shown that collective action intentions among advantaged group members with antagonistic political goals can be understood along the same psychological constructs. Furthermore, the similarity of the pattern for both Roma and immigrant out-groups suggests that definitions of citizenship generally affect the treatment of disadvantaged minority groups. Nevertheless, the differences in the strength of the connection indicate that immigrants and historic ethnic minorities are in a different position when it comes to inclusion in the majority ingroup. Ethnic citizenship was more relevant in connection with immigrants, and civic citizenship for the Roma. We assume that this difference has to do with the larger psychological distance with immigrants than with Roma people, and with differences in negative stereotypes connected to the groups.

The practical implications of our research have to do with the nationalist public discourse that is at the core of current right-wing populism (see Mudde, 2004). We have shown that political rhetoric about ethnic definitions of citizenship is associated with nationalist social movements, but it has also highlighted that even with a relatively simple manipulation, civic citizenship can be made salient with consequences for pro-minority collective action. Therefore, our research points out that it could be possible to design effective interventions and show their main direction.

Limitations and future directions

Our research provided both correlational and experimental evidence for the connection between definitions of citizenship and collective action intentions in intergroup contexts. Nevertheless, there are some limitations to these findings. Reflecting on previous debates about

the conceptualization of ethnic and civic citizenship (see Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010), and the problems with its operationalization for the Hungarian context, we relied on single-item scales for these constructs. Despite the limitations of single-item measures, they showed good construct validity by predicting the outcome variables in theoretically meaningful ways.

Another caveat is that threat and fear were measured differently in the two studies for solely practical reasons: we used an omnibus survey in Study 1 that already included a measure of threat. However, this measure would have been too long in Study 7, where dependent variables were related to two different out-groups. Such repetition would have risked respondent fatigue and unreliable responses. Therefore, we opted for shortening those scales that were repeated for both groups in Study 7. As previous research described the intergroup consequences of threat and fear similarly (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), and our research also yielded similar patterns in the two studies, we believe the different operationalization of fear and threat caused no problems for the interpretation of our findings.

We need to interpret the established causal connection between citizenship manipulations and pro-minority collective action intentions with some caution. In Study 6 we created a path model with intergroup emotions as mediators in the connection between the concept of citizenship and action intentions, however, this order of variables does not reflect a causal connection. Indeed, the opposite order of prediction is equally feasible, as suggested by Becker, Tausch, and Wagner (2011) in connection with protest participation and the related emotion of anger. Another caveat of our research in terms of establishing causality was the relatively high and uneven number of failed attention check questions in Study 7. The removal of participants weakened the internal validity of the randomized experiment, as we cannot rule out that those who failed the attention check answered based on their pre-existing attitudes. Furthermore, we used a positively framed manipulation that had a measurable effect only on the ethnic definition of citizenship while it was unable to change the level of the civic definition, suggesting that neither the ethnic framing could decrease the acceptance of the civic definition or the civic definition could increase it. This warns us about the limits of our manipulation of citizenship.

Our first study relied on a large sample that was demographically similar to the Hungarian population, while we used a student pool for our second, experimental study. The relative homogeneity of the sample in Study 7 allowed us to have more control over the effect of the manipulation, but the generalizability of the findings is limited by at least two characteristics of this sample. Firstly, the group consisted of university students, that is, young people with higher than average education. Secondly, over 70% of respondents were women. The use of a

student sample has well-known limitations (see Sears, 1986); for example, their high level of education and the normative context of the university can create social desirability bias as respondents attempt to appear more open minded and tolerant (An, 2014). This bias may have contributed to the lack of effect on pro-majority collective action intentions that may be seen as nonnormative in a university context and especially nonnormative among women in comparison with pro-minority collective action. White supremacy movements are often militaristic and represent a masculine culture, and have a disproportionally high male followership (see e.g., Hopkins, 2016, Miller & Idriss, 2017).

Finally, we did not include a control condition in Study 7. We therefore cannot establish whether differences were the result of increasing pro-minority collective action intentions in the civic manipulation or of decreasing it in the ethnic manipulation, or a little bit of both. Understanding which manipulation had the effect would be important for designing interventions. Future studies should therefore extend the design by including a control condition.

Despite these caveats, we provided the first evidence for the direct connection between definitions of citizenship and collective action intentions among ethnic majority group members, and presented the affective processes that contribute to this relationship. We showed this connection with two different out-groups, suggesting general validity while also presenting sources of differences in different intergroup contexts. Finally, our research pointed out that it makes sense to look at the distinct psychological mechanisms of collective action based on intergroup solidarity and nationalist movements simultaneously, as they are both responses to the same political context of growing right-wing nationalism and populism.

The research was complex in the sense that it included two different forms of collective action intentions, two different intergroup contexts, and analyzed two distinct emotional processes. However, this complexity was necessary to explain the common political and psychological roots of politically antagonistic social movements in Europe that our research set out to investigate. Our research has shown the scope and potential of interventions in bringing about social change, and also pointed out the limits of such interventions. Future research should therefore test more effective methods of intervention. In conclusion, we found that discourse about the nation is of vital importance for intergroup relations and for the future of Europe.

Volunteerism as an expression of striving for change[15]

"We, the front-line volunteers who for months now have been helping thousands of refugees, call on all the governments of Europe to act immediately and decisively to alleviate the situation."[16] Given the rapid rise in the number of refugees entering Europe, relying on volunteers to tackle the humanitarian crisis was inevitable. However, the statement quoted above makes it clear that volunteers involved in helping refugees also became actors for social change.

There were crucial differences in the treatment of and in the official rhetoric about refugees across the countries of Europe. In countries with governments that were unwilling to offer humanitarian aid, and treated refugees as enemies, authorities perceived the work of volunteers as an expression of political dissent. Nevertheless, it is not clear what motivated people to volunteer during the crisis, and whether achieving political and social change was among the goals of their involvement in offering humanitarian aid.

Intergroup Helping and Volunteerism

Volunteerism is the intentional engagement in long-term prosocial behavior that benefits others, mostly within an organizational framework (Penner, 2004), but it can also flare up in response to crises, such as a natural disaster or a terrorist attack (Penner, Brannick, Webb, & Connell, 2005).

While volunteerism usually benefits in-group members, there are many cross-group volunteer activities in which advantaged group members offer help to disadvantaged out-groups (Wilson, 2000). Most motivations to engage in interpersonal and in-group helping are valid in the cross-group context too. Intergroup helping can offer rewards to the helper that are similar to in-group helping, suggesting the prevalence of egoistic rather than altruistic reasons for offering help within or across groups (Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983). For example, people help both in-group and out-group members out of sympathy and empathy (Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 1995). Positive behavioral intentions toward in-group and out-group members are both affected by the perceived morality of the in-group (Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, & Ellemers, 2013). Volunteers are generally motivated to learn new skills, find meaning and personal growth (Omoto & Snyder, 1990; Snyder & Omoto, 2008), or help people

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[15] Kende, A., Lantos, N. A., Belinszky, A., Csaba, S., & Lukács, Z. A. (2017). The politicized motivations of volunteers in the refugee crisis: Intergroup helping as the means to achieve social change. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 5*, 260–281. http://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v5i1.642
[16] http://www.europeact.eu/

with whom they have personal relationships (Russell, 2011) regardless of the group membership of the help recipient.

However, some forms of intergroup helping or volunteerism underscore the hierarchical differences between helper and help recipient, based on the fact that helping relations are necessarily asymmetrical and convey the message that the helper is more competent and has the resources that the help recipient lacks. According to van Leeuwen and Täuber (2010), members of advantaged groups can help strategically affirm their power and independence and provide a positive group impression and group identity relative to the out-group. Intergroup helping can also disprove negative stereotypes about the ingroup and restore group image (Hopkins et al., 2007). And according to the theory of Intergroup Helping as Status Relations model by Nadler (2002), help – and specifically dependency-oriented help – is offered to defend the group's privilege when existing status differences are threatened, while still maintaining the moral advantage of being the helper.

However, if advantaged group members are *genuinely* committed to helping other groups, they need to challenge existing intergroup hierarchies and engage in forms of helping that address the problem of intergroup inequalities, including the sources of their own privileges (Case, Hansley, & Anderson, 2014; Case, Iuzzini, & Hopkins, 2012, Montgomery & Stewart, 2012), rather than provide direct assistance that meets only the immediate needs of the disadvantaged group (Jackson & Esses, 2000). This is particularly the case if helping is not a single event, but ongoing and institutionalized as in volunteerism (Omoto & Snyder, 1995).

In sum, in-group and intergroup helping and volunteerism share the motivations that are connected to the general rewards of helping, but stemming from the hierarchical differences between the helper and the help recipient, intergroup helping – especially if its motivation is related to affirming the status quo and the higher status of the helper – can paradoxically be the means to maintain intergroup asymmetries and reinforce existing inequalities between the groups. Intergroup volunteering bears the consequences of these differences, and while volunteerism can potentially offer help that successfully reduces social distance, paternalistic help and charity services can maintain the status differences between the groups.

Social Change Activism across Groups

The difference between volunteers and social change activists can be grasped by perceiving volunteers as service providers who strive for social cohesion, whereas social change activists attempt to disrupt the social order (Snyder & Omoto, 2008; Wright & Lubensky, 2009).

Indeed, intergroup helping and volunteerism differ from ally activism in their approach to social change: depending on whether the actions are aimed at offering services within the domains of the existing intergroup structure or challenging intergroup relations (i.e., group boundaries, social distance, and intergroup hierarchies).

Putnam (1993) argues that participating in civic organizations is an important first step toward engaging in political activities. However, this simple and direct connection between volunteerism and political activism is not supported empirically (van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & Akkerman, 2016; van der Meer & van Ingen, 2009). This may be precisely because of the different goals in terms of social change (Marullo & Edwards, 2000; Penner, 2004), and because of the charitable, philanthropic framing of volunteerism as opposed to the disruptive, confrontational nature of political activism (Bickford & Reynolds, 2002).

Intergroup helping can therefore be criticized for maintaining rather than challenging existing intergroup hierarchies (Nadler, Harpaz-Gorodeisky, & Ben-David, 2009). If, for example, volunteers offer services and thereby relieve the pressure created by the situation, authorities may be even less inclined to pay sufficient attention to a social issue. This was clearly the case at the peak of the refugee crisis, as the lack of services offered by the state was less apparent due to the humanitarian aid offered by volunteers. Nevertheless, these services can also draw attention to a particular problem and advance changes in the long run. It must also be noted that directly changing intergroup dynamics is not the only way to achieve social change, and volunteers can work toward social change through, for example, involvement in the redistribution of financial resources and technologies (Hansen & Postmes, 2013).

Identification with the in-group is an important driver for both volunteers and political activists, but it can also serve as the basis of their differences. Volunteers are motivated to engage in cross-group helping in the presence of a salient common ingroup identity, thus by emphasizing the similarities rather than the differences between the groups (Dovidio et al., 1997; Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005). However, the perception of similarities and the disregard for relative deprivation (Powers & Ellison, 1994) can lead to lower willingness to engage in social competition and actions challenging the status quo by both advantaged and disadvantaged groups (Wright & Lubensky, 2009).

Ally activists who work toward social change can be motivated by identification with the unjustly treated out-groups because of moral convictions (van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011). Moral convictions reflect people's strong and absolute stance on moral issues

and motivate people to engage in collective action through its close connection to politicized identity. When people experience violations of the moral principles of their in-group, it reinforces their politicized identity and motivates for collective action to achieve change and eliminate the violation (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012). Violations of moral principles also increase the identification with the relevant social movement (Mazzoni, van Zomeren, & Cicognani, 2015). Moral convictions are therefore a primary force in the engagement for collective action to achieve change, and remove the threat to one's moral principles.

However, identification with the out-group or the particular movement is not even necessary in case of a strong opinion based identity (Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007). Opinion based identity mobilizes people for collective action when aligned with other positively evaluated social categories, or to put it differently, social categories can be successful sources of mobilization if they are also connected to ideologies that represent important social identities (McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009). Therefore, opinion-based identities may be more accurate predictors for engagement in social change activism than other forms of group identification.

Despite the important differences in motivations in terms of social change, volunteerism and activism do not necessarily refer to essentially distinct activities. Indeed, charity organizations and volunteers can also offer services that lead to social change if their work addresses the structural causes of inequalities (Penner, 2004). An example is AIDS activism which started off as offering services during the AIDS crisis but became the source of various types of politicized actions (Gould, 2001), and managed to achieve significant change in the social perception and public treatment of HIV/AIDS.

Therefore, we ask whether similar motivations can be identified for volunteerism and social change activism in a humanitarian disaster that required volunteer help, but also triggered political protests. The refugee crisis was unique because of the scale of both the political tension and the humanitarian crisis, and because both peaked at the same time. However, the situation was not unique in the sense that intergroup conflicts involving groups with asymmetrical social status are often politicized and require that members of the advantaged group help members of the disadvantage group. We therefore use the case of the refugee crisis to draw attention to the importance of understanding the similarities and differences in the paths toward volunteerism and political activism, in terms of people's motivations to achieve change, as social movements are just as dependent on mobilizing allies for political actions (see Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor,

2010) as they are on mobilizing volunteers who understand and critically reflect on the structural aspects of disadvantage (see Case et al., 2012).

Study 8

Between June and August 2015, a growing number of refugees entered Hungary at the Serbian-Hungarian border without the intention to stay, making the country a transit rather than a destination state. Various actions, such as an anti-immigrant campaign sponsored by the government, and a barbed-wire fence built at the Southern border, underlined the government's clear stance against admitting refugees into the country. Despite the government's reluctance to accept refugees, free passage out of the country was also cut. As a result, the main railway stations of Budapest quickly filled up and became unofficial open-air refugee camps where refugees waited for the opportunity to leave the country. In these so-called transit zones, only civilian volunteers provided services. Because the number of asylum seekers had been very low prior to the influx of refugees in 2015, there were hardly any organizations experienced in dealing with them. Therefore, aid was provided mostly by ad hoc, grassroots organizations recruiting their volunteers on Facebook, supported by the civilian population and for-profit companies.

Hypotheses

We hypothesize that engagement in volunteerism – offering direct help to refugees in the form of participating in aid work and logistics, or financially helping them – would be largely predicted by the same social change motivations as engagement in protest actions related to the refugee crisis, because helping refugees fulfilled potentially both the purpose of offering humanitarian aid and the attempt to change the authorities' actions toward refugees. We therefore predicted that opinion based identity – identification with people who hold a pro-refugee opinion – and moral convictions would be important predictors for engagement in both types of actions.

In order to test whether volunteerism was the result of social change motivations as expected for politicized collective action, we outlined a mediation model, testing the connection between opinion based identity and either volunteerism or political activism mediated by moral convictions, see *Figure 10*. The mediation model can show that identification with the pro-refugee opinion group played an important role in motivating people to act, however, the mobilizing potential of opinion based identity was affected by perceived violations of moral principles (i.e., by moral convictions). The mediating role of moral convictions entails that

social change motivations explain the variance in engagement level, regardless of whether the form of engagement was volunteer help or protest participation.

Figure 10. Predicted mediation of moral convictions in the effect of opinion based identity on both volunteerism and political activism

Method

We conducted a survey among people engaged in pro-refugee activities to test these hypotheses. Data were collected in October, 2015, days after the borders were closed, and refugees could no longer enter the country. It was just after the largest wave of the crisis passed, when there was little to do in terms of actual help, but volunteer groups were still active on social media, and the topic continued to dominate public discourse.

The study was approved by the IRB of Eötvös Loránd University. We report all measures and data exclusions in the current paper. The questionnaire was administered in Hungarian, with adopted measures translated from and back-translated into English.

Measures

Ten items measured the frequency of engagement in different types of helping and political actions, both in online and offline forms generated for the purpose of the questionnaire, relying a 5-point scale from 1 (*never*) to 5 (*very often*). For the activity items see *Table 25*. Factor analysis using Maximum likelihood analysis with Promax rotation revealed two correlating factors ($r = .44$, $p < .001$, $KMO = .82$, $p < .001$) explaining 54.58% of total variance of *Volunteerism* (4 items, $\alpha = .77$) and *Political activism* (5 items, $\alpha = .75$). One item had to be removed for high cross-loadings.

Table 25. Items measuring volunteerism and political activism with factor loadings.

Items	Volunteerism	Political activism
I helped refugees in the field (e.g., train stations, refugee camps, headquarters of civil organizations, I had refugees stay in my house, I transported refugees in my car).	.84	
I helped indirectly (I gave support to the volunteers, I participated in background activities).	.73	
I collected used clothes, blankets and other useful things I could find at home, and I sent it to the refugees.	.64	
I gave financial support.	.53	
Did you post or share political contents connected to the refugee crisis on your own Facebook page/ Twitter account/ blog?		.81
Did you post or share political contents connected to the refugee crisis on the pages of refugee helpers' groups?		.80
Did you post or share political contents connected to the refugee crisis on other public forums?		.74
Did you participate in some demonstration / protest in connection with the refugee crisis?		.34
I expressed political resistance in some other forms (contacting a representative, participated in political statement made at my workplace / school)		.33
Omitted item: I provided logistic services online (posting, sharing, coordinating groups, made translations)	*.41*	*.38*

All other items were measured on a 7-point scale from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 7 (*completely agree*).We also asked participants with two separate items to indicate the degree to which they self-identify as a helping volunteer and a political activist which was used to validate the behavioral measures in this context.

We measured prior engagement in volunteerism and activism, as an expected strong predictor of collective action (see e.g., de Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Penner, 2002; Saunders, Grasso, Olcese, Rainsford, & Rootes, 2012; Verhulst & Walgrave, 2009). *Previous volunteerism* unrelated to the refugee crisis was measured using 2 items, *"How often did you participate in volunteerism before the refugee crisis? (e.g., giving food to homeless people, volunteering in hospitals)?"* and *"Before the refugee crisis how often did you donate money or participated in charity activity?"* ($r = .50$), and *previous political activism* unrelated to the refugee crisis by 3 items, *"In the last 12 months how often did you take part in the following actions unrelated to the refugee crisis? – Signing a petition, – Posting or sharing political contents on Facebook, – Participating in street protest"* ($\alpha = .75$), both measures were designed for the purpose of the questionnaire.

Moral convictions were measured by 4 items (α = .72) adopted from the scale of van Zomeren et al. (2011; 2012) to correspond with the refugee crisis: *"My opinion about refugees is an important part of my moral norms and values.", "There is only one true stance on this issue, and that is my stance.", "My opinion about refugees is a universal moral value that should apply to everywhere in the world."* and *"My opinion about refugees reflects an important part of who I am."*

We relied on the 5-item scale used by Bliuc et al. (2007) for testing *opinion based identity* (α = .90), and referred to "refugee helpers" as the relevant opinion based group. For example, *"I am content about my choice of supporting refugee helpers."* Refugee helpers was the term generally used in public discussions, media and social media to refer to people with a pro-refugee opinion who approved of helping refugees as opposed to those who disapproved of it.

We tested self-ascribed *political orientation* using 2 semantic differential items to measure left–right, liberal–conservative orientations; because of their acceptable correlations (r = .57, p < .001), left–right and liberal–conservative were joined for the analysis.[17]

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[17] For exploratory purposes, we measured other variables connected to political activism and volunteerism to get a more general picture of the pro-refugee movement. However, these measures did not serve the purpose of testing our hypothesis, and they are therefore not presented in the paper. The *supplementary material* contains the descriptive statistics of these additional variables, and their correlations with volunteerism and activism. *Efficacy beliefs* were measured using 2 items – *"I believe that we, refugee helpers as a group, can change the situation of refugees in Hungary."* and *"I believe that we, refugee helpers can achieve the common goal of changing the situation of the refugees in Hungary."* – from the scale of van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004, α = .92). We tested *national identity* (α = .87) using 3 items from measuring identification with the broader ingroup (Becker, Tausch, Spears, & Christ, 2011). We also measured religious identity using the same three items as for national identity (α = .94). We adapted 2 items from Täuber & van Zomeren (2013) to measure *striving for improvement* in the context of the refugee crisis *"I think it is important that Hungary deals with refugees as well as other nations."* and *"I think that the reputation of Hungary has to improve."* (α = .78). In addition we used 1 item to measure perceived *illegitimacy* designed for the questionnaire, *"The government did not get authorization from the voters to deal with the refugee crisis the way it does."* We had a third item measuring political orientation: moderate – radical which showed weak correlation with the other political orientation measure (r = .16, p < .001). The questionnaire also included 4 items measuring realistic (physical) and symbolic (cultural) threats based on Stephan and Stephan's (2000) scales, and adapted to the refugee situation (α = .89). We listed 6 *emotions* specifying whether they refer to emotions in connection with refugees (empathy, sympathy), or in connection with the situation (anger) and the ingroup (shame, guilt, and pride).

Sample

The online questionnaire was completed by 1479 respondents recruited on Facebook on the public pages and closed groups of NGOs, volunteer groups and religious groups who were involved in helping refugees. We expressly invited those who engaged in volunteerism and/or political activism regardless of whether it was regular or occasional involvement, within or outside organizations. We closed the link after 5 days because of the rapidly changing political context, the influence of which we could not account for in the cross-sectional design of our study.

After removing 20 respondents from the sample because they indicated no involvement in any of the listed activities, we ran the analysis on the remaining sample of 1459 people (M_{age} = 43.6, SD_{age} = 13.6, 18—85). We did not use forced response and analyzed only the available data assuming that data was missing at random. The majority of respondents were women (80%) which corresponded with the observation that most helpers were also women. 59.2% of the sample were residents of Budapest, 34.4% lived in other towns and villages of Hungary, and 6.6% lived abroad. We asked respondents to rate their financial status relative to the Hungarian average, and found that respondents scored somewhat above the midpoint on a 5-point scale from 1 (*far below average*) to 5 (*far above average*, $M = 3.36$, $SD = .94$). In terms of political orientation, respondents identified as left wing-liberal (the semantic differential of left-right, liberal-conservative used a 1 to 7 scale: $M = 2.65$, $SD = 1.35$).

Results

Descriptive statistics

The factor analysis revealed that activities referring to some form of direct helping of refugees, e.g., spending time at the railway stations, offering food, money or information, helping the helpers, loaded onto the same factor, and corresponded with respondents' self-identification as volunteers ($r = .64$, $p < .001$). The factor analysis also confirmed that expressions of political opinion either in social media or by participation in street protests created a separate factor which correlated with respondents' self-identification as political activists ($r = .34$, $p < .001$). To check whether the self-identification also correlated with engagement in activities opposite to self-identification, we ran partial correlations, necessitated by the correlations between the two types of behaviors. We found that self-identification as a volunteer showed a negative and very weak correlation with engagement in political actions if engagement in volunteerism was controlled ($r = -.06$, $p = .02$). Similarly, the partial correlations

between identification as a political activist and engagement in volunteerism was negative and very weak when engagement in political actions was controlled ($r = -.07$, $p = .007$). These correlations validated our measure of activism and volunteerism that relied on engagement in certain types of activities. For descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables, see *Table 26*. Results indicated a higher frequency of volunteer activities than political ones, and generally high scores on opinion-based identity, and moral convictions.

Table 26. Means, standard deviations and correlations for all variables

Variable	Mean	SD	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
1. Volunteerism	2.45	.99	.33**	.41**	.22**	.21**	.33**
2. Political activism	2.03	.89	1	.28**	.27**	.68**	-.24**
3. Opinion based identity	5.95	1.27	.	1	.30**	.25**	.17**
4. Moral conviction	5.24	1.06			1	.23**	.05
6. Previous activism	3.20	1.55				1	.21**
7. Previous volunteerism	3.34	1.50					1

Note. Volunteerism and Political activism are measured on a 5-point scale, all other means are calculated based on a 7-point scale. **$p < .001$, * $p < .05$. Non-significant correlation is in italics.

Hypothesis testing

In order to test the hypothesis about the presence of social change motivations for volunteerism and political activism, we ran two hierarchical linear regression analyses. In the first round we entered demographic and political orientation variables, expecting that these would be potential confounders to the regression. In the second, we entered opinion based identity and moral convictions. In the third and final round, we entered previous activism and previous volunteerism for their strong correlations with the dependent variables. The results of the hierarchical regression analysis is shown on *Table 27*.

The full model for volunteerism explained 25.4% of variance $F(8, 1370) = 58.30$, $p < .001$. Age, gender, financial status and political orientation explained only R^2 of .06, $F(4, 1374) = 21.92$, $p < .001$. Adding identity and moral convictions increased the power of the model by R^2 of .12, $F(2, 1372) = 96.68$, $p < .001$. Finally previous activism and volunteerism led to an increase in R^2 of .08, $F(2, 1370) = 71.51$, $p < .001$.

The full model for political activism had a higher explanatory power, explaining 50.7% of variance, $F(8, 1380) = 179.54$, $p < .001$. Demographic and political orientation variables explained R^2 of .16, $F(4, 1384) = 64.62$, $p < .001$. Identity, and moral convictions increased the R^2 by .05 only, $F(2, 1382) = 36.61$, $p < .001$. Previous activism and volunteerism added an increase in R^2 of .31, $F(2, 1380) = 436.17$, $p < .001$.

Table 27. Hierarchical regression analysis with Volunteerism and Political activism as dependent variables

Variable	Volunteerism $R^2 = .25^{***}$			Political activism $R^2 = .51^{***}$		
	B	β	t	B	β	t
Step 1	$\Delta R^2 = .06^{***}$			$\Delta R^2 = .16^{***}$		
(Constant)	2.37		11.64***	1.95		11.20***
Age	.003	.05	1.74	.02	.29	11.19***
Gender	.28	.11	4.26***	-.83	-.04	-1.47
Financial status	.08	-.07	-2.74	-.07	-.07	-2.99**
Political orientation	-.12	-.17	-6.29***	-.13	-.20	-7.88***
Step 2	$\Delta R^2 = .12^{***}$			$\Delta R^2 = .04^{***}$		
(Constant)	-.09		1.54	.80		3.68***
Age	.00	.01	.22	.02	.25	10.00***
Gender	.15	.06	2.37*	-.15	-.07	-2.65**
Financial status	-.08	-.07	-2.88**	-.07	-.07	-2.85**
Political orientation	-.01	-.02	-.65	-.08	-.12	-4.52***
Opinion based identity	.26	.34	12.02***	.10	.14	5.07***
Moral convictions	.10	.10	3.96***	.12	.14	5.50***
Step 3	$\Delta R^2 = .08^{***}$			$\Delta R^2 = .31^{***}$		
(Constant)	.15		.65	.21		1.21
Age	.00	-.01	-.54	.01	.11	5.62***
Gender	.09	.04	1.44	-.09	-.04	-2.09*
Financial status	-.06	-.06	-2.57*	-.04	-.05	-2.36*
Political orientation	-.03	-.04	-1.35	-.01	-.02	-.70
Opinion based identity	.22	.28	10.23***	.04	.06	2.62**
Moral convictions	.09	.10	3.80***	.06	.07	3.44**
Previous activism	.04	.06	2.17*	.33	.59	27.21***
Previous volunteerism	.18	.27	10.97***	.06	.10	5.13***

Note. $N = 1459$, ***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$, * $p < .05$.

The model outlined demographic differences in the two forms of activism. Being a man predicted political activism, but higher likelihood of engaging in volunteerism by women disappeared when previous volunteerism was entered in the final round of the regression. Older age predicted political activism, while higher financial status negatively predicted both forms

of actions. Political orientation lost its power in the full model when previous experiences with political and volunteer engagement unrelated to the refugee crisis was entered in the model.

Opinion based identity was an important predictor in the full model for volunteerism, but only a weak significant predictor of political activism. Moral convictions were weak but significant predictors of both forms of activities.

Previous activism was the strongest predictors of the model for political activism adding substantially to the explained variance, and previous volunteerism was a significant predictor for volunteerism. Additionally, previous volunteerism was also a significant, but weaker predictor of activism, and previous activism for volunteerism.

Mediation model

Our original hypothesis about the mediation of the connection between opinion based identity and volunteerism and political activism by moral convictions needed to be supplemented by adding a moderator to both models. Previous volunteerism and activism proved to be important predictors of engagement, underlining the important differences between novice and experienced protesters (de Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Penner, 2002; Verhulst & Walgrave, 2009), and between first time or experienced volunteers. We therefore, predicted that the mediated connection would also be moderated by previous engagement in the same form of action, suggesting that the influence of identification with the opinion based group and moral convictions on engagement in either volunteerism or political activism would also be affected by the degree to which people had previous experiences with similar actions. We tested the indirect conditional effect using Process macro (testing Model 5). Confidence interval was calculated using bootstrapping with 1,000 re-samples (Hayes, 2013).

We entered opinion based identity as the independent variable and either volunteerism or political activism as the dependent variable. Moral convictions functioned as the mediator, while the moderating effect of previous volunteerism was tested on the connection between opinion based identity and volunteerism, and the moderating effect of previous activism on the connection between opinion based identity and political activism. For the model outlines and the regression weights see *Figure 11*, the results of the analysis are presented in *Table 28*. Both analysis showed that the models were significant with a significant indirect effect.

For volunteerism the model explained 25.3% of variance ($R^2 = .25$, $F(4, 1429) = 120.81$, $p < .001$) with moral convictions as a significant mediator in the connection between opinion based identity and volunteerism (95% Confidence intervals, LLCI: . 01, ULCI: .04). The

connection was significantly moderated by the interaction of opinion based identity and previous volunteerism. For political activism the model explained 49.6% of variance ($R^2 = .50$, $F(4, 1442) = 355.45$, $p < .001$) again with moral convictions as a significant mediator in the connection between opinion based identity and volunteerism (LLCI: . 01, ULCI: .03).

Figure 11. Mediation analyses showing unstandardized coefficients for moral convictions as a mediator in the relationship between opinion based identity and either volunteerism or political activism with either previous volunteerism or previous activism as moderators. 95% confidence intervals and total effects are presented in brackets. All path are significant $p < .001$.

Table 28. Regression Results for Conditional Indirect Effect on Volunteerism and Political Activism

Predictor	B	SE	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
Outcome: Moral convictions						
Constant	5.246	.027	193.756	.000	5.193	5.299
Opinion based identity	.248	.021	11.891	.000	.207	.289
Predictor	B	SE	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
Outcome: Volunteerism						
Constant	1.932	.119	16.267	.000	1.699	2.165
Moral convictions	.098	.022	4.401	.000	.054	.141
Opinion based identity	.264	.020	13.524	.000	.226	.302
Previous volunteerism	.182	.015	11.911	.000	.152	.212
Opinion based identity x Previous volunteerism	.028	.011	2.584	.010	.007	.050
Conditional Direct Effect of Opinion Based Identity on Volunteerism						
Previous volunteerism	B	SE	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
Low (-1.516)	.221	.022	10.220	.000	.179	.264
Average (.000)	.264	.020	13.524	.000	.226	.302
High (1.516)	.306	.029	10.586	.000	.250	.363
Predictor	B	SE	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
Outcome: Moral convictions						
Constant	5.253	.027	195.296	.000	5.200	5.305
Opinion based identity	.252	.021	12.099	.000	.211	.292
Predictor	B	SE	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
Outcome: Political Activism						
Constant	1.681	.089	18.868	.000	1.507	1.856
Moral convictions	.063	.017	3.779	.000	.030	.096
Opinion based identity	.094	.016	5.873	.000	.063	.126
Previous activism	.359	.011	31.350	.000	.336	.381
Opinion based identity x Previous activism	.045	.010	4.529	.000	.025	.064
Conditional Direct Effect of Opinion Based Identity on Political Activism						
Previous activism	B	SE	t	p	LLCI	ULCI
Low (-1.577)	.024	.016	1.493	.136	-.007	.055
Average (.000)	.094	.016	5.873	.000	.063	.126
High (1.577)	.164	.027	6.028	.000	.111	.218

Note. $N = 1434$ in the model of Volunteerism and $N = 1447$ in the model of Political Activism due to differences in missing values. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Level of confidence = 95%

Discussion

Our hypotheses were formulated on the basis of the separate literatures of collective action research on behalf of out-groups (i.e. ally activism) and intergroup volunteerism (Hopkins et al., 2007; Levine et al., 2005; Mazzoni et al., 2015; Penner, 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2011) put into the context of the refugee crisis. We interpreted the refugee crisis as a politicized context in which immediate humanitarian help was required. Our findings confirmed that both the mobilization for volunteerism and political activism involved motivations connected to social change, but at the same time we could identify some clear differences that shed light on the different paths people chose for engagement.

Both moral convictions and opinion based identity were significant predictors for both types of actions in line with our hypothesis and previous research (see van Zomeren et al., 2011). However, opinion based identity – identifying with the pro-refugee opinion group – was stronger predictor for volunteerism. This result may have been the consequence of the wording of the scale in which we used "refugee helper" to designate the opinion group, or because those engaging in volunteerism indeed shared a stronger opinion based identity. Although our findings confirmed the hypothesis about the presence of opinion based identity and moral convictions among both volunteers and political activists, these variables added little to the power of the models, especially in the case of political activism, where previous activism accounted for most of the explained variance.

Certain stable characteristics also played a role in predicting whether people channeled their willingness to participate into volunteerism or activism. Gender was important in turning people with similar motivations into either volunteer helpers or political activists, although the significance of gender diminished after the inclusion of other variables. Political participation of women is low compared to men in most liberal democracies (Bari, 2005), while volunteerism, especially care-type services or those benefiting e.g. the poor or elderly are more prevalent among women (Dittrich & Mey, 2015; Taniguchi, 2006). Volunteerism may have therefore been perceived as a more appropriate response to the humanitarian crisis for women than the direct expression of political dissent in which men were more likely to engage. The influence of political orientation was absorbed in the final model of political activism and volunteerism, suggesting that preexisting political views did not shape engagement very strongly, and neither form of engagement was strongly dependent on political views.

Previous activism played a disproportionally larger role in predicting activism than any other variable, suggesting that the crucial difference between the engagement in volunteer helping and political activism was whether or not respondents had already been politically active prior to engagement in helping refugees. This interpretation of the findings offers a rather pessimistic view about the possibility of perceiving volunteerism as a stepping stone for involvement in direct political activism (for an analysis of the connection see van Stekelenburg et al., 2016). However, a closer inspection of our data allows an interpretation in line with our original assumption that volunteers and social change activists *shared social change motivations, but found different ways to express it*.

This interpretation was underlined by the mediation analyses which demonstrated that for both volunteering and engaging in political activism the expression of opinion based identity was mediated by moral convictions, and this mediated connection was moderated by previous experiences of the same form of engagement unrelated to the refugee crisis. We therefore argue that for a large group of people, engaging in volunteer helping was induced by opinion based identity and moral convictions which are important drivers for action among political activists when engaging in disruptive forms of collective action (Bliuc et al., 2007; McGarty et al., 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2012). Volunteerism was therefore not just cross-group helping for the sake of helping people in need out of sympathy or for the rewards of helping (see e.g., Hopkins et al., 2007; Penner, 2004), but to some extent for achieving change to restore the moral principles of their opinion based group of supporters of refugees. Thus we supplement the existing literature of volunteerism and social change activism with the claim that volunteers and political activists are not necessarily different by virtue of their motivations but that they choose different actions to alleviate the problems embedded in the intergroup situation. We can conclude that within the highly politicized social context requiring immediate humanitarian aid, both volunteerism and political activism became the means to express moral convictions on the basis of opinion based identity. The decisive difference is therefore not in the intentions to achieve change, but rather in the interpretations of the situation and the perception of required actions based on previous experiences of engagement.

Limitations and Future Research

Our study was conducted in a highly polarized societal context with the majority society, fueled by the actions of the government, strongly rejecting refugees (Sik & Szeitl, 2016). This context and the reliance on a convenience sample may bring some limitations to our results. We suspect some self-selection among respondents, with a higher representation of those who

were motivated to express their political opinion. Therefore, our results may partially stem from an overrepresentation of volunteers with social change motivations. We therefore suggest that future research tries to eliminate this bias by employing a more balanced sample of volunteers when examining social change motivations in intergroup helping within a politicized context.

The nonexperimental design of the current study could only highlight the connections between social change motivations and engagement in the two forms of action, but their causal connections should be further investigated using an experimental design. Our study pointed out that engagement in volunteerism and political activism can reflect the presence of similar social change motivations, but future research should establish the conditions under which people choose volunteerism over political activism and vice versa.

Conclusions

Although a simple generalization to other societal contexts and other issues is not verified by this research, our results put forward the hypothesis that under strong political pressure, in a situation in which intergroup help is an appropriate form of engagement, volunteers mobilized to help disadvantaged out-groups may share the motivations to achieve social change with political activists. In other words, people motivated for collective action may choose volunteerism to restore the moral principles shared by their opinion based group if volunteerism seems the more adequate answer to the problem, or fits better with their personal inclinations. The refugee crisis may seem unique in some ways because of its severity and because it happened as an unforeseen crisis, but all intergroup conflicts between groups in hierarchical relationships share some of the important characteristics of the current refugee crisis. Members of advantaged groups are not only essential for participating in the intergroup struggle as ally activists (see Thomas et al., 2010), but they are also needed to alleviate the everyday financial, educational, or health difficulties of members of disadvantaged groups. While the activities of pro-refugee volunteers consisted mostly of aid work – offering food, information, shelter and financial support – these acts became the means of expressing a desire for social change, and should therefore be recognized as such.

General Conclusions

The eight studies presented in this dissertation were all conducted between 2015 and 2020, most of them in Hungary, and some of them in other European countries, concerning intergroup relations between the majority societies and minorities. Although all studies had an aim of identifying general psychological processes that are valid beyond the specific social contexts, they also all contained a reflection on the social and political situation that was characteristic of this particular historical period and offered recommendations for solving some of the problems that were prevalent in this period. Importantly, in this period, the normative context of intergroup relations went through profound changes (see Crandall et al., 2018). We no longer think about intergroup relations or prejudice toward racial and ethnic groups as constantly improving, that is, we can no longer claim that some expressions of hostility are old-fashioned, whereas others are modern (for coining the term modern racism, see McConahay, 1983). In Hungary, there have been clear signs of this since 2006, culminating in racially motivated serial murder against Roma Hungarians and the rise of an extreme right-wing political party, Jobbik, along with its paramilitary organization using anti-Roma rhetoric for mobilization. These events along with a change in political discourse regarding the Roma (see our currently unplublished results at www.polrom.eu), Muslim immigrants since 2015 or LGBTQ+ people most recently, indicated a backlash in the normative context of intergroup relations in Hungary and the rise of intergroup tensions and hostility. The studies presented here reflect on psychological processes within these changing normative context.

Specifically, Study 1 and 2 contributed to the literature on intergroup relations by identifying the most important characteristics of anti-Gypsyism, connected these characteristics to existing theories of prejudice and prejudice expression. Doing that, these studies offered a place to this unique form of prejudice in mainstream social psychology, as well as highlighted area of interventions. Study 1 showed the importance of the normative context in prejudice expression (see also Kende & McGarty, 2019) and Study 2 highlighted that anti-Gypsyism as a unique form of prejudice is an important predictor of unfavourable acculturation preferences. This is not only theoretically relevant, but this result suggests that integration efforts (as well as efforts of inclusion and access) can meet with resistance among the majority population on the basis of individual level anti-Gypsyism. Study 3 puts this knowledge into practice, as it directly highlights the role of social norms in reducing prejudice, as well as the limitations of adapting prejudice reduction methods directly into different social, normative intergroup contexts. However, it also offers hope to achieve change in the presence of institutional support,

especially in the affective domain.

Studies 4 to 7 highlighted ingroup identification processes and its intergroup consequences. These studies focused on how the content of ingroup identities can have an impact on intergroup relations and offered cross-sectional and experimental evidence for areas of interventions. Notably, Study 4 and 5 showed that by defining national identity in either more flexible, inclusive terms with more permeable boundaries, it can be a source of higher acceptance and more harmonious relations with members of out-groups, while still serving the basic human need of a positive sense of belonging (in line with the claims of Brewer, 1999). These studies fit into the broader political science and sociological literature on the conceptualization of citizenship and patriotism, but it focus more on the psychological processes of identification and intergroup relations, and importantly these studies also offer experimental evidence for the causal relationship between the definition of the nation and intergroup relations which was missing from the literature. These studies also showed that even if the effect can be found in different intergroup relations – in connection with domestic minority groups, such as Roma people in Hungary and in connection with immigrant groups, such as recent Muslim immigrants in Europe – their mechanism may be different and connected to different content characteristics of the national identity.

Studies 6 and 7 continued to focus on identity content, but the novelty of these studies was that it considered the impact of identity content and mode of identification simultaneously, namely comparing national to European identity and attachment to glorification. In these studies, I could show that the negative intergroup consequences of ingroup identification can be mitigated when both identity content and the mode of identification entail inclusive intergroup attitudes. However, this is not the case when the ingroup is glorified or when the ingroup identity content does not promote acceptance. The combined effect of mode of identification and content had not been shown by previous studies directly.

Finally, the novelty of Study 8 was that it critically examined a low threshold-type intergroup helping (i.e., volunteerism) that has traditionally been considered either irrelevant for social change, or even a nuisance. This study, which was conducted in the politicized context of the refugee crisis of 2015, could clearly challenge this notion of volunteerism. We found that engagement in this form of action can be connected to the same psychological motivations that are well-documented motivators of confrontative collective action for social change. This result adds to the recent literature that began to critically examine different forms of benevolent and activist types of actions (see Thomas & McGarty, 2018). Finally, this study could also show that there are alternative paths to challenging intergroup relations in society, and just like with

prejudice reduction methods, context matters when it comes to challenging the current intergroup status quo by increasing pro-social behavior in society.

The research presented in the dissertation showed, that politicization of collective identities and politicization of target groups are both important aspects of intergroup tensions in society. On the one hand, they are the psychological drive for intergroup conflict and hate, they contribute to overt expressions of prejudice and action intentions against disadvantaged or minority groups. On the other hand, they are the psychological drive for collective action against unjust or unequal intergroup relations that can eventually lead to social change. Put together, these studies represent a plea to acknowledge the multiplicity of the experience of social exclusion, and at the same time not to give up on the notion that there is something systematic and identifiable in the different faces of intergroup relations. It is only within this understanding that we can identify successful prejudice reduction methods, understand the experiences of disadvantaged groups, work toward positive intergroup relations, and motivate people to take responsibility for changing the world we live in.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Items of ATRS in English and Hungarian in Study 1 and 2

Source	English	Hungarian
	Blatant Stereotyping	
Dunbar & Simonova, 2003	Roma people tend to make more criminal acts than other people.	A romák több bűncselekményt követnek el, mint más emberek.
Dunbar & Simonova, 2003	There are very little proper or reasonable Roma people.	Nagyon kevés a rendes vagy értelmes roma ember.
Dunbar & Simonova, 2003	Roma people do not have a positive relationship to work, they are lazy.	A romáknak nem jó a munkához való viszonya, lusták.
Enyedi, Fábián, & Sik, 2004	The growing Roma population threatens the security of society.	A roma lakosság számának növekedése veszélyezteti a társadalom biztonságát.
Dunbar & Simonova, 2003	Roma people usually have a lot of children, for which they do not give enough care.	A romáknak általában sok gyerekük van, akiknek nem adják meg a megfelelő törődést.
Enyedi et al., 2004	It is only right that there are still clubs where Roma people are not allowed to enter.	Csak helyeselni lehet, hogy még vannak olyan szórakozóhelyek, ahová a romákat nem engedik be.
	Undeserved benefits	
own item	The real damage is caused by organizations that offer an undeserved advantage to Roma people.	A valós kárt azok a szervezetek okozzák, akik jogosulatlan előnyhöz próbálják juttatni a roma embereket.
Pedersen, Beven, Walker, & Griffith, 2004	Roma people get given more government money than they should be given.	A romák több segítséget kapnak a kormánytól, mint amennyit kellene.
Dunbar & Simonova, 2003	I think that Roma people in this country are given preferential treatment in certain aspects.	Úgy gondolom ebben az országban a romák bizonyos szempontból kedvezőbb bánásmódban részesülnek.
Pedersen et al., 2004	Roma people are very vocal and loud about their rights.	A romák nagyon világosan és hangosan kifejezik a jogaikra vonatkozó igényeiket.
Pedersen et al., 2004	The only racial discrimination in Hungary these days is in favor of Roma people.	Az egyetlen etnikai megkülönböztetés ma Magyarországon, az a romák kedvező megkülönböztetése.

	Cultural difference	
own item	The love of freedom is much stronger among Roma people than among non-Roma Hungarians.	A szabadság szeretete sokkal erősebb a roma emberek körében, mint a nem roma magyaroknál.
own item	Music and dancing is something Roma children already learn in the womb.	A roma gyerekek a zenét és a táncot az anyatejjel szívják magukba.
own item	The musical talent of Roma people is superior to that of non-Roma Hungarians.	A romák zenei érzéke felülmúlja a nem roma magyarok zenei érzékét.
own item	We can only envy Roma people's freedom	A romák szabadságát csak irigyelni lehet.
Enyedi et al., 2004	There is more respect for traditional family values among Roma people than among non-Roma people.	A romák között a hagyományos családi értékek tisztelete erősebb, mint a nem cigányok között.

Appendix B

Acculturation preferences (Zagefka and Brown, 2002)

Preference for contact

I think it is important that Roma people have [nationality] friends.

 I think it is important that [nationality] spend time with Roma people.

Preference for culture maintenance

I do not mind if Roma people maintain their own culture'

I do not mind if Roma people maintain their own religion, language and clothing.

I do not mind if Roma people maintain their own way of living.

Appendix C

Items of the questionnaire used in Study 4 and 5

National and European attachment (Roccas et al., 2006)

1. Being Hungarian/European is an important part of my identity.

2. It is important to me to view myself as Hungarian/European.

3. It is important to me that others see me as a Hungarian/European.

4. When I talk about Hungarians/Europeans, I usually say "we" rather than "they ".

National and European glorification (Roccas et al., 2006)

5. Other communities can learn a lot from us Hungarians/Europeans.

6. Compared to other communities, Hungarians/Europeans are particularly good.

7. Relative to other communities, we Hungarians/Europeans are a very moral community.

8. Hungarians/Europeans are better than other groups in all respects.

 Anti-Muslim attitudes (Lee et al. 2013)

1. I would support any policy that would stop the building of new mosques (Muslim place of worship) in Hungary.

2. If possible, I would avoid going to places where Muslims would be (removed from analysis).

3. I would become extremely uncomfortable speaking with a Muslim.

4. Just to be safe, it is important to stay away from places where Muslims could be.

5. I dread the thought of having a professor that is Muslim.

6. If I could, I would avoid contact with Muslims.

7. If I could, I would live in a place where there were no Muslims.

8. Muslims should not be allowed to work in places where many Hungarians gather such as airports.

Anti-immigrant attitudes (Harell et al., 2013)

1. Immigration is good for Hungary's economy (reversed scored).

2. Too many recent immigrants just don't want to fit into Hungarian society.

3. Immigrants take jobs away from other Hungarians (removed from analysis).

4. Hungary's cultural life is enriched by immigrants to this country (reversed scored).